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1 
PART I
2 
3 
1 Introduction
Twenty years ago I spoke to the immigrants about 
the multicultural society on Christmas day. And of 
course the multicultural society is a revolution, it is 
inevitable. But because I’m a reformist I want this 
revolution to transpire gradually.1
Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme in Dagens Nyheter, 16 
October 1985.
If the multicultural society is a revolution, as asserted by 
Olof Palme, the iconic Swedish Social Democratic Party 
leader and then Prime Minister, it is a revolution that has 
spawned numerous counter-revolutionary movements in 
Europe’s ethno-culturally diverse countries over recent 
decades. One of the most significant shifts in European 
politics of the 2000s is the rise of an ideologically assorted 
collection of populist radical right-wing parties. A common 
denominator of these parties is a critical or blatantly hostile 
stance on multiculturalism, both as a social fact and a 
political idea. Right-wing populists often conceptualize 
multiculturalism as ‘anti-nationalism’ or ‘anti-Westernism’ 
that espouses open borders, subverts ‘truths’ and is employed 
1 ”För 20 år sedan talade jag på juldagen till invandrarna om det 
mångkulturella samhället. Och naturligtvis är det mångkulturella 
samhället en revolution, den är oundviklig. Men eftersom jag är 
reformist, vill jag att denna revolution skall ske gradvis.” This and 
subsequent translations from Swedish are mine. See study II, ‘The 
difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden 
in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’, in this thesis 
for more on Palme’s multiculturalist Christmas day speech in 1965. 
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as an ideological tool with which to suppress dissidents.2 As 
a consequence of the rise of radical right-wing populists, 
political debates and academic discussions on the present and 
future multiculturalism in Europe have intensified: what is 
the problem? Is there a problem? How can the problem be 
resolved?3 Even if the past is employed as a point of reference 
in these debates and discussions, little attention has been paid 
to the history of multiculturalism, especially as a political 
idea. 
The studies in this compilation thesis conceptually, 
comparatively, transnationally, and biographically examine 
the origins and early post-war history of the idea of 
multiculturalism and also the interplay between idea and 
politics in the shift from a public ideal of homogeneity to 
a public ideal of multiculturalism in Sweden. The thesis is 
divided into two parts. Part I comprises the introductory and 
summarizing chapters of the thesis. Part II comprises the four 
studies of the thesis: ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: 
The Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of 
Integration’ (study I); ‘The difference white ethnics made: The 
multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of 
Canada and Denmark’ (study II); ‘Making the Case for the 
Mother Tongue: Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New 
Policy Discourse on Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden 
in the 1960s and 1970s’ (study III); and ‘Huvudsekreteraren 
och mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års 
invandrar- och minoritetspolitik’ (study IV). 
2 Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2007), pp. 144–145.
3 See e.g. Alessandro Silj, ed., European Multiculturalism Revisited 
(London: Zed Books 2010); Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka, eds., 
Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution 
in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006); 
Alana Lentin & Gavan Titley, The Crises of Multiculturalism. Racism in a 
Neoliberal Age, (Zed Books: London 2011). 
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Analytically, the use of the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
and corresponding terms in Swedish (mångkulturalism 
or multikulturalism) and other languages can be divided 
into descriptive and normative usage. The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives the following definition:  
The characteristics of a multicultural society ; 
[also] the policy or process whereby the distinctive 
identities of the cultural groups within such a society 
are maintained or supported.4
The  term ‘mult ic u ltura l i sm’  and i t s  adjec t ive  ( i . e . 
multicultural) can thus be employed in different and 
overlapping ways. Sociologists Michel Wieviorka and Östen 
Wahlbeck have analytically identified three distinct usages 
of ‘multiculturalism’: it can refer to the existence of ethno-
culturally diverse segments in the population of a society or 
state (e.g. multiculturalism in Finland); it can also denote 
particular types of programme and policy that take ethno-
cultural diversity into consideration (e.g. multiculturalist 
education); it can also refer to general political or normative 
aims concerning how an ethno-culturally diverse society 
ought to be organized and managed (e.g. multiculturalism 
is the answer).5 The opacity of ‘multiculturalism’ and the 
contested nature of the interrelated referents of the term 
sometimes make it difficult to pinpoint its precise meaning 
when it  is  employed in public debates and academic 
discussions. Multiculturalism can, as sociologist Thomas Faist 
emphasized, “mean many different things – a demographic 
4 OED Online, September 2013, Oxford University Press, http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/234921 (accessed 11 November, 2013).
5 Michel Wieviorka, ‘Is multiculturalism the solution?’ Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 21 (1998), pp. 881–910; Östen Walhbeck, Mångkulturalism i 
Finland: en kritisk litteraturöversikt (Åbo: Åbo Akademi 2003). 
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description, an ideology, a set of policies or a political 
theory of modern society”, although Faist points out that it 
still carries a distinctive conceptual core in its “normatively 
oriented intellectual lineage” – the overcoming of ethno-
cultural inequalities and the creation of social cohesion 
through the “recognition of cultural traditions, language and 
religion” of minority groups.6 
For my dissertation project, I have studied the political 
and normative side of multiculturalism historically, from 
the beginning of the “normatively oriented intellectual 
lineage” of multiculturalism. For the purposes of my work, 
I have defined multiculturalism as a political idea on how 
an ethno-culturally diverse liberal democratic polity ought 
to accommodate and manage its diversity. The political idea 
of multiculturalism includes the following core tenets: (i) 
ethno-cultural diversity should be publicly endorsed for the 
greater good of the whole of the polity, and (ii) ethno-cultural 
minority groups should be formally recognized as groups and 
protected from discrimination and assimilatory pressure (i.e. 
a form of discrimination) exerted by the majority population. 
The idea of multiculturalism is an inherently political idea 
that both normatively describes the polity by conceptualizing 
it  as comprising different ethno-cultural groups and 
prescribes solutions on how the polity should be politically 
and socially ordered on the basis of this description.7 
The idea of multiculturalism resembles earlier notions of 
6 Thomas Faist, ‘From Heterogenities to Social (In)equalities’ in Kivisto, 
Peter & Östen Wahlbeck, eds., Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic 
Welfare States, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 2013, pp. 24–25.
7 Here I  draw on Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism .  A Civic Idea 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 2007); Ali Rattansi, Multiculturalism: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011); Hans Ingvar 
Roth, Mångkulturalismens utmaningar (Lund: Studentlitteratur 2005); 
Amy Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994). 
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cultural pluralism that also valourised difference. However, 
whereas the early 20th century idea of cultural pluralism 
advanced by the Jewish-American philosopher Horace Kallen 
exalted diversity, it did not place the onus on democratic 
incorporation in a way similar to multiculturalism. The idea 
of multiculturalism is underpinned by the belief that respect 
for difference and support for its endurance will expand the 
scope of the societal “we” (i.e. demos, or the common people) 
and generate social cohesion in diversity.8  
Official multiculturalism 
Following the definition of the idea of multiculturalism 
above, we can speak of official multiculturalism or state-
sponsored multiculturalism when a polity introduces policies 
that affirm and endorse ethnic diversity, formally recognizes 
ethno-cultural minority groups living in the polity and 
supports the maintenance and development of the language 
and culture of these groups. Official multiculturalism was first 
introduced into Canada in 1971; Australia also introduced 
official multiculturalism in the 1970s, which is further 
discussed below. 
Sweden was the first European country where the idea 
of multiculturalism emerged in the political mainstream in 
the latter half of the 1960s and became public policy in the 
mid-1970s. On the 14th of May 1975, a unanimous Swedish 
parliament passed an act on a new immigrant and minority 
policy put forward by the social democratic government 
8 Peter Kivisto & Östen Wahlbeck, ‘Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States’, in Kivisto, Peter & Östen Wahlbeck, eds., 
Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States, (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 2013), pp. 2–3.
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lead by Olof Palme, that explicitly rejected the ideal of 
ethno-cultural homogeneity and the policy of assimilation. 
The three main principles of the new policy were equality, 
partnership and freedom of choice. The explicit policy 
aim of the freedom of choice principle was to create the 
opportunity for ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden 
to transgenerationally retain their own languages and 
cultures, a decidedly multiculturalist policy goal.9 From the 
mid-1970s, the goal of enabling the preservation of ethno-
cultural minorities and creating a positive attitude towards 
the new publically endorsed multicultural society among 
the majority population became incorporated into Swedish 
cultural, educational and media policies.10 The introduction 
of state-sponsored multiculturalism in 1975 constitutes the 
political crowning of Sweden’s multicultural moment: the 
revolutionary shift in the publicly affirmed ideals on ethno-
cultural diversity between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. 
9 Maritta Soininen, ‘The ‘Swedish model’ as an institutional framework 
for immigrant membership rights’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration 
Studies 25 (1999), pp. 687–689; Karin Borevi, ‘Understanding Swedish 
Multiculturalism’, Debating Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States, 
eds. Peter Kivisto & Östen Wahlbeck (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
2013), pp. 149–150.
10 Mahama Tawat, ‘Danish and Swedish immigrants’ cultural policies 
between 1960 and 2006: toleration and the celebration of difference’, 
International Journal of  Cultural Policy  20 (2014),  pp.  202–220; 
Erland Bergman, Fostran till tolerans? Etniska relationer i skolan: en 
rapport från Diskrimineringsutredningen  (Stockholm: LiberFörlag 
1983); Birgitta Löwander, Sveriges radio och invandrarpolitiken: en 
översikt över samhällets invandrarpolitik och etermediepolitik under 
tre avtalsperioder, åren 1967-1992 (Umeå: Umeå universitet 1998); 
Mats Wickström, ’Making Multiculturalism Work: Policy and Praxis 
on Moulding Attitudes and Public Discourse on Ethnic Diversity 
in  Post-war  Sweden’,  NORDEUROPAfor um  (2014) ,  pp.  11–32 . 
Available at edoc Humboldt-Universität: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/
nordeuropaforum/2014-/wickstroem-mats-11/PDF/wickstroem.pdf.
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Multiculturalism remains a publicly affirmed ideal in 
the country despite the rise and protestations of the, as 
of yet, politically isolated right-wing populist party, the 
Sweden Democrats. The emergence of the political idea of 
multiculturalism in Sweden and subsequent elevation of 
the idea to a public ideal and conceptual basis for the new 
multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy of 1975 is 
therefore of historical interest. The history of the idea and 
politics of multiculturalism might also be of relevance to 
contemporary debates on multiculturalism in Sweden and 
elsewhere. 
 
Multicultural transformations
The immigration waves during and after the Second World 
War changed the composition of the Swedish population in 
a historically unprecedented way. At the end of the 1980s, 
historian Harald Runblom and ethnologist Ingvar Svanberg 
declared that the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity of Sweden had never been greater.11 According to 
intellectual historian Svante Nordin, echoing Palme, the 
societal and intellectual changes brought on by post-war 
immigration into Sweden are revolutionary; not only has 
immigration changed the structure of the Swedish population, 
it has also changed the very idea of Sweden and Swedish 
culture. Nordin dates the beginning of the immigration-
induced intellectual revolution, which he contends was the 
result of the interplay between the social phenomenon of 
immigration and politicking legitimized by this phenomenon, 
11 Harald Runblom & Ingvar Svanberg, ’Det mångkulturella Sverige’, Det 
mångkulturella Sverige. En handbok om etniska grupper och minoriteter, 
eds. Ingvar Svanberg & Harald Runblom (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokförlag 
1989), p. 9. 
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to the 1960s. Nordin argues that the numerous new concepts 
relating to immigration, which have been introduced into 
Sweden from the 1960s onwards, mirrors the depth and scope 
of a major societal transformation that he suggests might 
have been the most salient of all the great cultural changes in 
20th century Sweden.12 
Nordin’s observation that post-war immigration has 
not only had a demographic and social impact on Sweden 
but also profound intellectual consequences is a pertinent 
historical and historiographical point. The modern era of 
immigration into Sweden that began at the end of the Second 
World War has, without doubt, transformed Sweden in many 
ways – socially, economically, culturally, intellectually and 
politically – and thus needs to be studied from different and 
overlapping historical perspectives. 
In particular, this thesis focuses on the beginning 
of Nordin’s “intellectual revolution”13 in general and on 
the early history of the idea of multiculturalism and the 
introduction of official multiculturalism (i.e. policies based 
on the idea of multiculturalism), a juncture in the intellectual 
and political history of Sweden that I have chosen to term 
Sweden’s ‘multicultural moment’. I have chosen to employ 
the term ‘moment’ because I consider the radical changes, 
beginning with the f irst sustained public crit ique of 
assimilationism in 1964 and ending with the introduction 
of official multiculturalism in 1975, in political discourse 
and public policy to be a pivotal period, a turning point, in 
the modern and contemporary history of Sweden. The term 
‘multicultural’ is here employed in the normative, political 
sense of the word; that is, it analytically denotes that the 
12 Svante Nordin, ’En intellektuell revolution’, in Bortom multikulti, 
eds. Kurt Almqvist & Lotta Gröning, (Stockholm: Axel och Margaret 
Ax:son Johnsons stiftelse för allmännyttiga ändamål 2012), pp. 11–19. 
13 “Intellektuell revolution”, Nordin, p. 12, 
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historical development examined for this dissertation project 
was a profound change at the levels of ideas and politics. Thus 
defined, a polity can become increasingly multicultural in a 
descriptive sense without the occurrence of a ‘multicultural 
moment’: the introduction and establishment of the idea of 
multiculturalism in political discourse and the subsequent 
elevation of this idea to a public ideal. 
Post-war Sweden was, despite the influx of war-time 
refugees and labour immigrants, still relatively culturally 
homogenous in the mid-1960s, when 96 percent of the 
population still belonged to the Lutheran state church and 
the only non-Christian communion was that of the Jewish 
community.14 More importantly, the ostensible homogeneity 
of Sweden was upheld as the ideal societal condition or, 
in the words of historian Rune Johansson, “[t]he folkhem 
[people’s home] was distinctly a home for ethnic Swedes, and 
in some contexts was only for the representative members of 
the tribe.”15 The notion that the good society rested upon the 
homogeneity of the Swedish population can be exemplified 
with the following statement made by Sweden’s long-term 
(1946–1969) social democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander, 
Palme’s predecessor, in parliament on the 28th March 
1965: 
We Swedes live in an infinitely more happy condition 
[in comparison to the Americans]. The population of 
our country is homogenous, not only in regards to 
race but also in many other aspects.16
14 David Thurfjell, ’Världens mest sekulariserade land?’ Sveriges historia 
1965–2012, Kjell Östberg & Jenny Andersson (Stockholm: Nordstedt 
2013), p. 156. 
15 Rune Johansson, ’The Construction of Swedishness’, The Swedish 
Success Story? eds. Kurt Almqvist & Kay Glans (Stockholm: Axel and 
Margareta Ax:son Johnson Foundation 2004), p. 118. 
16 ”Vi svenskar lever ju i en så oändligt mycket lyckligare lottad situation. 
Vårt lands befolkning är homogen, inte bara i fråga om rasen utan också i 
12 
The ideal of racial and cultural homogeneity, which was 
regarded as an important condition for the realization of 
the social democratic peoples’ home had, since the inter-
war period, also underpinned Swedish policy on domestic 
minorities and immigrant settlement. The inhabitants of 
the land that were not ‘Swedish’ (with the exception of the 
reindeer herding Sámi, who were to be ‘protected’ from 
the dangers of civilized life17), namely Finnish speaking 
Tornedalians, the Roma, war-time refugees and more recently 
arrived labour immigrants, should become Swedish, that 
is, be assimilated into the Swedish majority. ‘Non-Swedes’ 
were, without doubt, officially tolerated in the early post-
war period, although the expectation was that the collective 
basis of their ethno-cultural distinctiveness would not be 
generationally reproduced.18 
At the beginning of 1965, Sweden was a much more 
ethno-culturally diverse society than it had been at any 
point since the loss of Finland in 1809. However, as Nordin 
points out, it was not immigration per se that brought on 
the intellectual and political changes that were connected 
många andra avseenden.” Riksdagens protokoll 1965, första kammaren nr. 
13, 23.3.1965–24.3.1965, p. 60. 
17 Patrik Lantto & Ulf Mörkenstam, ‘Sami Rights and Sami Challenges. 
The modernization process and the Swedish Sami movement, 1886–2006’, 
Scandinavian Journal of History 33 (2008), pp. 26–51. 
18 Norma Montesino Parra, Zigenarfrågan. Intervention och romantik 
(Lund:  Lunds  univers ite t  2002) ;  Leena Huss  & Erl ing  Wande, 
’Emancipation i vardande? Drag i tornedalingarnas och sverigefinnarnas 
språkpolitiska utveckling’, Svenskt i Finland - finskt i Sverige 2. Mellan 
majoriteter och minoriteter, eds. Marianne Junila & Charles Westin 
(Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 2006), pp. 229–267; 
Anders Svensson, Ungrare i folkhemmet. Svensk flyktingpolitik i det kalla 
krigets skugga (Lund: Lund University Press 1992); Jesper Johansson, 
”Så gör vi inte här i Sverige. Vi brukar göra så här.” Retorik och praktik 
i LO:s invandrarpolitik 1945-1981 (Växjö: Växjö University Press 2008). 
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to the phenomenon. Many European countries became 
multicultural (or more multicultural) in a descriptive sense 
as a consequence of post-war labour immigration without 
experiencing a multicultural moment or even acknowledging 
that the country had in fact become a country of immigration, 
as in the case of Germany.19 During Tage Erlander’s tenure as 
prime minister from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1960s, 
the folkhem had de facto become home to many substantial 
groups of non-Swedish peoples (e.g. Finns, Estonians, 
Latvians and Hungarians). Nevertheless, this demographic 
change did not lead to a change in the political thoughts 
of Erlander or those who shared his ideal of homogeneity. 
The political idea of multiculturalism, the recognition and 
affirmation of ethno-cultural group differences in the public 
sphere, the re-conceptualization of the people’s home to the 
home of peoples, was a far-fetched if not inconceivable notion 
for many Swedes in the mid-1960s.20 Ten years later, the ideal 
of ethno-cultural homogeneity and the Swedification of all 
non-Swedes was undoubtedly a conceivable notion, although 
it contradicted official policy. 
From a historical perspective, the multicultural moment 
in Sweden is certainly conspicuous and is also distinct 
from a comparative perspective. Sweden is the odd one 
19 Christian Joppke, Immigration and the Nation-state: The United States, 
Germany, and Great Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), p. 62. 
Also see chapter 2.
20 In 1968, the Commission on Immigration, which in the same year had 
been set up to investigate and put forward proposals on the facilitation 
of immigrant adjustment in Sweden (see study I), conducted the first 
large-scale interview survey on Swedish opinion on immigration and immigrant settlement. This survey indicated that the majority of the respondents favoured the Swedification of immigrants and their children over a more multiculturalist approach. Arne Trankell, ‘Svenskarnas fördomar mot invandrare’, SOU 1974:70, 
Invandrarutredningen 4. Bilagedel (Stockholm 1974), pp. 121–212. 
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out in the three countries that standard reference works, 
such as The Age of Migration, lists as the early adopters of 
official multiculturalism in the 1970s: Canada, Australia and 
Sweden.21 The history of the emergence of Canadian and 
Australian multiculturalism has constituted an important 
point of reference for this dissertation project, as will be 
shown later. I will therefore next outline the history of the 
introduction of official multiculturalism in Canada and 
Australia.
Canadian and Australian multiculturalism
Canada became the first country in the world to introduce 
state-sponsored multiculturalism in 1971 when the country 
adopted it as an official policy, “multiculturalism within 
a bilingual framework”. Similar to the other major British 
settler societies of immigration (i.e. the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand), Canada actively pursued the 
assimilation of immigrants and the ideal of a common 
national culture and language until the Second World War. 
Ethno-cultural groups that, for intertwined cultural and 
racial reasons, were deemed not to be assimilationable were 
not allowed to immigrate into Canada. In the post-war 
period, Canada’s racially charged immigration policy was 
gradually dismantled and assimilationism gave way to a more 
pluralist perception of what it meant to be Canadian.22 It was, 
however, the social and political upheavals triggered by the 
so-called Quiet Revolution in the French-speaking province 
of Québec that provided the impetus to introduce official 
21 Castles & Miller, p. 15. 
22 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International 
Politics of Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009), pp. 71–72. 
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multiculturalism in Canada.23   
At the beginning of the 1960s, an independence movement 
emerged in Québec that posed a severe challenge to the 
cohesion of the Canadian state. One of the most significant 
responses to the national crisis by the Canadian government 
was the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism 
and Biculturalism (i.e. the B&B Commission) in 1963. The 
primary mandate of the commission was
 to inquire into and report upon the existing state 
of bilingualism in Canada and to recommend what 
steps should be taken to develop the Canadian 
Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership 
between the two founding races, taking into account 
the contribution made by other ethnic groups to the 
cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that 
should be taken to safeguard that contribution  
[---].24 
The goal of the B&B Commission was clear: national unity. 
Both Francophone and Anglophone Canadians, “the two 
founding races”, should consider the national institutions 
and the Canadian state as their own.25 The Quebec nationalist 
movement and the creation of the B&B Commission also 
brought a heightened salience to the question concerning the 
position of the other ethno-cultural groups in Canada. Many 
23 Michel Temelini, ‘Multicultural Rights, Multicultural Virtues: A 
History of Multiculturalism in Canada’, Multiculturalism and the Canadian 
Constitution, ed. Stephen Tierney (UBC Press: Vancouver 2007), pp. 45–46. 
24 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV: The 
Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada 1969), p. 235. 
25 Raymond Breton, ‘Multiculturalism and Canadian Nation-Building’, 
The Politics of Gender, Ethnicity and Language in Canada, eds. Alan Cairns 
& Cynthia Williams (Toronto: Toronto University Press 1986), p. 39.
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of the non-English or non-French-speaking groups were not 
content with the B&B Commission’s focus on bilingualism 
and biculturalism. The group that most actively voiced its 
disapproval was the Ukrainian-Canadian community.26 
Historical research on the introduction of off icial 
multiculturalism in Canada has shown that the activism and 
lobbying of the non-English- or non-French-speaking groups, 
primarily Ukrainian-Canadians, was a crucial element in 
the establishment of a federal policy of multiculturalism.27 
In a recent publication, historian Aya Fuijiwara sums 
up  t he  c u r re nt  s t ate  of  k now l e d ge  on  Uk r ai n i an -
Canadian involvement in the establishment of Canadian 
multiculturalism as follows: 
The multiculturalism movement,  as a form of 
resistance to bilingualism and biculturalism, thus 
began under the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists.  
Having representatives in the Senate and on the B&B 
Commission who were motivated by cultural and 
linguistic survival as well as pride as nation builders  
equipped them for this leadership.28 
26 Julia Lalande, ‘The Roots of Multiculturalism – Ukrainian-Canadian 
Involvement in the Multiculturalism Discussion of the 1960s as an 
Example of the Position of the “Third Force”’, Canadian Ethnic Studies 
38 (2006), pp. 47–64; Varun Uberoi, ‘Multiculturalism and the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, Political Studies 57 (2009), p. 808; Breton, 
p. 45. 
27 See ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of 
Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’, study II 
in this thesis. Also see Eve Haque, Multiculturalism Within a Bilingual 
Framework: Language, Race, and Belonging in Canada, (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press 2012); Aya Fujiwara, Ethnic Elites and Canadian identity: 
Japanese, Ukrainians, and Scots, 1919-1971, (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press 2012); Temelini, pp. 48–55. 
28 Fujiwara, p. 173.
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Following the recommendations of the final report of the 
B&B Commission, “The Cultural Contribution of the Other 
Ethnic Groups”, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau 
introduced the Canadian policy of multiculturalism in the 
House of Commons on the 8th October 1971:   
The policy of multiculturalism I am announcing 
today accepts the contention of the other cultural 
communities [those not of British or French origin] 
that they, too, are essential elements in Canada and 
deserve government assistance in order to contribute 
to regional and national life that derive from their 
heritage yet are distinctively Canadian.29 
The introduction of the new policy formalized the post-war 
Canadian turn from a policy of assimilationism. At the same 
time, a similar turn was underway in another British settler 
society, Australia. 
Australian research on the emergence of the political idea 
of multiculturalism in the late 1960s and the subsequent 
introduction of state-sponsored multiculturalism in the 
mid-1970s has also emphasized the role of ethnic activism 
in Australia’s turn to multiculturalism.30 The German-
Jewish refugee Walter Lippmann, President of the Australian 
Jewish Welfare Society was, for example, one of the leading 
29 Quoted in Haque, p. 227. 
30  James  Jupp,  ‘Pol i t ics ,  Publ ic  Pol ic y  and Mult icu ltura l i sm’, 
Multiculturalism and Integration. A Harmonious Relationship, eds. Michael 
Clyne & James Jupp (Canberra: ANU Press 2011), p. 48; Bronwyn Hinz, 
‘Ethnic Associations, Networks and the Construction of Australian 
Multiculturalism’, refereed paper presented at the Canadian Political 
Science Association Annual Conference, Montreal June 3, 2010. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1621356. 
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activists in the promulgation of the idea of multiculturalism 
in Australia.31 However, in comparison to the Canadian 
turn, whereby organized ethno-cultural minorities and 
their representatives played a pivotal role in the emergence 
of multiculturalism, Australian scholars, in particular Mark 
Lopez in his seminal work The Origins of Multiculturalism 
in Australian Politics 1945–1975, have identified a relatively 
small group of public officials and politically active academics 
as the prime movers in the establishment of multiculturalism 
as a political idea and public policy in Australia.32 According 
to Lopez: 
The ideology of multiculturalism was developed 
between 1966 and 1975 by a small  number of 
academics, social workers and activists initially 
located on the political arena of migrant settlement 
and welfare [---] The definers of multiculturalism 
were also the principal actors in the struggle to 
advance their beliefs and make them government 
policy.33 
31 Geoffrey Brahm Levey, ’Jews and Australian Multiculturalism’ in Jews 
and Australian Politics, eds. Geoffrey Brahm Levey & Philip Mendes 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press 2008, p. 185; Andrew Markus, 
‘Multiculturalism and the Jews’, in New Under the Sun: Jewish Australians 
on Religion, Politics & Culture, eds. Michael Fagenblat, Melanie Landau & 
Nathan Wolski (Melbourne: Black Inc. 2006), pp. 93–95. 
32  Mark Lopez,  The Or ig ins  of  Multiculturali sm in  Australian 
Politics 1945–1975, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press 2000). 
Also see Brian Galligan & Winsome Roberts,  ‘Multiculturalism, 
National Identity, and Pluralist Democracy: The Australian Variant’ 
in Political  Theory & Australian Multiculturalism ,  ed.  Geoffrey 
Brahm Levey (New York:  B erghahn B ooks 2008),  pp.  209–224. 
33 Mark Lopez, ’ The politics of the origins of multiculturalism: 
lobbying and the power of influence’, People and Place 8 (2000), p. 22. 
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Lopez furthermore shows that “many of the principal 
multiculturalists were Anglo-Australians” and argues 
that during the “decisive events of the early 1970s the 
overwhelming majority of ethnic groups and their leaders 
played no direct role in the progress of multiculturalism”.34 
Multiculturalism was thus engendered differently in 
Canada and Australia. In Canada the ethnic groups and 
their leaders played a direct role in the advancement of 
multiculturalism from its development as a political idea to 
the introduction of official multiculturalism. Comparative 
historian Jatinder Mann has also pointed out that there was 
no “French-Canadian factor” or “other long-established 
ethnic groups such as  the Ukrainian-Canadians” in 
Australia.35 According to Mann, this “makes the adoption 
of a policy of multiculturalism in Australia even more 
noteworthy”.36 Australian multiculturalism, in comparison 
to that in Canadian, was to a greater extent the product of 
behind-the-scenes activism and lobbying at an interpersonal 
level. 
That the settler state of Canada, which harboured two 
major nationalities (i.e. Anglophones and Francophones, 
the so-cal led founding peoples of  Canada) and also 
numerous indigenous peoples and large and established 
immigrant minorities, would become the birthplace of 
official multiculturalism, and that Canada would be followed 
by Australia, its fellow British settler state and a country of 
immigration, does not, in hindsight, appear particularly 
odd, at least in comparison with Sweden, the first European 
country that introduced state-sponsored multiculturalism in 
the 1970s. 
34 Ibid, p. 23.
35 Jatinder Mann, ‘The introduction of multiculturalism in Canada 
and Australia, 1960s–1970s’, Nations and Nationalism 18 (2012), p. 498.
36 Ibid., p. 499.
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1.1 Research questions and scope of the thesis 
The fol lowing research quest ions  have  guided this 
dissertation project from its inception: when, how and why 
did the political idea of multiculturalism emerge and become 
established in Swedish political discourse? When, how and 
why did the idea of multiculturalism become established 
in the emerging field of immigrant research and policy in 
Sweden? In what way does the history of the idea and politics 
of multiculturalism in Sweden differ from or resemble 
developments in other Western European countries and also 
in Canada and Australia, the other two early adopters of 
official multiculturalism?
Spatially, the thesis primarily focuses on the nation-state 
of Sweden. The spatial scope of the thesis, however, extends 
beyond intellectual and political life in Sweden to include 
Sweden’s Nordic neighbours, particularly Finland and 
Denmark, and the migrational context of post-war Western 
Europe and similar historical developments in Canada and 
Australia. Diachronically, the thesis mainly focuses on the 
1960s and 1970s, in particular the years between 1964 and 
1975, although the diachronic scope of the thesis also covers 
the early post-war decades of the 1940s and 1950s and also 
takes into account developments following the political 
breakthrough of multiculturalism in the mid-1970s.  
The idea of multiculturalism could have been introduced 
into Sweden without official affirmation, in which case 
there would not have been a Swedish multicultural moment 
as defined in this thesis; that is, the rooting of the idea 
of multiculturalism in political discourse and also in the 
ethnic politics of Sweden. The inception of multiculturalism 
into Swedish political discourse might have merely offered 
an alternative way in which ethno-cultural difference 
was addressed in public. For a few years around 1970, 
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this certainly seemed to be a possible outcome from a 
contemporary perspective. If that had been the outcome, the 
history of the introduction of the idea of multiculturalism 
would now perhaps be written as the history of a curious 
phenomenon in Swedish intellectual history with little or no 
political and cultural impact. As such, the word ‘moment’, 
usually reserved for more profound intellectual and political 
shifts, would hardly be apposite as a descriptive term. 
When, how and why the political idea of multiculturalism 
found a (seemingly) thriving home in post-war Sweden, 
an old homogenous nation-state with a long history of 
homogenising nationalism and a short history of large-
scale immigration, are questions that have puzzled me since 
I took an interest in the public debates on migration and 
multiculturalism that, as I perceived it, grew in intensity from 
around the mid-2000s in Finland and internationally. Over 
the last decade, the idea of multiculturalism has been fiercely 
criticized in the public mainstream and many countries that 
espoused multiculturalism as a public ideal have now rejected 
it, with Sweden as the notable European exception.37 
The multicultural moment in Sweden represents a 
conceptual and political shift of scholarly importance across 
disciplinal lines, as also testified by previous research on the 
topic.38 In addition to being of general academic interest, 
Sweden’s multicultural moment also carries transnational 
significance due to Sweden’s status as a role model for the 
other Nordic countries, especially Norway and Finland. 
According to Norwegian social scientists Brochmann & 
Djuve, “the credo [of Norwegian integration ideology] that 
37 Steven Vertovec & Susanne Wessendorf, ‘Introduction: assessing 
the backlash against multiculturalism in Europe’, The Multiculturalism 
Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and Practices ,  eds. Steven 
Vertovec & Susanne Wessendorf (London: Routledge 2010), pp. 1–31. 
38 See chapter 4.
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minorities and immigrants should be able to choose to 
sustain their own culture while having equal access to the 
goods of the majority society” was imported from Sweden 
in the 1970s.39 The development of a Finnish policy of 
multiculturalism in the 1990s was also influenced by the 
Swedish example.40 
Even though integration policies and public discourse on 
multiculturalism have undergone many shifts in Sweden, the 
officially declared public ideal on ethno-cultural diversity as 
a societal good, established by the multicultural moment, is 
still upheld.41 The multicultural moment was undoubtedly 
only one of the major historical changes that occurred 
within the frame of the expanding welfare state of post-war 
Sweden. However, in comparison to other ‘moments’ of the 
1960s and 1970s, for example, ‘the feminist moment’, ‘the 
39 Grete Brochmann & Anne Britt  Djuve,  ‘Mult icultural ism or 
Assimilation? The Norwegian Welfare State Approcah’,  Debating 
Multiculturalism in the Nordic Welfare States, eds. Peter Kivisto & 
Östen Wahlbeck (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), p. 223. 
40 In the 1970s, Finnish Roma policy moved in a multiculturalist direction 
partly because of the multicultural moment in Sweden. See Panu Pulma, 
Suljetut ovet. Pohjoismaiden romanipolitiikka 1500-luvulta EU-aikaan, 
(Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2006). Sweden and Swedish 
policies were also points of reference in the early 1990s when official 
Finnish multiculturalism was being developed, see e.g. Monikulttuuriseen 
Suomeen. Syrjintää selvittävän työryhmän muistio, Oikeusministeriön 
lainvalmisteluosaston julkaisu 4/1990 (Helsinki: VAPK- kustannus 1990). 
41 E.g. the former social democratic government declared the year 2006 
to be The Year of Multiculturalism (Mångkulturåret) and the current 
centre-right government, in office since 2006, has consistently maintained 
that increasing ethno-cultural diversity is good for Swedish society. 
According to political scientist Anders Johansson Heinö, a “diversity 
discourse” (mångfaldsdiskurs) is well established in Sweden and mångfald 
(diversity) is one of the most positively charged words in the Swedish 
language today. Andreas Johansson Heinö, Gillar vi olika? Hur den svenska 
likhetsnormen hindrar integration (Stockholm: Timbro 2012), p. 27. 
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anti-authoritarian moment of 68’ and the ‘sexual revolution’, 
which were more or less transnational phenomena in the 
West, the multicultural moment was not a widely shared 
historical juncture. As will be shown in the following chapter, 
“A new diversity: post-war Europe and labour migration”, the 
multicultural moment in Sweden was a European exception. 
The uniqueness of Sweden’s multicultural moment in 
the European context and its apparent significance for later 
developments in migration and integration policy, even 
national identity, in Sweden and elsewhere, has become 
even more noticeable in the wake of the ‘anti-multicultural 
moment’, in the throes of which Western Europe seems to be 
at the time of writing (i.e. 2014). 
The following chapter of part I (Chapter 2) situates the 
Swedish multicultural moment in a European, Nordic and 
historical context. Chapter 3 presents the extant research 
on the history of multiculturalism in Sweden. Chapter 
4 is devoted to a discussion on the theory and methods 
employed in the dissertation project. Chapter 5 presents 
and discusses the sources of the project and chapter 6 gives 
the summaries of the four studies that, together with the 
introductory and summarizing chapters of part I, comprise 
the compilation thesis. Chapter 7 presents the results of the 
dissertation project and draws final conclusions of the thesis. 
Subsequently, the individual four studies are presented in part 
II. 
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2 A new diversity: post-war Europe and  
 labour migration
From the end of the Second World War to the oil crisis of 
1973–1974, massive capital investment and expansion of 
production in Western Europe brought large numbers of 
migrant workers from the less developed European periphery 
and former and present European colonies to the expanding 
industrial regions of Western Europe. From the end of the 
1940s, the Western European economy, especially that of 
Western Germany, began to recover from the devastation of 
total war and when economic growth ensued, it escalated. 
From the early 1950s, the Western European demand for 
cheap labour could no longer be satisfied by domestic labour 
forces and an era of mass migrations to the prosperous 
regions of Europe ensued.42 
In the mid-1950s,  the government of  the Federal 
Republic of Germany began to recruit foreign workers. 
The first recruitment offices of the Federal Labour Office 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) were established in Southern 
European countries. The recruitment process, social security 
and working conditions were regulated through bilateral 
agreements between the German government and the 
migrants’ countries of departure.43 The first agreement was 
made between Germany and Italy in 1955. In 1960, German 
entered into agreements with Spain and Greece, which were 
soon followed by agreements with Turkey (1961), Morocco 
(1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and, finally, with 
42 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (Vintage 2010), pp. 
333–337.
43 Stephen Castles & Mark J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International 
Population Movements in the Modern World 4th Edition  (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2009), p. 100.
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Yugoslavia in 1968.44 
German immigration policy was conceptualized and 
treated foreign workers as guest workers (Gastarbeider), not 
as immigrants that would settle in the country. The foreign 
workers were, as migration scholars Stephen Castles and 
Mark J. Miller have pointed out, perceived as “temporary 
labour units”. Guest workers were recruited, employed and 
removed according to the requirements of their German 
employers. Labour and residency permits were only granted 
for limited time periods, with labour permits usually being 
restricted to particular jobs or segments of the labour market 
to facilitate rotation of the workers.45 In addition to Germany, 
other continental European countries that received labour 
immigration through recruitment, such as Switzerland, 
Austria, and the Netherlands, also regarded foreign workers 
as “guests” and treated them as such; that is, foreign workers’ 
political and social rights were limited.46 This also meant that 
44 Randall Hansen, ‘Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its 
Lessons’, The Political Quarterly 74 (2003), p. 25. 
45 Castles & Miller, p. 100.
46 Gianni D’Amato, ‘Migration and Integration Policies in Switzerland’, 
Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts 
in Past and Present, eds. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Penninx & Maren 
Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), pp. 108-127; 
Stefanie Mayer, ‘Migration and Labor Markets. Political Discourse in 
Austria’, Debating Migration: Political Discourses on Labor Immigration 
in Historical Perspective, eds. Stefanie Mayer & Mikael Spång, Mikael 
(Innsbruck: StudienVerlag 2009), pp. 25–73; María Bruquetas-Callejo, 
Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Rinus Penninx and Peter Scholten, ‘The case 
of the Netherlands’, Migration Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of 
Actors and Contexts in Past and Present, eds. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus 
Pennix & Maren Borkert (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), 
pp. 129–163. Denmark also perceived its labour immigrants to be guest 
workers. However, although this perception of immigrants framed and 
structured public discourse and policy on immigration, the immigrants 
were not excluded from the Danish welfare state’s social rights; see 
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no policies on immigrant settlement (i.e. integration), be 
they assimilationist or multiculturalist, were introduced in 
countries ‘hosting’ guest workers. 
Despite the aim of preventing immigration, that is, the 
act of entering and settling in a country, Western European 
countries that upheld guest worker regimes still had to face 
the social challenges of de facto immigration. At the end of 
the 1960s, the restrictions on settlement and family reunion 
were loosened and could also be circumvented by the foreign 
workers. This meant that countries receiving guest workers 
were forced to confront the reality of guest workers’ children, 
who might be born in their parents’ country of residency 
but still lacked citizenship of that country, entering the 
educational system, which resulted in the introduction of 
bilingual education in recipient countries. The introduction 
of bilingual and bicultural education was, however, not 
motivated by the political aim of recognizing and supporting 
the emergence of new ethno-cultural minorities of immigrant 
origin and modern multicultural societies, but by the 
overarching migration policy goal of encouraging ‘non-native’ 
ethno-cultural groups to leave. Symptomatically, the 1977 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers 
did not seek to promote the introduction of multiculturalist 
policies. Article 15 of the convention recommends the 
introduction of mother tongue teaching in migrant workers’ 
languages to facilitate their return to their state of origin.47 
In Germany, inclusion of guest workers’ children within 
the German educational system, while simultaneously 
preparing them for return to their ‘home’ countries, was 
termed Ausländerpädagogik ,  or “foreigner pedagogy”. 
Ausländerpädagogik became the leading principle in the 
‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden 
in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’ in this thesis. 
47 Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys, p. 176, note 2. 
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education of guest workers’ children in Germany from the 
end of the 1960s.48 When the official guest worker policy was 
ended due to the cessation of immigration into Germany in 
1973, it was replaced by a policy that promoted voluntary 
repatriation.49 The nationalist immigration policy and 
Germany’s segregationist Ausländerpädagogik undoubtedly 
recognized the difference between German nationals and 
‘non-Germans’, but it did so to preserve the ethno-cultural 
integrity of the German nation, not to promote the inclusion 
of new ethno-cultural groups into German society. The 
demographical fact that Germany’s ethno-cultural mix 
had changed as a result of employing guest workers was 
not acknowledged and after the guests, from a German 
perspective, had overstayed their visit, their presence was no 
longer perceived as economically beneficial or, least of all, as 
a culturally enriching social good. 
In the 1980s, the idea of multiculturalism was introduced 
into German political discourse, when, according to social 
scientist Frank-Olaf Radtke, some pro-immigrationist 
German politicians “picked up the idea of multiculturalism 
and painted a colourful picture of a society of cultural 
plurality”50. In the early 1990s, the idea of multiculturalism 
reached its, as of then, peak influence in Germany when it 
48 Daniel Faas, ‘Producing Class and Ethnic Identities Among Turkish 
Youth in Working- and Middle-Class Schools in Germany’, Social Class and 
Education: Global Perspectives, eds. Lois Weis & Nadine Dolby (New York: 
Routledge 2012), p. 92. 
49 Maren Borkert & Wolfgang Bosswick, ’The Case of Germany’, Migration 
Policymaking in Europe. The Dynamics of Actors and Contexts in Past 
and Present, in eds. Giovanna Zincone, Rinus Pennix & Maren Borkert 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2011), p. 97. 
50 Frank-Olaf Radtke, ’The formation of ethnic minorities and the 
transformation of social into ethnic conflicts in a so-called multi-cultural 
society: The case of Germany’, Ethnic Mobilisation in a Multi-Cultural 
Europe, eds. John Rex & Beatrice Drury (Averbury: Aldershot 1994), p. 35.
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was promoted by leftists and liberals in an effort to prevent 
potentially re-awakening German nationalism in the wake 
of re-unification. An article on the protection of minority 
rights for all ethnic groups was almost introduced into the 
German constitution before conservative opposition opposed 
to the multiculturalist integration of ethno-cultural groups of 
immigrant origin prevented its introduction.51 In the 2000s, 
according to immigration scholar Karen Schönwalder, the 
idea of multiculturalism lost its “hegemonial position in the 
left-liberal spectrum” of German politics.52 
Post-colonial immigration
The labour demands of the former colonial powers such as 
France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were, to a 
large extent, satisfied with spontaneous migration of workers 
from the former colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; 
workers from Western Africa moved to France; the United 
Kingdom received migrants from the Caribbean, Pakistan, 
India and Ireland; and Indonesians and Surinamese settled in 
the Netherlands.53 Following its tradition of what sociologist 
Rogers Brubaker, among others, has termed “Republican 
51 Peter A. Kraus & Karen Schönwalder, ‘Multiculturalism in Germany: 
Rhetoric, Scattered Experiments and Future Chances’, eds. Keith Banting 
& Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition and 
Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2006), p. 206. 
52 Karen Schönwalder, ‘Germany: Integration policy and pluralism in a 
self-conscious country of immigration’, eds. Steven Vertovec & Susanne 
Wessendorf, The Multicultural Backlash: European Discourses, Policies and 
Practices (London: Routledge 2010), p. 163. 
53 Castles & Miller, pp. 102–103. 
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assimilationism”54, immigration into France in the 1960s and 
1970s did not prompt the French government to alter its way 
of approaching the settlement of immigrants; the newcomers 
were expected to accept French values and abandon their 
former collective identities in favour of a new French 
identity.55 
Gre at  Br it a in  adopted  a  genera l  p ol ic y  of  ant i -
discrimination and tolerance of cultural diversity in the 1960s 
that rejected outright assimilationism.56 It was, however, 
not until the 1980s that British policies of multiculturalism, 
particularly a multiculturalist educational policy which 
actively valued and promoted diversity, were introduced.57
In the Netherlands, post-colonial Indonesian immigrants 
of the 1950s were encouraged to assimilate. Post-colonial 
Surinamese immigrants and guest workers from the 
Mediterranean region who arrived in the Netherlands in the 
1960s and early 1970s were, however, encouraged to retain 
their own ethno-cultural identity and no effort was made 
to advance their integration into Dutch society. Instead of 
trying to integrate or assimilate the migrants, the authorities 
followed the traditional Dutch system of ‘pillarization’ 
(verzuiling) and created institutional ‘pillars’ for the migrant 
communities in line with how the existing pillars of the 
various political and religious communities of Dutch society 
were arranged. The official motive for this policy approach 
54 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 1992), p. 112. 
55 Gilles Verbunt, ‘France’, European immigration policy. A comparative 
study, ed. Tomas Hammar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985), 
pp. 127–164. 
56 Christian Joppke, ‘Multiculturalism and immigration: A comparison 
of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain’, Theory and Society 25 
(1996), p. 480. 
57 Ralph Grillo, Pluralism and the Politics of Difference: State, Culture, and 
Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998), p. 179. 
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was that the retention of ethnic identity, facilitated by the 
separate institutional arrangements of the pillar, would 
help migrants to reintegrate into their countries of origin 
when they returned; that is, migrant groups’ pillars were 
perceived to be temporary structures in Dutch society. The 
policy was not underpinned by the idea of multiculturalism 
as the permanent presence of new ethno-cultural minority 
groups was not even acknowledged. When, in the 1980s, it 
became clear that the labour immigrants’ stay was more than 
temporary, the ‘guests’ were formally re-conceptualized as 
ethnic minorities. The pillarization policy was then continued 
in the Dutch Minorities’ Policy, a decisively multiculturalist 
policy.58 
The French historian Marc Bloch has, by making an 
epidemiological analogy, argued that an idea can only breed 
in the correct conditions and that “contagion” of an idea 
“supposes two things: microbe multiplication and, at the 
moment when the disease strikes, a favourable breeding-
ground”.59 Germany, France, Denmark and most of the rest 
of Western Europe where hardly exposed to the idea of 
multiculturalism; no multiplication of the idea occurred in 
these inhospitable breeding grounds until the 1980s and then 
only in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The idea 
of multiculturalism was, however, able to strike and multiply 
in one European country in the post-war labour migration 
period, Sweden, and when the idea struck, the breeding 
ground turned out to be favourable. 
58 Han Entziger, ‘The parallel decline of multiculturalism and the welfare 
state in the Netherlands, Multiculturalism and the Welfare State. Recognition 
and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies, eds. Keith Banting & 
Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006), p. 179, pp. 177-201
59 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press 2004), p. 35
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2.1 Post-war immigration and the Swedish  
 welfare state 
The Kingdom of Sweden has a long history of immigration, 
especially into the cosmopolitan upper echelons of society. 
The Swedish state was ethnically very diverse until the early 
19th century and the loss of Finland, the eastern part of 
the kingdom. In the latter half of the 19th century and first 
half of the 20th century, Sweden was primarily a country 
of emigration with, from a historical and comparative 
perspective, an ethnically homogenous population. The 
Germans, Walloons, Dutch, Scots and the Forest Finns that 
had migrated to Sweden in the previous centuries had been 
assimilated by the early 20th century.60 In the early 1940s, the 
Jewish group numbered approximately 8,00061, the Roma 
group in the hundreds62, the Sámi population was roughly 
approximated as 10,00063 and the census of 1930 estimated 
the Finnish-speaking population of Norrbotten, a Northern 
Province bordering Finland, to be approximately 30,000, 
most of whom were Tornedalians.64
60 Ingvar Svanberg & Mattias Tydén, Tusen år av invandring. En svensk 
kulturhistoria, (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokförlag 1992).
61 Harald Runblom & Mattias Tydén, ’Judar’, Det mångkulturella Sverige. 
En handbok om etniska grupper och minoriteter, eds. Ingvar Svanberg 
& Harald Runblom (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokförlag 1989), p. 193. 
62 Karl-Olov Arnstberg, ’Zigenare’, Det mångkulturella Sverige. En 
handbok om etniska grupper och minoriteter , eds. Ingvar Svanberg 
& Harald Runblom (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokföralg 1989), p. 485. 
63 Hugh Beach, ’Samer’,  Det mångkulturella Sverige. En handbok 
om  e tni ska  g r uppe r  och  minor i te te r ,  e ds .  Ing v ar  Sv anb e rg  & 
Harald Runblom (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokförlag 1989),  p.  339. 
64 Erling Wande, ’Tornedalingar’,  Det mångkulturella Sverige. En 
handbok om etniska grupper och minoriteter , eds. Ingvar Svanberg 
& Harald Runblom (Stockholm: Gidlunds Bokförlag 1989), p. 441. 
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As late as 1930, more persons left Sweden than entered the 
country. Due to returning Swedish-Americans, immigration 
began to exceed emigration in the 1930s. At the end of 
the Second World War, approximately 30,000 Estonians, 
Latvians and Lithuanians fled to Sweden and after the war, 
approximately 34,000 war-refugees, so-called displaced 
persons, were transported to Sweden.65 The flight from 
Estonia brought future ethnic activists Sven Alur Reinans and 
Voldemar Kiviaed to Sweden, and the most prominent ethnic 
activist of post-war Sweden, Polish-Jewish Holocaust survivor 
David Schwarz, who after the war had ended up in a refugee 
camp in Italy, was brought to Sweden in 1950 as part of the 
displaced persons programme.66   
Labour immigration
Sweden was unaf fected by the human and mater ia l 
devastation of the Second World War and the export-
driven Swedish economy grew rapidly in the post-war 
period. The average annual GDP growth of the Swedish 
economy in the 1950s and 1960s was 3.6 percent. In 1945, 
the visa requirement for Danish and Norwegian citizens 
65 Jonas Widgren, Svensk invandrarpolitik. En faktabok, 2. Rev. Uppl. 
(Lund: LiberFörlag 1982), p. 12. For more on Swedish refugee policies 
in the 20th century, see Mikael Byström & Pär Frohnert, eds., Reaching a 
State of Hope: Refugees, Immigrants and the SwedishWelfare State, 1930–
2000 (Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2013). 
66 Interview with Sven Alur Reinans 17.12.2009; David Schwarz, ed., 
Svenska minoriteter. En handbok som kartlägger invandringspolitiken 
och befolkningsminoriteternas ställning inom det svenska samhälle , 
(Stockholm: Aldus 1966), p. 296; Henrik Román, En invandrarpolitisk 
oppositionell. Debattören David Schwarz syn på svensk invandrarpolitik 
åren 1964–1993 (Uppsala: Centre for Multiethnic Research 1994), p. 13. 
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was abolished and for Finnish citizens in 1949. The post-
war economic boom in Sweden led to a shortage of labour 
and steps were taken to provide Swedish industries with 
the labour they required. In 1954, the Common Nordic 
labour market, which gave Nordic citizens the right to take 
up residence in another Nordic country without a work 
permit, was formally introduced. The agreement on and 
implementation of the Common Nordic labour market 
further facilitated intra-Nordic movement, particularly 
labour migration from the economically underdeveloped 
Finland to the economic powerhouse of Sweden.67
From 1947, labour immigrants were also recruited 
from Europe, initially from Italy, Hungary and Austria 
and, in the 1950s, from West Germany, the Netherlands, 
Greece and Belgium.68 In the mid-1950s, a policy of what 
essentially amounted to free immigration of foreign labour 
was introduced, the so-called tourist immigration policy, by 
cancelling the visa requirement for most foreign nationalities. 
Non-Nordic foreigners could arrive in Sweden on a tourist 
visa, apply for a job in Sweden and then utilize an offer of 
employment to receive Swedish work and residency permits. 
In the 1960s, the trade union movement began to criticize the 
system of tourist immigration. The demands for regulation 
by the trade union movement were spurred on by the large 
numbers of Yugoslavs who arrived in Sweden in 1964 and 
1965. Many Yugoslavs arriving on tourist visas were unable 
to find work or housing in Sweden and the unemployed 
Yugoslavs were gathered in camps by the National Labour 
Market Board. The plight of the Yugoslavs fuelled the debate 
67 Tomas Hammar, ’Sweden’, European immigration policy. A comparative 
study, ed. Tomas Hammar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985), 
pp. 17–49. Also see the sub-chapter “Finland as Sweden’s special case” 
below.
68 Widgren, p. 13. 
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on Sweden’s immigration and immigrant problem that was 
ongoing at that time. Fackföreningsrörelsen, the weekly journal 
of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, demanded 
stricter immigration controls to avoid the “chaos” that the 
“Yugoslav invasion” had caused in 1965.69 The following 
year, Lars Ahlvarsson, the ombudsman for immigration and 
immigrant matters at the Trade Union Confederation, argued 
that unregulated immigration was beyond the resources of 
Sweden.70 As ombudsman for immigration and immigrant 
matters, Ahlvarsson was to play a key role in the Swedish 
multicultural moment, which shows that the endorsement of 
the idea of multiculturalism was not tied to an open-borders 
position at this time.71   
Control and consequences of labour immigration
Although the foreign born population of Sweden had 
steadily grown since the 1940s, it was the so called crisis of 
the ‘Yugoslav invasion’ that made immigration and, more 
importantly, the question of immigrant adjustment (i.e. 
integration in today’s terminology) an issue in the public 
sphere.72 In 1965, a working group on immigrant matters 
69 ”Kaos” and ”jugoslaviska invasionen”, quoted in Denis Frank, Staten, 
företagen och arbetskraftsinvandringen – en studie av invandringspolitiken 
i Sverige och rekryteringen av utländska arbetare 1960-1972 (Växjö: Växjö 
University Press 2005), p. 85. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See the studies ‘The difference white ethnics made: the multiculturalist 
turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases of Canada and Denmark’ 
(II) and ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The Marginalization 
of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’ (I) in this thesis. 
72 See studies I, II and IV (‘Huvudsekreteraren och mångkulturalismen. 
Jonas Widgren och 1975 års invandrar- och minoritetspolitik) in this 
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was established by the Government. This can be posited as 
the historical starting point for the development of a new 
policy field in Swedish politics that is now termed ‘integration 
policy’.73 What was to become the Swedish multicultural 
moment had thus begun two decades after Sweden had 
opened its borders to refugee and labour immigration.74 
The period of free tourist immigration ended in 1967, 
when new rules forbidding the issue of work permits after 
entry into Sweden were introduced. The new immigration 
policy, introduced in 1968, further regulated the entry of 
non-Nordic labourers by introducing requirements for both 
a work permit and housing before entering Sweden. This 
meant that non-Nordic foreigners could no longer enter 
Sweden as tourists, apply for work and then receive work and 
residency permits. However, the organized recruitment of 
labourers continued and workers continued to be imported 
from Yugoslavia and Turkey.75 The introduction of the new 
regulations on immigration was coupled to an improvement 
in the position of non-Nordic migrant workers in the Swedish 
labour market. Work permits for non-Nordic migrant 
workers who had entered the Swedish labour market before 
the introduction of the new regulations were prolonged 
indefinitely, which meant in practice that the migrants could 
thesis for the politicization of the so-called immigrant question in the 
public sphere in the mid-1960s. 
73 Hammar, p. 32.
74 Sweden’s intake of war refugees in the mid-1940s was, as labour and 
migration historian Lars Olsson has shown, a precursor to Sweden’s labour 
immigration policy in the post-war period. Upon arrival in Sweden, the 
refugees were almost immediately put to agrarian work in the south of 
the country. Lars Olsson, På Tröskeln till Folkhemmet: Baltiska flyktingar 
och polska koncentrationslägerfångar som reservarbetskraft i skånskt 
jordbruk kring slutet av andra världskriget (Växjö: Morgonrodnad 2008).
75 Lundh & Ohlsson, pp. 82–83.
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remain permanently in Sweden if they so chose.76 The secured 
right of residency also gave non-Nordic migrant workers 
and their families, who were allowed to re-unify in Sweden, 
the same social rights as Swedish citizens and invandrare 
(immigrant) symbolically replaced utlänning (foreigner) as an 
administrative and political concept.77 The official affirmation 
that labour immigrants were persons likely to settle in 
Sweden was a pivotal precondition for the promotion of the 
idea of multiculturalism.78 
In 1972, the Trade Union Movement effectively put a stop 
to large-scale recruitment of non-Nordic labour immigrants 
by issuing an internal circular letter to the national trade 
unions urging them to exercise a more restrictive policy 
towards the approval of work permits.79 Finnish migration 
to Sweden decreased considerably after the immigration 
peak at the turn of the 1970s due to improved economic 
conditions in Finland, a slow-down of the Swedish economy 
and the introduction of regulations on the praxis of Swedish 
recruitment in Finland.80 By the mid-1970s, the post-war 
era of large-scale labour immigration had ended in Sweden, 
as it also had in the other western European countries that 
had received millions of labourers from Southern Europe, 
Turkey and past and present colonies. In comparison to other 
labour importing countries such as West Germany, Sweden 
never formally introduced a guest worker regime, despite the 
76 Frank, pp. 95–103.
77 Hammar, p. 18.
78 See study II in this thesis for a comparative analysis between the case of 
Sweden, where foreign workers were regarded as settling immigrants, and 
Denmark where, for a long time, foreign workers and their families were 
perceived as ‘guests’ . 
79 Christer Lundh & Rolf  Ohlsson,  Från arbetskraftsimport  ti l l 
flyktinginvandring (Stockholm: SNS Förlag 1994), p. 78.
80 Jouni Korkiasaari & Kari Tarkiainen, Suomalaiset Ruotsissa (Turku: 
Siirtolaisinstituutti 2000), pp. 143–144. 
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Swedish immigration policy towards non-Nordics containing 
elements of that kind of rotation system.81 
The scale of immigration into Sweden from the 1940s to 
the 1970s was, from a historical perspective, massive and 
greatly increased the ethno-cultural diversity of the country. 
When immigration and the adjustment of immigrants to 
Swedish society became ‘problems’ in the mid-1960s, the 
‘problem’ of labour immigration was solved by restricting 
non-Nordic immigration. The problem of immigrant 
adjustment was to be, as one of the key actors in the 
introduction of official multiculturalism, Jonas Widgren, 
polemically put it in retrospect, solved to general satisfaction 
by teaching the immigrants Swedish and creating social 
equality between the immigrants and the Swedes; in other 
words, by assimilating them in the same way as earlier 
influxes of immigrants.82 
Sweden had, from a demographic perspective, become 
multicultural  over the t ime-span of one generation. 
The country went from a foreign-born population of 
approximately 1 percent at the start of the Second World War 
to a foreign born population of 6.7 percent in 1970.83 It was 
against this backdrop of demographic change that the idea 
of multiculturalism was introduced into Swedish political 
discourse in the mid-1960s. It is, however, important to bear 
in mind that official multiculturalism was established after 
the cessation of non-Nordic immigration and the decrease 
in Nordic immigration in the 1970s, and also that the new 
policy did not contradict the restrictive labour immigration 
policy that had been established a few years earlier. On the 
81 Frank, p. 51. During the period of tourist immigration, migrant workers 
from Southern Europe were not guaranteed continued work and residency 
rights in Sweden after the time limits of their work permits had expired 
(ibid. p. 248). 
82 Widgren, p. 15. 
83 SOU 1974:69, pp. 51–59. 
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contrary, the success of the new policy of multiculturalism 
was presented as being dependent on regulated (labour) 
immigration.84 The annual net immigration of 20,000 in the 
1960s dropped to 13,000 in the 1970s and remained below 
20,000 until the 1990s.85 
 
The post-war people’s home
Another important backdrop to the multicultural moment 
was the increase in prosperity, the political stability of the 
corporatist system, the long rule of the Social Democratic 
Party, which controlled the Swedish government from 1932 
to 1976, and the institutionalization of the universalist 
welfare state.86 Sweden’s bulging public treasury, to which 
immigrants were net contributors, was handled by a party 
that was intent on changing Swedish society in line with its 
ideology and the growing expectations of the citizenry. As a 
84 SOU 1974:69, pp. 114–115. The Commission of Immigration did, 
however, also legitimize its multiculturalist policy aims by forecasting a 
continued inflow of immigrants to Sweden. A premise of the new policy 
was that the current minority groups of Sweden “will be joined by new 
population groups speaking other languages besides Swedish and having a 
partly different identity which in many cases they will be anxious to retain”, 
SOU 1974:69, p. 25. This was in line with the prediction of Jonas Widgren 
(head secretary of the Commission, see study IV in this thesis) that the 
Swedish nation-state would wither away as a consequence of immigration. 
85 Lundh & Olsson, p. 22.
86 Klaus Misgeld,  Vi l ly  B ergström, Klas  Åmark & Karl  Molin, 
eds. ,  Socialdemokratins samhälle:  SAP och Sverige under 100 år 
(Stockholm: Tiden 1989); Hugh Heclo & Henrik Madsen, Policy and 
Politics in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism (Philadelphia, PA: Temple 
University Press 1987); Yvonne Hirdman, Jenny Björkman & Urban 
Lundberg, Sveriges historia: 1920-1965 (Stockholm: Norstedt 2012). 
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result, new universal benefits and services were introduced 
and the public sector grew massively from the 1960s onwards. 
The wave of social reforms, together with concurrent changes 
in the cultural mainstream brought on by urbanization, 
secularization, and the 68-revolt(s) against prevailing 
conventions on social behaviour, politics, sex, gender and the 
environment, transformed the Swedish way of life. 87 
The process of modernization went hand in hand with the 
ideological construction of Sweden as the most modern of 
nations, a form of implicit or banal nationalism that by the 
1960s had largely replaced the more expressive conservative 
nationalism of the 19th century.88 At the beginning of the 
87 Kjell  Östberg & Jenny Andersson, Sverige historia 1965–2012 
(Stockholm: Norstedt 2013); Torbjörn Nilsson, Mellan arv och utopi: 
moderata vägval under 100 år, 1904-2004 (Stockholm: Santérus 2004); 
Alf W Johansson, Herbert Tingsten och det kalla kriget: antikommunism 
och liberalism i Dagens nyheter 1946-1952 (Stockholm: Tiden 2005); Kjell 
Östberg, I takt med tiden: Olof Palme 1927–1969, (Stockholm: Leopard 
2008); Kim Salomon, ’The Revolutionary Utopias of the 1960s’, The 
Swedish success story?, eds. Kurt Almqvist & Kay Glans (Stockholm: Axel 
and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation 2004), pp. 199–212. Marie 
Cronqvist, Lina Sturfelt & Martin Wiklund, eds., 1973: en träff med 
tidsandan (Nordic Academic Press Lund 2008); Jens Ljunggren, Inget 
land för intellektuella: 68-rörelsen och svenska vänsterintellektuella (Lund: 
Nordic Academic Press 2009); Kjell Östberg, 1968 – när allting var i rörelse. 
Sextiotalsradikaliseringen och de sociala rörelserna (Stockholm: Prisma 
2002); Claes Arvidsson, Ett annat land. Sverige och det långa 70-talet 
(Stockholm: Timbro 1999); Olav Panelius & Torsten Steinby, eds., Svenska 
modeord (Helsingfors: Hufvudstadsbladet 1970). 
88 Patrick Hall, Den svenskaste historien: nationalism i Sverige under sex 
sekler (Stockholm: Carlsson 2000); Henrik Berggren, ’The forward-facing 
angel: nationalism and modernity in Sweden in the twentieth century’. 
The Swedish success story?, eds. Kurt Almqvist & Kay Glans (Stockholm: 
Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation 2004), pp. 67–79; Henrik 
Berggren & Lars Trädgårdh, Är svensken människa? Gemenskap och 
oberoende i det moderna Sverige (Stockholm: Norstedt 2006).
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1960s, the Swedish historian Sten Carlsson characterized 
Sweden’s new nationalism in the following succinct way:
The Swede is no longer enthroned upon memories of 
great olden days [a reference to the second verse of 
Sweden’s national anthem] but finds the superiority 
of his own country over other countries fairly self-
evident without giving the matter much thought.89
In the mid-1960s, the popular celebration of the warrior 
kings of old, whose statues were centrally placed in many 
of Sweden’s major cities, came to an end90 and, with the new 
constitution of 1974, the monarchy lost the last vestiges 
of power and was given a purely ceremonial role in the 
political system. The law on religious freedom in 1951, which 
guaranteed the free choice of religious affiliation and the 
removal of Christian elements (e.g. Christian instruction and 
the Morning Prayer) in the new comprehensive school system 
that was introduced in the 1960s, weakened the influence 
of the Lutheran Church. By the mid-1970s, the traditional 
pillars of Swedish nationhood, the Monarchy and the Church, 
had formally been reduced to quaint, if not embarrassing, 
symbols of the “great olden days” that were now considered 
merely old in light of the ever progressing modern (social) 
democratic Swedish welfare state. 
The state’s basic centralized power structure that had been 
established by the sovereigns of centuries past was, however, 
utilized and expanded by the post-war welfare state; never 
89 ”Svensken tronar inte längre på minnen från fornstora dar, men finner 
det egna landets överlägsenhet över andra tämligen självklar, utan att 
närmare reflektera häröver.” Quoted in Hall, p. 277.
90 As late as 1960, 20,000 persons participated in the celebration of 
Gustavus Adolphus in Gothenburg. Sverker Oredsson, Gustav II Adolf, 
(Stockholm: Atlantis 2007), p. 360. 
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before had Swedish society been so thoroughly organized and 
centralized. The strong state, together with the high level of 
taxation which increased with the growth of the public sector, 
meant that there was virtually no possibility to organize 
communal life independent of the state. A non-public school, 
for instance, needed special permission from the state to 
operate and the funding of such schools was almost always 
given on a temporary basis. 
 
Ethno-cultural difference in the people’s home
In 1940s and 1950s, before the implementation of the 
comprehensive school system reform, Estonian and Jewish 
refugees were able to secure permission to establish schools 
of their own. However, the public funding of these schools 
was precarious and the costs of running them had to be 
supplemented by the community members.91 State subsidies 
for the running of the catholic St. Erik’s School were also 
granted on a temporary basis and on the condition that the 
school would not be utilized as a base for missionizing or 
as a precedent for establishing additional religious schools 
in Sweden.92 The establishment and existence of the schools 
was only tolerated due to the so-called special circumstances 
91 Voldemar Kiviaed, ’Esterna i Sverige bildar samhälle’,  Svenska 
minoriteter.  En handbok som kartlägger invandringspolitiken och 
befolkningsminoriteternas ställning inom det svenska samhälle,  ed. 
David Schwarz (Stockholm: Aldus 1966), pp. 218–219; Bruno Kaplan, 
’Judarna i Sverige’, Svenska minoriteter. En handbok som kartlägger 
invandringspolitiken och befolkningsminoriteternas ställning inom det 
svenska samhälle, ed. David Schwarz (Stockholm: Aldus 1966), p. 193. 
92 SOU 1966:55, Skolgång borta och hemma. Utlandssvenska barns skolgång 
– skolinackordering – skolgång för vissa minoriteters barn (Stockholm 
1966), p. 281. 
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and small size of the groups. After the comprehensive 
school system had been established, the Estonian and Jewish 
minority schools were increasingly regarded as problematic 
precedents, especially when immigration from Finland 
increased in the 1960s.93 
The scope and power of the expanding welfare state also 
meant that new political ideas and reforms, often introduced 
and drawn-up by academic experts close to the Social 
Democratic Party, could have enormous impact on all aspects 
of society.94 Social scientists, for example, gave scientific 
legitimacy to new ideas on gender and women activists, 
armed with these ideas, worked within the Social Democratic 
Party and the state to change Swedish gender relations.95 
Through political reforms (e.g. the introduction of separate 
assessment in taxation) and state-run campaigns, the Swedish 
housewife, as an ideal and a social position, became obsolete 
in the 1960s and 1970s.96 The expansionist and reform-
oriented drive of the welfare state, the top-down political 
power structure of the state and the labour movement (i.e. 
the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement) 
in control of the state made it possible for new ideas to break 
through politically at the top of the structure and then be 
implemented across the whole of society. 
In brief, the political and the cultural context of post-
93 Thomas Gür, Staten och nykomlingarna. En studie av den svenska 
invandrarpolitikens idéer (Stockholm: City University Press 1996), pp. 143–
159. 
94 Niels Finn Christiansen & Pirjo Markkola, ‘Introduction’, The Nordic 
Model of Welfare – a Historical Reappraisal, eds. Niels Finn Christiansen, 
Klaus Petersen, Nils Edling & Per Haaved (Copenhagen: Museum 
Tusculanum Press 2012), p. 20. 
95 Christina Florin & Bengt Nilsson, ”Något som liknar en oblodig 
revolution”. Jämställdhetens politisering under 1960- och 70-talen (Umeå: 
Jämställdhetskommittén 2000). 
96 Östberg & Andersson, pp. 182–183. 
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war Sweden included both adverse and conducive elements 
for the idea of multiculturalism. However, the nationalist 
universalism of the people’s home was unfavourable to 
an idea directly opposed to the ideal of homogeneity. The 
liberal egalitarian norms on which the welfare state project 
was built could be, and were, also employed to legitimize the 
emancipation of the individual from historically constituted 
institutions such as the family.97 This did not bode well for an 
idea that stressed the importance of preserving ethno-cultural 
minorities. A minority is preserved through intra-group 
contact and cohesion, beginning at the level of family, while 
the universalist norms and institutions of the Swedish welfare 
state were (implicitly) nationalistic; that is, the whole of 
society was geared towards the reproduction of ‘Swedishness’. 
The reformist drive and future-oriented outlook of the 
Swedish political and cultural elites, the general level of 
prosperity and the widespread will of the politically dominant 
left and parts of the centre-right to turn disadvantages into 
equal life chances did, however, also offer opportunities for 
the furthering of multiculturalism. 
Underprivileged immigrants and their children needed to 
be included in the welfare state project according to the logic 
of the universal (social democratic) model of welfare. Political 
philosopher Nancy Fraser has pointed out that political 
discourse in modern welfare states centres on ‘needs’ and 
that these needs are not self-evident but politically contested, 
rejected or affirmed. Needs can be established or denied 
through struggles over the interpretation of what a particular 
need is and how it might be satisfied.98 The institutionalized 
possibility of creating new needs and making claims on the 
satisfaction of these needs in the (expanding) welfare state 
97 Berggren & Trägårdh, pp. 294–297.
98 Nancy Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to 
Neoliberal Crisis pp. 53–54 (London: Verso 2013). 
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opened up an opportunity for the advancement of the idea of 
multiculturalism. The needs of the immigrant groups could 
be defined and shown as different in kind from the needs of 
other underprivileged groups, and prompt and legitimize 
political reform to satisfy these new needs. 
Furthermore, the increase of ethno-cultural diversity 
brought on by immigration was, from a contemporary 
Swedish perspective, a modern economically beneficial 
and even excit ing socia l  phenomenon.  The idea  of 
multiculturalism was at least new ,  if nothing else; the 
question was whether it was also progressive. 
2.2 Finland as Sweden’s special case and vice  
 versa 
Labour immigration from Finland, unaffected by the 
regulations on non-Nordic immigration, increased rapidly 
in the late 1960s and peaked in 1970 with more than 40,000 
Finnish citizens emigrating to Sweden during that year. In 
1970, in excess of 200,000 Finnish citizens and more than 
50,000 Finnish-born Swedish citizens resided in Sweden.99 At 
the beginning of the 1970s, the Finnish immigrant group was 
larger than all the other immigrant groups combined and, as 
the Finnish migration scholars Korkiasaari and Tarkiainen 
have pointed out, the question of immigrant adjustment in 
Sweden was, to a great extent, tantamount to the Finnish 
immigrant question at that time.100 
The fact that the majority of labour immigrants in Sweden 
were Finnish citizens sets Sweden apart from the rest of the 
European countries receiving immigrant labour. The territory 
99 Korkisaari & Tarkiainen, p. 164. 
100 Ibid., p. 170. 
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of the Republic of Finland had been an integral part of the 
Kingdom of Sweden from the middle-ages until the early 19th 
century when Sweden lost the eastern part of its realm to 
Russia during the Napoleonic wars. The shared history of the 
two countries and the reforging of close political and cultural 
ties under the banner of Nordic cooperation after the end of 
the Second World War differentiated Finnish immigration 
into Sweden de jure and de facto from other streams of labour 
immigration. 
From the 1940s onwards, the scope of Nordic cooperation 
widened and deepened. The Nordic Council, an arena for 
parliamentary cooperation between the Nordic countries, 
was founded in 1952. In this year, passport-free travel, which 
allows Nordic citizens to travel and reside in Nordic countries 
without residency permits and passports, was introduced. 
The joint Nordic labour market came into force on the 2nd 
July 1954 and, in 1955, the Nordic Convention on Social 
Security was implemented, which expanded the social rights 
of Nordic citizens living in another Nordic country on the 
basis of formal mutuality.101 These intra-Nordic reforms 
also gave impetus to Nordic cooperation on citizenship 
legislation. Formally initiated during a meeting of the Nordic 
ministers of Justice, a commission of experts was called in 
1961 to overhaul and give recommendations on the revision 
of citizenship legislation in Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway. The political mission of the joint Nordic commission 
on citizenship was to investigate the further facilitation of 
naturalization for Nordic citizens in the Nordic countries.102 
According to the commission, the need for a revision 
101 Klaus Petersen, ’National, Nordic and trans-Nordic: transnational 
perspectives on the history of the Nordic welfare states’, Beyond Welfare 
State Models: Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, eds. 
Pauli Kettunen & Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011), p. 50. 
102 Betänkande med förslag till nya medborgarskapslagar för Danmark, 
Norge och Sverige (Stockholm: 1949), p. 9.
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of citizenship legislation that furthered the naturalization 
of Nordic citizens had become pressing in light of the 
advancement of Nordic cooperation in other fields and due 
to the general aspirations of the Nordic countries to deepen 
cooperation. The reform of citizenship legislation was 
conceived as a judicial expression of the togetherness that 
existed between the Nordic peoples.103 The 1961 commission’s 
proposal for revisions to the naturalization policies of 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway were introduced 
in all four countries at the end of the 1960s. The residency 
times required of Nordic citizens for naturalization through 
application were lowered in all four countries and, from the 
beginning of the 1970s, all non-naturalized Nordic citizens 
could become citizens of another Nordic country by simply 
notifying the relevant authorities of their wish to acquire 
citizenship, providing they had resided in the country for a 
minimum of seven years.104
Finnish immigrants in Sweden were thus not considered 
to be strange and distant foreigners in the eyes of the law, 
nor according to the trans-Nordic political principles of 
Nordic cooperation and brotherhood. The intertwined past, 
close geographical proximity and geopolitical positions of 
Sweden and Finland also meant that the connection between 
Finland and Sweden went beyond the institutionalization of 
Nordic cooperation; Finland was Sweden’s ‘special sibling’ 
and vice-versa. The interlaced historical ties between 
Sweden and Finland were also manifested in the official 
103 Ibid., p. 13.
1 0 4  Je s s i c a  Fa ge r lu n d  &  S amp o  Br an d e r,  R e p or t  on  F in l and 
(EUDO Citizenship Observatory 2013), http://eudo-citizenship.eu/
admin/?p=file&appl=countryProfiles&f=Finland.pdf, p. 5–6; Julia 
Boguslaw, Svensk invandringspolitik under 500 år: 1512–2012 (Lund: 
Studentlitteratur 2012), p. 202; Grete Brochmann & Idun Seland, 
’Citizenship policies and ideas of nationhood in Scandinavia’, Citizenship 
Studies 14:4 (2010), pp. 429–443.
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bilingualism of the Finnish state (i.e. Finnish and Swedish), 
the constitutionally protected language rights of Swedish-
speaking Finnish citizens and the monolingual (Swedish) 
institutions of the Swedish-speaking minority. 
For centuries, Swedish had been the language of the state, 
commerce and high culture in Finland and remained so for 
decades after Finland was incorporated into the Russian 
Empire as an autonomous Grand Duchy after Russia’s 
victory over Sweden in the Finnish war of 1808–1809. In 
the latter half of the 19th century, the Finnish language 
slowly but surely gained an official position in Finland. 
The constitution from 1919 and the Language Act of 1922 
established that Finnish and Swedish were the two national 
languages of the independent Republic of Finland. When 
Finland declared its independence in 1917, approximately 
11 percent of the population was Swedish-speaking, but by 
1970 this percentage had dropped to 6.6 percent.105 One 
of the causes for the proportional decline of the Swedish-
speaking population was emigration. After the end of the 
Second World War, many Swedish-speaking Finns migrated 
to Sweden and approximately 15–20 percent of the total 
Finnish emigration flow to Sweden from the 1950s to the 
1970s comprised Swedish-speaking Finns.106 After the loss 
of Finland, 19th century Swedish nationalism concentrated 
on naturalizing the unity and ‘Swedishness’ of ‘true’ Sweden. 
Over time, the Sweden that came into existence territorially 
after the loss of Finland was projected onto the past before 
the turning point of 1809.107 
105 Kenneth D. McRae, Conflict and Compromise in Multilingual Societies. 
Volume 3, Finland (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1997), p. 86.
106 Sven Alur Reinas, ‘Den finländska befolkningen I Sverige – en 
statistisk-demografisk beskrivning’, Finnarnas historia i Sverige 3. Tiden 
efter 1945, ed. Jarmo Lainio (Stockholm: Finska Historiska Samfundet/
Nordiska museet 1996), p. 100.
107 Gabriel Bladh & Christer Kuvaja, ’Från ett rike till två nationalstater’, 
48 
The ideal of ethno-cultural homogeneity established in the 
19th century was carried into the 20th century by the Swedish 
labour movement in reconfigured, equality-driven form with 
the gaze of reform set firmly on the future. The Conservatives 
of the 19th century wanted to forget Finland because the 
separation was too painful, and the Progressives of the 20th 
century were no longer bothered with the past except as 
a negative point of reference in the march towards an ever 
improved future. The Swedish heritage of Finland, including 
the existence of the Swedish-speaking minority, thus became 
increasingly irrelevant in Sweden. This, coupled to the 
fundamental fact that Swedish-speaking Finns who emigrated 
to Sweden spoke Swedish and shared the same cultural 
traditions with the Swedes, which facilitated their adjustment, 
meant that Swedish-speaking Finnish immigrants largely 
disappeared from view in Sweden. In the eyes of the Swedish 
authorities, all Finnish immigrants were presumably Finnish-
speaking and Swedish-speaking Finns were, for instance, sent 
information material on Sweden written in Finnish.108
In 1969, Swedish-speaking Finns in Sweden established 
their own national organization, Finlandssvenskarnas 
Riksförbund i Sverige, which was comparatively late if one 
considers the duration of sustained immigration of Swedish-
speaking Finns and the size of the group at that time. In 
comparison to the national organization of Finnish-speaking 
Finns in Sweden, Ruotsin Suomalaisseurojen Keskusliitto – 
Centralförbundet för finska föreningar i Sverige, the national 
organization of Swedish-speaking Finns established in 1957 
carried little political weight and was never an active player 
Svenskt i Finland – finskt i Sverige. 1, Dialog och särart, eds. Gabriel Bladh 
& Christer Kuvaja, (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 
2005), p. 25.
108 Barbro Allardt Ljunggren, ’Finlandssvenskarna i Sverige’, Finnarnas 
historia i Sverige 3. Tiden efter 1945, ed. Jarmo Lainio (Stockholm: 
Finska Historiska Samfundet/Nordiska museet 1996), pp. 215–227. 
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in the debates and political struggles over Sweden’s future 
as a multicultural society in the 1960s and 1970s. There 
is also no evidence of individual Swedish-speaking Finns 
in Sweden making the claim that Swedish-speaking Finns 
constituted a new Swedish minority group worthy of public 
recognition and support. However, Swedish-speaking Finns 
living in Sweden at that time, such as author Gösta Ågren and 
journalist Erik Bagerstam (Pakarinen), expressed support for 
the idea of multiculturalism in general and for the recognition 
of the linguistic and cultural rights of Finnish-speakers in 
Sweden in particular.109 The preservation of the Swedish-
speaking Finns as a distinct minority group in Sweden was 
never brought to the fore by the Swedish-speaking Finns 
in Sweden who merely wanted the Swedish authorities to 
recognize that Swedish, not Finnish, was their mother tongue. 
The Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden, however, had more 
pressing issues with the Swedish government concerning the 
future of Finnish-speaking immigrants and their children. 
Transnational Swedish-Finnish entanglements and
 multiculturalism
In the third study of the thesis, I show how the education 
of  Finnish-speaking immigrant  chi ldren in Sweden 
became politicized transnationally in both Sweden and 
Finland. Language teaching in and of the mother tongue 
was conceptualized as a social policy and migration policy 
question. The new perception and policy discourse on mother 
109 Gösta Ågren, ‘Minoriternas rätt’, Dagens Nyheter 1.6.1966; Gösta 
Ågren, ’Förtrycket lever kvar i  Tornedalen’,  Expressen  13.2.1968; 
Erik Pakarinen, ’Acceptera språklig pluralism’, Arbetet 2.3.1971; Erik 
Bagerstam, ’Låt invandrarna behålla modersmålet’, Arbetet 25.5.1972. 
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tongue teaching that was established at the end of 1960s in 
Sweden occurred in the context of large-scale immigration 
from Finland, which had been enabled by common Nordic 
labour. The efforts of a dedicated group of ethnic activists, 
linguistic experts and officials facilitated the introduction of 
multiculturalist policies supporting non-Swedish languages in 
Sweden in the mid-1970s. The main actor in the initial stage 
of politicization, ethnic activist Artturi Similä, largely built 
his claims for mother tongue teaching in and of Finnish on 
the basis of comparison between the politics of language in 
Sweden and Finland. 
In study III, I furthermore show how scientific concepts 
such as, in this case, the concept of semilingualism were 
introduced and rooted in contemporary political debates 
and also the historically constituted saliency of language. I 
also demonstrate how these post-war debates on language 
acquisition and education stil l  affect language policy 
discourses in both Sweden and Finland today. The political 
discourse on mother tongue teaching in Sweden shows 
how the new policies could be legitimized in different, even 
contradictory, ways to satisfy various political demands 
and ideological motives, most of which evolved around the 
‘special relationship’ between Sweden and Finland. 
The importance of the ‘Finnish factor’ in the making 
of Sweden’s multicultural moment is also demonstrated 
in study II of this thesis, the results of which highlight the 
specific characteristics of the groups for whom ethno-
cultural recognition and support was claimed and for whom 
multiculturalism was introduced. The establishment of 
multiculturalism in Canada was facilitated by claims made 
by well-integrated white ethnics who, as Kymlicka has 
pointed out, were regarded as “fully committed to the basic 
liberal democratic principles” and “seen to share a common 
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‘Western’ and ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization”110. The Finns in 
Sweden were also white ethnics and well-integrated in the 
sense that their labour market participation was higher than 
that of the majority population. The Finns not only shared 
a common ‘Western’ and ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilization with 
the Swedes, they belonged, in the words of historian Pirjo 
Markkola, to the same “Lutheran corner of the world”111 as 
the Swedes and the other majority populations of the Nordic 
countries. 
Kymlicka has, on the basis of the historical success and 
failures of multiculturalism policies in the West, theorized 
that the following conditions are especially salient for 
multiculturalism to prosper: i) the minority group is not 
perceived as a threat to national security; ii) the group is 
not regarded as illiberal; that is, the group’s culture is not 
at odds with human rights norms; iii) there is a perception 
among the citizenry that immigration is regulated and 
borders controlled; iv) immigration is heterogeneous; that 
is, immigrants come from many source countries; and 
v) immigrants are perceived as economic contributors to 
society.112 Post-war Finnish immigrants were never regarded 
as potential fifth columnists in a conflict between Sweden and 
Finland, and after a slight ‘red scare’ concerning some Finnish 
immigrants in connection to the so-called wild strikes (i.e. 
strikes not authorized by the Trade Union Confederation) 
at the beginning of 1970s113, the Finns in Sweden have not 
110 Will Kymlicka, ‘The Canadian Model of Multiculturalism in 
Comparative Perspective’, Multiculturalism and the Canadian Consitution, 
ed. Stephen Tierney (Vancouver: UBC Press 2007), p. 71. 
111 Pirjo Markkola, ’The Lutheran Nordic welfare states’, Beyond Welfare 
State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on Social Policy, eds. 
Pauli Kettunen & Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2011), p. 104.
112 Will Kymlicka, Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future, 
(Washington, D.C.:  Migration Policy Institute 2012),  pp. 21–24. 
113 ‘Invandrarna svåraste frågan’ [Interview with PM Olof Palme], Dagens 
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been perceived as any sort of national security threat in 
Sweden. There was also no fear of culturally-based human 
rights abuse in the Finnish community and, when official 
multiculturalism was introduced, labour immigration had 
been regulated and the borders of Sweden were (seemingly) 
under control. Post-war immigration into Sweden was not 
as heterogeneous as subsequent immigration has been, but 
after the leadership of the Finnish community was co-opted 
by the Social Democrats and the large majority of Finnish 
immigrants became politically well-integrated from a social 
democratic standpoint − the Swedish labour movement 
practiced collective affiliation of local unions with the Social 
Democratic Party and Finnish immigrants were highly 
unionized114 − the size of this single immigrant group was 
no longer perceived as a political problem.115 The economic 
contribution of the Finns was also never in doubt; in the 
1960s and the 1970s, Finnish immigrants contributed more to 
the Swedish welfare state than they took out.116 
Finnish immigrants in Sweden were a ‘special’ group, not 
on the grounds that they were particularly unusual, peculiar 
or exotic but because they were perceived as rather ordinary. 
The Finns were ‘special’ in a political sense due to the 
interwoven history of Finland and Sweden and because they 
Nyheter 23.1.1970; ‘Invandringen från Finland sköttes dåligt’ [Interview 
with Gunnar Helén, party leader of the Liberal People’s Party] 24.1.1970. 
114 Leif Lewin, Governing Trade Unions in Sweden (Cambridge Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 1980), p. 46; Risto Laakkonen, ‘Finländarna 
på den svenska arbetsmarknaden efter det andra världskriget  – 
arbetskraftsfrågan i finsk-svenska relationer’, Finnarnas historia i Sverige 
3. Tiden efter 1945, ed. Jarmo Lainio (Stockholm: Finska Historiska 
Samfundet/Nordiska museet 1996), p. 119. 
115 See studies II and III in this thesis. 
116 Eski l  Wadensjö,  ’Arbetsmarknad,  invandring och ekonomi’, 
Invandringen och framtiden, eds. Eva M. Hamberg & Tomas Hammar 
(Stockholm: LiberFörlag 1981), pp. 109–110. 
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were Nordic citizens living in another Nordic country at a 
time of extensive Nordic cooperation. The cultural sameness 
of the Finns and the political circumstances connected 
to their migration to Sweden furthered the advancement 
of multiculturalism as a political idea in Sweden. It also 
facilitated the introduction of official multiculturalism due to 
the universal logic of the Swedish welfare state; although the 
Finns were ‘Nordic brothers’, they were still conceptualized as 
one group among many new groups and measures directed at 
the Finns also had to apply to the other groups. Nevertheless, 
the fact that immigration into Sweden was heterogeneous and 
not exclusively Finnish could also be utilized to legitimize the 
rejection of Finnish claims of Swedish-Finnish parity and the 
limits of Swedish multiculturalism. Sweden could not follow 
Finland’s example of bilingualism without discriminating 
against other minority groups of immigrant origin and official 
multilingualism was not a conceivable option.
In the larger context of post-war European migration, 
Finnish migration to Sweden constituted a special case. 
However, Finland was not only Sweden’s special case, Sweden 
was also Finland’s special case and the power relationship 
between the two countries was asymmetrical. Their shared 
past and Nordic cooperation could and was employed to 
underpin argumentative claims on Swedish obligations 
towards Finland and Finnish immigrants, although the 
ability and will of the Finnish state to make demands on 
Sweden was limited. Finland’s past as a Swedish province, 
the historical prosperity gap between the two countries, 
the (accentuated) geo-political predicament of Finland 
in the post-war shadow of the Soviet Union and the close 
ties between the Social Democratic Parties in Sweden and 
Finland all contributed to curb potential Finnish pressure 
on Sweden with regard to Finnish immigrants. Also, shown 
in study III, neither the Finnish government nor the Finnish 
president, Urho Kekkonen, pushed for the introduction of 
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formalized minority rights for Finns in Sweden. The Finnish 
political elite was satisfied with the official affirmation of 
the new multicultural and multilingual Sweden that centred 
on the Finns and, from a historical perspective, the radical 
policy reforms based on this new outlook, even though 
these reforms were very limited in comparison to Finnish 
bilingualism. There was room for multiculturalism in the 
Swedish people’s home as long as it did not cross national 
and social democratic thresholds; thresholds that the Finnish 
government also respected. 
3 Earlier research on the history  
 of multiculturalism in Sweden
The research literature on immigration, integration, 
ethnic relations and related topics in Sweden is vast. In the 
following, I present the literature that has been especially 
relevant for this dissertation project in chronological order, 
according to date of publication.  
The history of the victors
Research on the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in 
Sweden began a few years after the idea of multiculturalism 
was introduced into Swedish polit ical  discourse due 
to the fact that David Schwarz, the father of Swedish 
multiculturalism117, pursued a career as a social scientist 
from the end of the 1960s to the mid-1970s. Schwarz 
117 See studies I and II in this thesis. 
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conducted research on immigration and the politics of 
ethnicity in Sweden and published scholarly works on the 
political response to the idea of multiculturalism.118 Schwarz’s 
academic ambitions were deeply intertwined with his political 
aims and thus his works, including the anthologies he edited, 
should be read as part scholarly treatises and part political 
pamphlets. When one realizes the duality of Schwarz’s work, 
it becomes twice as useful. It is an essential reference work 
on the history of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden and, 
simultaneously, an important part of that same history. 
Sv e n sk  inv andrar p o l i t i k :  e n  fak tab ok ,  an  o f t e n 
(uncritically) quoted work by Jonas Widgren, the former 
head secretary of the Commission on Immigration, also 
carries the duality of being both a treatise on historical 
development of Swedish immigrant policy and a defence 
of it in its then current multiculturalist approach. Widgren 
presents, without mentioning his own role in the process, 
a generalized account of the post-war history of Swedish 
immigrant and migration policy and, at the same time, 
tries to legitimize the multiculturalist policy turn, of which 
he was one of the architects in the 1970s.119 As the history 
of Sweden’s multicultural moment, the political turn to 
multiculturalism in particular, was initially written by 
118 David Schwarz, Attitudes in the Swedish parliament towards ethnic 
minorities and immigration: report no. 1 (Stockholm: University of 
Stockholm 1969); Bengt Börjeson & David Schwarz, De politiska partierna: 
invandrar- och minoritetspolitik, (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet 1970); 
David Schwarz, Svensk invandrar- och minoritetspolitik 1945–68 (Stockholm: 
Bokförlaget Prisma 1971); David Schwarz, Kan invandrarna bli svenskar? 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur 1973); David Schwarz, Botkyrkaprojektet: en 
tvärvetenskaplig, longitudinell studie av social och etnisk identitet och dess 
följder för individ och grupp: forskningsrapport (Stockholm: Stockholms 
universitet 1974).
119 Widgren, Svensk invandrarpolitik, pp. 15–17, 87–89; Also see study IV 
in this thesis for an analysis of Widgren’s pivotal role in the making of the 
multiculturalist turn.
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the ‘winners’, that is, ethnic activists, experts and officials 
advocating multiculturalism directly involved in the making 
of the moment and/or its political aftermath of sweeping 
implementation, the turn to multiculturalism is presented 
in passive voice and carries a teleological tendency in early 
accounts.120 For example, Widgren describes the turn as 
a teleological process brought about by immigration into 
Sweden, unified demands for a generous minority policy by 
the minority groups and a general breakthrough of a more 
progressive outlook on ethno-cultural diversity among the 
political parties and forces influencing public opinion.121 
The agency of the actors Widgren mentions in passing is 
not specified; no individuals, specific parties or forces are 
identified and Widgren also, perhaps out of modesty, writes 
himself out of the process. The focus of Widgren’s short 
account is on the process, not on whom or what made the 
process happen. 
Nevertheless, the narratives by Widgren and other actors 
involved in the turn have contributed to my understanding on 
the events and processes leading up to the turn. For example, 
Widgren’s brief comment that the two main arguments for a 
multiculturalist society (i.e. no-one should have to abandon 
his/her language and ethnic identity and that ethno-cultural 
diversity is enriching and beneficial for the whole of society) 
120 See e.g. SOU 1974:69, Invandrarutredningen 3. Invandrarna och 
minoriteterna: huvudbetänkande (Stockhom 1974), pp. 46–50; Jonas 
Widgren, ’Recent trends in European migration policies’, International 
Review of Education, 21 (1975), pp. 275–285; Jonas Widgren, ’Aktuella 
trender i europeisk migrationspolitik’, Invandrare och Minoriteter 
3–4/1976, pp. 25–30; Sulo Huovinen, ’En kulturpolitik för språkliga 
minoriteter’, Svensk invandrarpolitik inför 1980-talet. Rapport från 
invandrarrådets rådslag den 15–17 juni 1979 (Stockholm: LiberFörlag 
1979), pp. 82–102; Kjell Öberg, ’När Sverige blev ett invandrarland’, Tiden 
1980:4, pp. 241–249. 
121 Widgren, Svensk invandrarpolitik, p. 88.
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made an impression on the Commission of Immigration and 
was an important lead for this dissertation project.122 These 
accounts were, however, not written as historical treatises 
but with the intention of providing a short and legitimizing 
background to the then current (post-turn) polit ics 
coupled to discussions on how the multicultural society 
and multiculturalist policy could be further developed. The 
teleological narrative of progress presented in passive voice 
was, to a degree, reproduced when historians started writing, 
at the beginning of the 1990s, on post-war immigration and 
its consequences.  
Historical studies on Swedish multiculturalism
In the standard work on post-war immigration into Sweden, 
Från arbetskraftsimport till f lyktinginvandring (1994), 
economic historians Christer Lundh & Rolf Ohlsson casually 
and causally claim that the growth of immigrant minorities 
was strong in the early 1960s and that this engendered 
an explicit and coherent minority policy.123 The growth 
in numbers and size of the immigrant minority groups 
was, however, even stronger in the latter part of the 1960s, 
although this did not compel the Social Democratic Party 
to introduce an explicit and coherent minority policy at 
that time. Lundh & Olsson also sweepingly claim that the 
minorities, both new and old, as individual collectives 
and collectively demanded a minority-friendly policy on 
multiculturalism.124 As a matter of fact, this was also how 
the ethnic activists of the 1960s framed their demands 
122 Ibid.
123 Lundh & Ohlsson, p. 122. 
124 Ibid., p. 123. 
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and how the introduction of official multiculturalism was 
later legitimized by, among others, Jonas Widgren and the 
Commission on Immigration in the mid-1970s. 
However, as shown in this thesis, the conceptualization 
of non-Swedish ethnic groups in Sweden as (national) 
minorities and the political demands that followed from 
this was highly contested within and between the groups. 
Furthermore, I emphasize that official multiculturalism was 
introduced after immigration had decreased substantially; 
that is, when it seemed that the growth of immigrant groups 
had been halted. Harald Runblom’s seminal article ‘Swedish 
multiculturalism in a Comparative European Perspective’ 
(1994) also, to some extent, reproduced the passive voice 
of the (victorious) narrative on the multicultural moment. 
Runblom’s historical and comparative take on the established 
narrative of the moment nonetheless dismantles the teleology 
of formal and semi-formal accounts. There is more on 
‘Swedish multiculturalism in a Comparative European 
Perspective’ below.
In En invandrarpolitisk oppositionell. Debattören David 
Schwarz syn på svensk invandrarpolitik åren 1964–1993, 
Henrik Román analyses David Schwarz’s perspective on 
Swedish immigrant policy from 1964 to 1993 on the basis 
of Schwarz’s debate articles. Román’s booklet introduces the 
life and writings of Schwarz and provided a starting point 
for this dissertation project. The main work in Swedish 
on the post-war history of the Finns in Sweden, Finnarnas 
historia i Sverige 3. Tiden efter 1945 (1996) is, together with 
the main study on the same subject in Finnish, Suomalaiset 
Ruotsissa (2000), an invaluable resource on the history of 
Finnish labour immigration into Sweden.125 The multicultural 
125 Finnarnas historia i Sverige 3. Tiden efter 1945, ed. Jarmo Lainio 
(Stockholm: Finska Historiska Samfundet/Nordiska museet 1996); 
Korkiasaari & Tarkiainen, Suomalaiset Ruotsissa.
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moment is also touched upon in both works, especially in 
Suomalaiset Ruotsissa that narrates the intra-Finnish feuds 
on, among other things, whether the Finns were a national 
minority in the making or a group of social democratic 
workers with some ‘special problems’ and on how they should 
organize themselves politically in Sweden. 
Due to the language barrier, neither Suomalaiset Ruotsissa 
nor other academic works in Finnish have been utilized by 
Swedish researchers. The same is true for source material in 
Finnish. This has created something of a blind-spot on the 
largest and politically most important immigrant group in 
post-war Sweden as a factor in Swedish politics. Finnish-
speaking researchers writing in Swedish or English have, 
however, mainly been interested in the social and cultural 
history of the Finnish migratory experience, not the history 
of ideas and politics relating to migration.126 This has left a 
research gap on the transnational politicking of the Finns 
in Sweden and bilateral Finnish-Swedish discussions on the 
Finns in Sweden, a gap that this dissertation only partially 
fills. 
126 See e.g. Marja Ågren, ’”Är du finsk, eller ...?” En etnologisk studie om 
att växa upp och leva med finsk bakgrund i Sverige (Göteborg: Göteborgs 
universitet 2006); Hanna Snellman, ’Lapplandsborna i Göteborg’, 
Svenskt i Finland - finskt i Sverige 2. Mellan majoriteter och minoriteter: 
om migration, makt och mening, eds. Marianne Junila & Charles Westin 
(Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 2006), pp. 103–123; 
Anneli Sarvimäki, Sirkka-Liisa Ekman, Kristiina Heikkilä, Gunilla Kulla 
& Liisa Palo-Bengtsson, ’Så blev livet. Reflektioner kring migration’, 
Svenskt i Finland - finskt i Sverige 2. Mellan majoriteter och minoriteter: 
om migration, makt och mening, eds. Marianne Junila & Charles Westin 
(Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 2006), pp. 442–470; 
Mirjaliisa Lukkarinen Kvist, Tiden har haft sin gång. Hem och tillhörighet 
bland sverigefinnar i Mälardalen (Linköping: Linköpings universitet 2006). 
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In  h is  g round-bre a k ing  h is tor ica l  s tudy  on  t he 
development of Swedish immigrant policy in the post-war 
period, Jämlikhet och valfrihet: en studie av den svenska 
invandrarpolitikens framväxt (2001), historian Lars-Erik 
Hansen expands on Román’s work on Schwarz and the 
debates on the immigrant question in the 1960s.127 Jämlikhet 
och valfrihet is a pioneering work on the post-war history 
of Swedish integration policy and is regularly cited in later 
political and social science studies. Hansen empirically 
charts the discourses on immigrant policy from 1945 to 
1975 with detours back to the inter-war period. Hansen’s and 
Roman’s studies were the first empirically grounded historical 
accounts on the actors and debates that shaped (what I term) 
the multicultural moment. Without the efforts of Hansen and 
Román, this dissertation would not exist in the form it does 
today. 
In Jämlikhet och valfrihet ,  Hansen declares that he 
will critically discuss two of Roman’s results: Roman’s 
categorization of contesting camps in the first major debate 
on the immigrant question into zealous assimilationists 
(assmiliationsivrare) and pluralists and Roman’s actor-
centric hypothesis that David Schwarz seemingly played 
a pivotal part in the way in which the new policy of 1975 
was formulated. However, among these issues, Hansen 
only addresses the question of categorization head on; he 
argues that the group Román terms ‘zealous assimilationists’ 
should be termed ‘advocates of a mixed culture society’ 
(blandkulturförespråkare) as they were not keen supporters 
of assimilation. Political scientist Carl Dahlström, however, 
categorizes  the two groups as  mult icultural ists  and 
127 Lars-Erik Hansen,  Jämlikhet och valfr ihet:  en studie av den 
svenska invandrarpolitikens framväxt (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International 2001).
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universalists in his analysis of the debate from 2004.128 
I think all three are misguided in their labelling of the 
group I have chosen to term ‘progressive assimilationists’.129 
The 1960s’ advocates of assimilation were neither Swedish 
ethno-nationalists nor advocates of a mixed culture and, 
as Will Kymlicka, the leading political philosopher of 
multiculturalism has pointed out, there is no such thing 
as non-assimilationist universalism because states are not 
ethno-culturally neutral.130 The perception that the modern 
and secular Swedish state was, or at least strived to be, 
ethno-culturally neutral and universalist did, however, form 
the basis for the progressive assimilationists opposition to 
multiculturalism. The progressive assimilationists perceived 
the idea of multiculturalism as reactionary collectivism, 
the primacy of blood-lines, tradition and conservatism 
over modernity and the progressive emancipation of the 
individual, thus arguing much in the same way as many of 
today’s numerous critics of multiculturalism.131 
Hansen’s disregard for Román’s tentative claim that 
Schwarz played an important part in the making of Swedish 
multiculturalism probably stems from Hansen’s theoretical 
approach: “I analyse the actors from a discursive perspective 
[…] and is therefore not interested in the interests of the 
actor or their tactical games.”132 However, I have studied 
128 Carl Dahlström, Nästan välkomna. Invandrarpolitikens retorik och 
praktik (Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet 2004), p. 88.
129 ’Multiculturalists’ is an apt categorization of the group I call 
ethnic activists if one merely considers the ideological position of the 
‘multiculturalists’, but as I also focus on the personal history of the 
‘multiculturalists’ and their political activism, I have chosen the more 
contextualizing label ethnic activists. See subchapter 5.2. 
130 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minori-
ty Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995). 
131 For more on the progressive assimilationists see study I in this thesis. 
132 ”Jag analyserar aktörerna ur ett diskursperspektiv […] och är därför 
inte intresserad av aktörernas intressen eller taktiska spel.” Hansen 2001, 
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the multicultural moment from an idea- and actor-centric 
perspective. Thus, I have also taken an analytical interest in 
the motives and intentions of the actors and their “games”. 
From this perspective, Román’s argument on the importance 
of Schwarz, which he advanced solely on a comparison 
between the policy prescriptions made by Schwarz in his 
debate articles and the policy aims of the state-sponsored 
multiculturalism introduced in 1975, must be applauded.133 
Hansen’s neglect of the role of the actors, their interests and 
tactical games in his examination on the development of 
Swedish immigrant policy is perfectly understandable as he 
primarily employs a method of discourse analysis to chart the 
development of policy. However, in so doing, he presents a 
fragmented narrative on the policy turn that displays gaps of 
information, inaccuracies and temporal incoherence. 
A major problem of Hansen’s Jämlikhet och valfrihet is 
that, although Hansen professes to historically chart the 
emergence of the field of immigration policy with the use of 
discourse analysis, he does not map or present the analysed 
discourses diachronically. Evidence of the discourses, usually 
written statements from the source material, is presented 
and analysed without much regard to when the statements 
were made. Hansen’s theoretical and methodological need to 
fit the historical evidence into a scheme of discourses leads 
to a disregard for the historicity of the source material from 
which the evidence is derived; speech acts are categorized 
as belonging to this or that discourse and the temporal 
context of the speech-acts and also the discourses that the 
speech-acts purportedly manifest are neglected. Due to a 
lack of information and the dogmatic scheme of discourses, 
Hansen, for instance, declares that the Working Group on 
p. 21. More on the limitations of Hansen’s method of discourse analysis in 
the following sub-chapter. 
133 Román, p. 37. 
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Immigration suffered from conceptual confusion when, in 
1968, it argued that a compromise between integration and 
assimilation must be sought.134 In light of how the concept of 
integration had been defined in 1968 by the Working Group’s 
expert, Harald Swedner, partly on the basis of the ethnic 
activist’s definition of integration, the group’s statement on 
the need to reach a compromise between integration and 
assimilation makes perfect sense (see study II in this thesis). 
When the existence of a discourse at a particular point 
in time has been established by Hansen, he proceeds to 
infer, sometimes on a very loose or non-existent empirical 
basis, that the discourse has become dominant. Hansen, 
for example, claims that David Schwarz (or the discourse 
emanating from Schwarz) in 1967 had broad-based social 
democratic support, that the social democrats positioned 
themselves in support of increased ethnic equality (i.e. 
a confusing analytical concept employed by Hansen to 
categorically label anything not explicitly assimilationist) and 
that large parts of the social democratic movement came out 
in support of state-sponsored multiculturalism at this time.135 
This was simply not the case: the social democratic movement 
was staunchly anti-multiculturalist in 1967, as shown in 
studies I and IV in this thesis. It is highly questionable 
whether the social democratic movement has ever shown 
broad-based support for multiculturalism or to the much 
more radical ‘ethnic equality’ concept employed by Hansen, 
even after the idea of multiculturalism was conditionally 
adopted by the Social Democratic Party in the 1970s. Hansen 
wants to prove his thesis that the changes in discourse he 
identified almost immediately caused radical political change 
in a simple causality model of discursive change–policy 
change, even though he lacks empirical evidence to support 
134 Hansen 2001, p. 142.
135 Hansen 2001, p. 146.
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his claims.
Hansen did, however, produce new historical knowledge 
on the birth of Swedish immigration policy in the post-war 
period. Hansen paved the way for further historical research 
on both the policy-making process and the multicultural 
moment by uncovering new information and, at the same 
time, revealing the gaps in historical knowledge on the 
subject. Later historical, political and social science research 
has not filled these gaps because the ‘hows’ and ‘whys’ of the 
multicultural moment as an historical turning point have 
not been of main research interest. Explanations for the 
introduction of official multiculturalism that have not strictly 
followed the teleological narrative utilized to legitimize 
the new policy after it was introduced have, however, been 
presented on a regular basis since the 1990s. 
3.1 Explaining Sweden’s political turn to 
multiculturalism in earlier research 
Since the 1990s, the multiculturalist turn of Sweden has been 
a subject of both historical and social scientific research as a 
part of the general rise in academic interest on immigration 
into Sweden. In the article ‘Swedish multiculturalism in 
a Comparative European Perspective’ (1994), historian 
Harald Runblom argued that Swedish multiculturalism, as 
a political ideology, constituted a clear break from Swedish 
traditions when it was introduced in the 1970s.136 Runblom 
points to four factors that caused what he characterizes as 
136 Harald Runblom, ‘Swedish multiculturalism in a Comparative 
European Perspective’, Sociological Forum 9 (1994), pp. 623–640.
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a “180° turn”.137 First, there was a “growing awareness” that 
some immigrant groups, especially the Greeks and the Turks, 
who had arrived in the late 1950s and in the 1960s were 
not as easily integrated as groups who had come during the 
1940s and 1950s.138 Second, because of these ‘problematic’ 
immigrants groups, the Swedish government established 
immigrant policy as a policy field. Here Runblom refers to 
parliamentary motions on supporting the aspirations of the 
Balts in Sweden; however, the Balts were one of the groups 
who had arrived in the 1940s and, thus, supposedly followed 
Runblom’s first factor of an ‘unproblematic’ group. Third, 
“in certain circles awareness was growing that the state had 
moral responsibility for the well-being [of the immigrants]” 
and the Swedish authorities “discovered and accepted the 
consequences” of the population’s diversification. Fourth, 
Finland initiated international pressure.139 
Runblom’s brief and hypothetical explanation for the 
“180° turn” was, in light of later research including my own, 
surprisingly poignant. Runblom’s article functioned as one of 
the starting points for this dissertation project and one could 
argue that some of the factors and processes Runblom points 
to have now been empirically substantiated and analytically 
fleshed out. An odd feature of previous Swedish research is 
the lack of references to earlier research. Runblom’s article is 
not referred to in later research on the multiculturalist turn; 
for example, Hansen’s Jämlikhet och valfrihet does not cite 
Runblom’s article. 
Runblom’s article also garners no mention in studies 
on political science that discuss and/or try to explain the 
multiculturalist turn such as Demker and Malmström’s 
Ingenmansland? Svensk immigrationspolitik i utrikespolitisk 
137 Ibid., p. 629.
138 Ibid., pp. 629–630
139 Ibid., p. 630.
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belysning (1999)140; Ulf Mörkenstam ’Ekonomi, kultur 
och jämlikhet: teman i svensk politik i invandrarfrågor 
decennierna efter andra världskriget’ (2010)141 and Karin 
Borevi ’Sverige: mångkulturalismens flaggskepp i Norden’ 
(2010)142. 
My initial reading of Runblom, Román and Hansen in the 
latter half of the 2000s partly satisfied my curiosity while, 
at the same time, leaving me wanting more information 
and analysis on what I, from my temporal vantage point, 
perceived to be a profound shift in the modern history of 
Sweden. The works of Runblom, Román and Hansen thus 
provided an impetus to initiate this dissertation project 
and the historiographical basis on which to further develop 
Sweden’s multicultural moment as a research problem. 
Neither Hansen’s discourse analytical approach, nor 
Rumblom’s empirically and theoretically vague factors 
nor Román’s short biography on Schwarz as a debater, 
fulfilled my then dim expectations concerning what should 
be known on such a pivotal and comparatively unique 
historical turning point. After I began my own research 
into the matter, I was able to determine why I found the 
historical accounts of Runblom, Román and Hansen, and 
also the political and social science literature referred to 
140 Marie Demker & Cecilia Malmström, Ingenmansland? Svensk 
immigrationspolitik i utrikespolitisk belysning (Lund: Studentlitteratur 1999).
141 Ulf Mörkenstam ’Ekonomi, kultur och jämlikhet: teman i svensk 
politik i invandrarfrågor decennierna efter andra världskriget’, Historisk 
tidskrift för Finland 95 (2010), pp. 572–607.
142 Karin Borevi, ’Sverige: mångkulturalismens flaggskepp i Norden’, 
Velferdens grenser. Innvandringspolitikk og velferdsstat i Skandinavia 
1945–2010 ,  eds.  Grete Brochmann & Anniken Hagelund (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget 2010), pp. 41–130. See study II, ’The difference white 
ethnics made: the multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the 
cases of Canada and Denmark’, in this thesis for a discussion on Borevi’s 
synthesis of earlier explanations for the turn. 
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above, lacking: the theoretical approach, be it discourse 
analysis, institutionalism, policy analysis or a mix of all 
three, produced accounts of the turn that, in my opinion, 
underplayed the role of actors, ideas and concepts within 
the historical process and also the nature and composition of 
post-war immigration. 
The method of discourse analysis utilized in the earlier 
research in particular overlooks the agency of actors 
as conceivers and users of ideas and concepts. Instead, 
applications of the method have led to a form of circular 
reasoning on the emergence of multiculturalism: an 
empirically observed discourse is explained as a product of 
that same discourse. At the level of actual political impact, 
the explanatory value of discourse analysis can also become 
rather mystical as historians might, knowingly or unwittingly, 
endow ‘discourse’ itself with agency. Hansen, for instance, 
argues that “the equality discourse drove all established 
parties, influenced all ideologies in the direction of state-
intervening pluralism [i.e. multiculturalism]”143. This might 
be so, but it begs the question of why the “equality discourse”, 
apparently in place since at least the beginning of the 1960s, 
as connected by Hansen to the so-called active foreign policy 
of Sweden and the establishment of the welfare state, did not 
work its magic before the 1970s, why the Swedish equality 
discourse produced this outcome when equality discourses 
in other countries did not and why exactly the (Swedish) 
equality discourse drove both parties and “ideologies” 
towards multiculturalism and not assimilationism, which it 
arguably had done before the 1970s.
In a similar fashion to Hansen, political scientist Ulf 
Mörkenstam primarily employs a method of Foucauldian 
143 ”[J]ämlikhetsdiskursen drev på alla etablerade partier, påverkade 
samtliga ideologier i riktning mot en statsintervernerande pluralism”, 
Hansen 2001, p. 224. 
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discourse analysis to uncover the normative foundations 
of Swedish immigrant policy between 1946 and 1976. 
Mörkenstam acknowledges that the methodology of his 
analysis marginalizes individual actors, although he argues 
that the party political consensus on immigration policy in 
the time-period he studied lessens the problem of omitting 
actors.144 I maintain, in line with Borvei and Hammar145, 
and in this thesis show that the lack of pronounced party 
politicization gave individual actors a much more influential 
position in the agenda-setting and policy-making process 
than would have been the case if immigrant policy had been 
party politicized. 
In comparison to Hansen’s chronically fragmented analysis 
of Swedish immigration policy discourse(s), Mörkenstam’s 
narrative follows the normative changes in discourse 
in an orderly fashion from 1946 to 1976 by analysing a 
clearly delimited string of statements on immigration and 
immigrants in official publications such as Commission 
reports, government propositions and law. Mörkenstam 
makes several noteworthy observations on discursive ‘themes’ 
in the material and some of these observations have been of 
relevance for my dissertation project. For example, he notes 
that concerns on security in connection to immigration 
declined in salience and that immigration was regarded as 
economically beneficial.146 He also emphasizes the importance 
of Nordism and Finnish immigration in the discourse on 
immigration and immigrant policy.147 My dissertation project 
has benefited from the results of Mörkenstam’s discourse 
analytical reading of official statements on immigration 
policy, even though Mörkenstam’s analysis does not go 
144 Mörkenstam, pp. 574–575.
145 Hammar, p. 45. 
146 Mörkenstam, p. 586.
147 Ibid., pp. 599–600.
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deeply into the discourse to reveal the ideas, players and 
moves that produced the themes and norms that he finds 
on display in the formal documents. Moreover, much in 
the same way as Hansen, Mörkenstam’s explanations for 
the discursive changes he detects suffers from theoretical 
overstretch brought on by the choice of theory and method. 
The discourse(s), seemingly immune to human agency 
and interest, reproduces and sometimes reconfigures 
itself according to changing ‘structural’ circumstances 
and impresses itself on policy. According to Mörkenstam, 
Sweden’s multiculturalism in the 1970s somehow amounted 
to the re-creation of the cultural hierarchies embedded 
in Swedish nationalism during the early 20th century. 
Mörkenstam construes the multiculturalist recognition of 
difference introduced in the mid-1970s as negative othering 
of immigrants brought about by the nebulous force of 
institutionalized Swedish nationalism.148 In Mörkenstam’s 
account, the immigrants or, for that matter, the Swedes 
themselves are bereft of political agency. Multiculturalism 
becomes a product of Swedish ethnocentrism forced on the 
hapless immigrants; Sweden and Swedish ideological power 
as the subject, the immigrant other as the excluded object. 
In addition to a lack of information, disregard for human 
agency and diachronic incoherencies, the earlier research 
also carries methodological nationalist tendencies. The 
explanations for the Swedish turn to multiculturalism are 
fuelled by the unarticulated assumption that only factors 
inside nationally bounded societies, in this case Sweden, 
determine and explain historical change. There are also, with 
the exception of Runblom, no attempts to analytically situate 
the Swedish turn in a transnational context or to contrast the 
Swedish case with other national cases. The methodological 
nationalism of previous research is especially apparent in the 
148 Ibid., pp. 605–606.
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‘active foreign policy-argument’ put forward by both Hansen 
and Demker & Malmström, which seemingly transcends 
the boundaries of the Swedish nation in its explanation for 
the multiculturalist turn, although ultimately falling back 
on a very national and social democratic cause. According 
to Hansen, and also Demker & Malmström, Sweden’s active 
foreign policy, which included a critique on racism and 
ethnic discrimination in other countries, made the Swedish 
government vulnerable to moral critique on how it treated 
minority groups in Sweden. Therefore, as the Swedish 
government wanted to pursue its active foreign policy, it had 
to adjust its own policy on immigrants and minorities. There 
is, however, nothing to suggest that Sweden faced any serious 
charges of hypocrisy in the international arena on this point. 
Sweden’s active foreign policy, with its concomitant critique 
on racial discrimination, was perhaps in its most active phase 
in the years prior to Sweden’s official turn to multiculturalism 
in 1975.149 
Hansen apparently takes the arguments of the ethnic 
activists as literal truths by arguing, without providing any 
empirical evidence to support his claim, that when abroad, 
Swedish diplomats, politicians and journalists were often 
reproached about the situation of the immigrants and 
minorities in Sweden and that this led to a re-evaluation of 
domestic policy.150 Demker & Malmström, in turn, stretch 
149 Kjell Östberg, När vinden vände: Olof Palme 1969-1986 (Stockholm: 
Leopard 2009), p. 111. See also Tor Sellström, Sweden and National Liberation 
in Southern Africa. Vol. 1, Formation of a Popular Opinion (1950-1970) 
(Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 1999); Tor Sellström, Sweden and National 
Liberation in Southern Africa. Vol. 2, Solidarity and Assistance 1970-1994 
(Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2002).
150 Hansen 2001, p. 205. The ethnic activists, in particular Schwarz, 
often emphasized what they conceptualized as a discrepancy between the 
internationalism of Swedish foreign policy and the policies towards the 
immigrants and minorities in Sweden. To widen the scope of this claim 
to include international remarks on Swedish ideological inconsistency, 
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their thesis too thinly when they argue that, in addition to 
Sweden’s immigration policy, its integration policy can also 
“to a great extent can be explained by Sweden’s active foreign 
[policy] profile [utrikesprofil] and the picture of reality that 
this profile gave rise to”.151 Demker & Malmström fail to 
realize that multiculturalism in no way had been established 
as an international norm in the 1970s and that Sweden, 
ceteris paribus, could be conceptualized and portrayed as a 
leading country in immigrant/integration policy, in line with 
the picture of reality that the active foreign policy profile 
potentially gave rise to without embracing multiculturalism 
as a political idea. In fact, Sweden was portrayed as a 
leading country in the field of immigration policy well 
before multiculturalism became official policy as Hansen, 
contradicting his own foreign policy argument, has shown.152 
This is not to say that the idea of internationalism, the 
internationalism of prime minister Olof Palme in particular, 
and the use of this idea to further the idea of multiculturalism 
did not facilitate the multiculturalist turn, although there was 
nothing intrinsically multiculturalist about post-war Swedish 
foreign policy. Sweden’s active foreign policy emphasized the 
principles of democracy, human rights (at that time, human 
rights were conceptualized as individual rights, not minority 
Schwarz, in his 1971 book Svensk invandrar- och minoritetspolitik 1945–68, 
referred to a statement made by South Africa in the general assembly of 
the UN on the 14th October 1960 that criticized Sweden and Norway (both 
prominent critics of Apartheid) for discriminating the Sámi and two similar 
manoeuvres made by the dictatorships of Portugal in 1969 and Poland in 
1970 after the Swedish critique. However, Schwarz himself conceded that 
these few instances of international critique from authoritarian regimes 
hardly made the minority question in Sweden a foreign policy concern. 
David Schwarz, Svensk invandrar- och minoritetspolitik 1945–68, p. 48. 
151 Demker & Malmström, p. 150. 
152 Hansen 2001, p. 205. 
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or group rights, in the arena of international relations153), 
universalist anti-racism and national sovereignty protected 
by international law.154 
Hansen and Demker & Malmström thus present a line of 
argument that tries to break from the national framework, 
although reproducing it in a different form. According to 
Hansen and Demker & Malmström, Sweden’s multiculturalist 
turn was, at least in part, caused by the active foreign policy 
of the social democratic Swedish government. Hansen also 
criticizes Demker & Malmström for being unable to show the 
connections between Sweden’s foreign policy and the Swedish 
policy of multiculturalism while ultimately failing to do so 
himself.155 
The earlier research on Sweden’s turn to multiculturalism 
has undoubtedly covered many aspects of the turn, although 
its  nation-state-centric angle and often discursively 
underpinned observations have, to some extent, overlooked 
actors and processes below, beyond or even inside the 
Swedish welfare state. Policy change is not always set in 
motion by national political elites, institutions or ideological 
traditions. 
 
153 Duncan Ivison, ‘Introduction: Multiculturalism as a Public Ideal’, 
The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism, ed. Duncan Ivison 
(Farnham: Ashgate Publishing 2010) p. 5.
154 See e.g. Ulf Bjereld, Kritiker eller medlare? En studie av Sveriges 
utrikespolitiska roller 1945–90 (Stockholm: Nerenius & Santérus 1992). 
155 Hansen 2001, p. 33.
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4 Theory and method
Tracing the emergence of  an idea and analysing its 
development and political impact makes for a multi-layered 
and multifaceted research problem. The nature of the research 
problem led me to approach it from different theoretical 
and methodological angles. However, at its theoretical and 
methodological core, this work is a study on the history of 
ideas. My dissertation seeks to historicize the multicultural 
moment of Sweden by exploring it as it developed in a 
particular historical context and was conceived and shaped 
by the agency of historical actors. The premise of the study 
is that history is not wholly determined by socioeconomic 
structures or self-generating discourses (in a discourse 
analytical or Foucauldian sense) and that the making of 
the future both in the past and in the present is never self-
evident, but contingent on, among other things, the acts of 
men and the ideas they devise, develop and employ. 
Following the theoretical and methodological tradition 
of the history of ideas or intellectual history, I have regarded 
texts and documents of the past, in the words of intellectual 
historian J.G.A. Pocock, “as media of political discourse, 
in which authors perform speech acts upon readers and 
universes, and respondents perform acts leading to dispute 
and reflection.”156 Political discourse is here understood as 
being conducted “in a context of shared languages, consisting 
of variety of language games” which have been historically 
constituted and which are “specialised to perform rhetorical 
and paradigmatic functions related to the conceptualization 
and conduct of politics”.157 To make sense of the emergence 
of the idea of multiculturalism in Swedish political discourse, 
156 J.G.A. Pocock, Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and 
Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009), p. 81. 
157 Ibid., p. 81. 
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I have traced and analysed speech acts that manifested and, 
more importantly, utilized the idea of multiculturalism in 
arguments aiming at political change. 
By speech-act I mean, following Pocock and fellow 
intellectual historian Quentin Skinner, ‘doing things with 
words’; that is, what historical actors were doing when 
making their utterances and, in particular, what kind of 
“move” they (potentially) performed.158 I thus posed the 
question of what kind of action is performed in a text or in 
particular statements of a text. To understand these actions, 
they must be, as Pocock points out, placed “within a context 
furnished ultimately by social practices and historical 
situations, but also – in some ways more immediately – 
by the political languages by means of which the acts are 
performed”.159 Pocock defines ‘political languages’ primarily 
as “idioms, rhetorics,  ways of talking about politics, 
distinguishable language games of which each may have its 
own vocabulary, rules, preconditions and implications, tone 
and style”160. This means that in addition to asserting what 
was said, I have also addressed the matter of how it was said, 
why it was said in a particular manner and in what way the 
utterances might have had an effect on subsequent speech-
acts and, thus, political discourse. Political discourse is in this 
dissertation project is simply defined as the communication 
of political ideas and arguments, either through the spoken 
158 “To put it in another way, there is a sense in which we need to 
understand why a certain proposition has been put forward if we wish 
to understand the proposition itself. We need to see it not simply as a 
proposition, but also as a move in argument. So we need to grasp why it 
seemed worth making that precise move; to recapture the presuppositions 
and purposes that went into the making of it.” Quentin Skinner, ‘A reply to 
my critics’, Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics, ed. James 
Tully (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988), p. 274. 
159 Pocock, p. 67. 
160 Pocock, p. 89. 
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or written word. 
An understanding on the social, political and intellectual 
context and also intimate familiarization with the inter-
textual context of the debate, in which the author was 
participating, was thus necessary to answer the questions 
concerning what the actors said and meant: “the intended 
force with which the utterances is said”161. The intellectual 
and inter-textual contexts were identified through a holistic 
reading of contemporary texts; that is, the contexts were not 
identified separately from any particular contemporary text. 
The contexts were rather analytically constructed through 
a process of analysing different (and, it would turn out, at 
times inter-textually connected) contemporary texts that was 
conducted in tandem with reading narrative sources and the 
research literature on the post-war period. I was thus able 
to learn the ‘languages’ in which the political discourse was 
conducted, situate the texts in the contexts of which they 
themselves were constitutive parts, develop an understanding 
on what their authors were doing in writing them and what 
the conventions (the then prevailing tacit assumptions and 
practices162) on ethno-cultural diversity in Swedish political 
discourse were and in what way these embedded conventions 
were challenged by the speech-acts (and other actions) of a 
particular set of actors and ultimately reconfigured. 
Following this method, I plotted the emergence of the idea 
of multiculturalism in Swedish public discourse as a series of 
moves and counter-moves beginning with the opening move 
of David Schwarz in October 1964. I was attentive to any 
form of conceptual innovation in the debate(s) that followed 
and was able to pinpoint the introduction and propagation 
161 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 1: Regarding Method 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), p. 82. 
162 Kari Palonen, Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric (Cambridge: 
Polity 2003), p. 41. 
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of new concepts such as ‘the multicultural society’163 as the 
idea of multiculturalism took shape through argument. 
The operation of tracing and analysing the speech-acts was 
supplemented and underpinned by tracing concomitant 
actions conducted with the intention of advancing the idea 
through means other than performing (public) speech-
acts and performing rhetorical moves; for example, ‘making 
contact’ and ‘collaborating’. 
The question on how a move was performed with a 
speech-act has been primarily answered by identifying two 
specific and interconnected linguistic actions, referring 
(including pleading and invoking) and legitimizing. To what 
or whom did the actors refer when making their claims and 
in what way did the actors try to legitimize their claims? The 
question of legitimacy is not, as Skinner has pointed out, 
merely a question of epiphenomenal ex post rationalizations 
for chosen courses of political action. Politicking, for instance 
the choice between policies, requires legitimation, especially 
if the political move attempted by an actor is in some way 
untoward, which was the case with the advancement of 
multiculturalism.164 Skinner typifies an actor attempting 
to legitimize untoward social and political action as an 
“innovating ideologist”: 
It  i s  by  descr ibing and thereby commending 
certain courses of action as (say) honest or friendly 
or  courageous,  whi le  descr ibing and thereby 
condemning others as treacherous or aggressive or 
cowardly, that we sustain our vision of the social 
behaviour we wish to encourage or disavow. This 
being so, all innovating ideologists may be said to 
163 S ee  Study I ,  ‘C onceptual  Change in  Postwar  Sweden:  The 
Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of Integration’, in 
this thesis. 
164 Skinner, Visions of Politics, pp. 145–148.
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face a hard but obvious rhetorical task. Their goal is 
to legitimise questionable forms of social behaviour. 
Their aim must therefore be to show that a number 
of favourable terms can somehow be applied to their 
seemingly questionable actions. If they can bring off 
this rhetorical trick, they can hope to argue that the 
condemnatory descriptions otherwise liable to be 
applied to their behaviour can be overridden or set 
aside.165
I have chosen to describe David Schwarz as an “innovating 
ideologist” in ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The 
Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of 
Integration’ (study I) as Skinner’s ideal type perfectly fits 
the actions of Schwarz. The categorization of Schwarz as an 
innovating ideologist underlines the historical importance 
of the actions of Schwarz and his fellow promoters of 
multiculturalism who, in a way, were also innovating 
ideologists in their own right.166 The innovating ideologist 
Schwarz, followed by the other advocates of multiculturalism, 
was able to, in the way Skinner posits, “challenge your 
opponents to reconsider the feelings of disapproval or they 
normally express when they use the terms concerned” by 
rhetorically re-describing concepts such as homogeneity (as 
in the homogenous society), assimilation and integration. 
Skinner notes that the innovative ideologist “can try in the 
first place to introduce new and favourable terms into the 
language” and simply “coin new terms as the descriptions of 
allegedly new principles, and then apply them as descriptions 
of whatever questionable actions you [the innovating 
ideologist] wish to see commended”.167 
165 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 149. 
166 E.g. Artturi Similä (see study III in this thesis) and Jonas Widgren (see 
study IV in this thesis). 
167 Skinner, Visions of Politics, p. 151.
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This is exactly what the ethnic activists did when they 
introduced the concept of the multicultural society and 
described this ‘new’ society (wherein minority groups uphold 
their own communities and seek to perpetuate the distinctive 
cultural character of the group transgenerationally ; a 
questionable action in post-war Sweden) by employing 
existing and favourable evaluative-descriptive terms such as, 
for example, modern, progressive, international, open and 
enriching. This rhetorical move was usually performed in 
tandem with a comparison to the ‘old’ homogenous society 
that was described by employing existing negative evaluative-
descriptive terms such as, for example, nationalistic, divisive, 
discriminatory and parochial. 
The activists’ conceptual innovation was thus made up of 
both the introduction of novel concepts and the innovative 
use of the established terminology of what could be referred 
to as the ‘political language of progress’ to prop up their new 
concepts and pejoratively described concepts deemed to be 
at odds with the idea of multiculturalism. The point here is 
that the activists had to address and utilize the prevailing 
conventions and political language to innovate in a manner 
that could be understood and successful.
The idea of multiculturalism emerged and developed 
through conceptual innovation and the concomitant use of 
the idea in political discourse. In this thesis, I have studied 
the idea of multiculturalism as it was conceptualized 
and advanced in political argument by actors engaged in 
politicking on the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of 
Sweden. The idea of multiculturalism emerged through 
conceptual innovation (e.g. the concept of the multicultural 
society), rhetorical re-descriptions or re-conceptualization 
(e.g. of the concept of assimilation), and by inter-connecting 
concepts in an oppositional scheme to a set of pejoratively 
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defined concepts (e.g. multicultural – uniform).168 Concepts 
not directly born out of the struggle to change discourse and 
politics in Sweden, such as semilingualism and identity, but 
that furthered advancement of the idea of multiculturalism, 
were also enlisted and given a place in the conceptual 
scheme that constituted the idea in Sweden by the time it was 
officially accepted in the mid-1970s. 
Precisely as the idea of multiculturalism was in flux when 
it emerged, it has clearly continued to change as it has been 
employed. The idea(s) of multiculturalism that exists today 
are not conceptual carbon copies of the post-war idea of 
multiculturalism as it was construed in Swedish political 
discourse and in the 1960s and 1970s, just as any idea that 
was conceptually constituted in a particular historical context 
and ‘lives on’ over time (in this case, to the present day) 
will be shaped by contestation and re-conceptualizations in 
different contexts.169 Although the idea of multiculturalism 
is very much a ‘living’ idea, we can still refer to the idea of 
multiculturalism then and now without committing the 
sin of anachronism. Employing the term ‘multiculturalism’ 
communicates that the idea of multiculturalism, over which 
we argue today, has a history of usage in argument and 
politics that reaches back to the 1960s.  
168 See studies I and II in this thesis.
169 James Farr, ‘Understanding conceptual change politically’, Political 
Innovation and Conceptual Change, eds. Terence Ball, James Farr & R. L. 
Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), pp. 24–50.
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4.1 Comparative and transnational perspectives
My interest in the multicultural moment of Sweden stems 
from what I perceived to be, from a temporally comparative 
perspective, the peculiarity of the moment. Sweden’s 
multicultural moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
seemed curious to me in light of the country’s history of 
state-sponsored race biology and assimilatory practices 
and I became even more curious when I realized, through a 
superficial synchronic comparison between Sweden and the 
rest of post-war Western Europe, that Sweden’s multicultural 
moment also stood out in the contemporary European 
context. One might say that a comparative perspective on 
Sweden’s multicultural moment gave birth to this dissertation 
project and that comparison, as a perspective and method, 
has been an integral part of the project from the beginning. 
The transnational perspective has been an in-built 
theoretical approach of the dissertation project because the 
project was conceived as a study on the history of ideas. 
Historians of ideas, intellectual historians and conceptual 
historians and also a host of other historians interested 
in phenomena, events and spaces that transcend or cross 
different kinds of border (usually national borders) have 
been studying transnational history since long before the 
term ‘transnational’ became a historiographical buzzword in 
the 1990s.170 The gist of the so-called transnational turn in 
historiography171, the notion that nation-states are not and 
170 Sisse Bjerrum Fossat, Anne Magnussen, Klaus Petersen & Nils 
Arne Sørensen, ’Transnational historie’, Transnationale historier, eds. 
Sisse Bjerrum Fossat, Anne Magnussen, Klaus Petersen & Nils Arne 
Sørensen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag 2009), pp. 9–15. 
171 For a historiographical disussion on transnational turn see Rolf 
Torstendahl, ‘Idén om global historia och den transnationella trenden’, 
Historisk tidskrift 129 (2009) pp. 235–240; Jürgen Osterhammel, ‘A 
‘Transnational’ History of Society: Continuity or New Departure?’, 
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never have been hermetically sealed containers but open 
vats in close proximity to each other, has been an important 
source of inspiration for the project, both methodologically 
and theoretically. 
Comparative history
The comparative historian Marc Bloch, an innovator in 
the field of historical research, noted that “there is no true 
understanding without a certain range of comparison”172 and 
this adage has been followed in this dissertation project both 
diachronically and synchronically. Diachronic, or historic, 
comparison uncovers and, more often than not, tries to 
explain change over time and constitutes a raison d’être for 
much of modern historiography. Synchronic comparison, 
however, seeks to explain similar and/or different outcomes 
between units of analysis in the same temporal context and is 
commonly employed in the social sciences.
What, then, does the use of synchronic comparison entail 
in historical research? Following comparative historian 
Jürgen Kocka, “comparing in history means to discuss two 
or more historical phenomena systematically with respect 
to their similarities and differences in order to reach certain 
intellectual aims”.173 Kocka argues that there are four principal 
methodological purposes and functions (i.e. intellectual aims) 
of comparative historical research: heuristic, descriptive, 
Comparison and Transnational History: Central European Approaches 
and New Perspectives, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt & Jürgen Kocka (New 
York: Berghahn Books 2009), pp. 39–51; Ian Tyrrell, ‘Reflections on the 
Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice’, Journal 
of Global History 4 (2009), pp. 453–474. 
172 Bloch, p. 35. 
173 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Comparison and Beyond’, History and Theory, 42 
(2003), p. 39. 
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analytical and paradigmatic. 
The heuristic function of the comparative approach 
enables an historian to identify problems and questions that 
would otherwise have remained unidentified and un-posed.174 
It was the heuristic function of comparison that enabled 
me, by studying the research literature on the emergence 
of multiculturalism as a political idea and the introduction 
of official multiculturalism in Canada and Australia, to, 
for example, develop an assumption that ethnic activism, a 
prominent feature of the Canadian and Australian cases, 
might also have been a feature of the Swedish moment. 
Working from this assumption, I discovered ethnic activism 
in the Swedish case. 
The descriptive function of historical comparison 
clarifies the profiles of single cases by contrasting them 
with other cases. Kocka points out that all particularistic 
characterisations of historical phenomena (e.g. the notion 
of a German Sonderweg) are, in a way, comparative and 
that comparison not only can gives impetus to descriptions 
of particularity but can also be employed to criticize such 
notions.175 In this dissertation project, by contrasting Sweden 
to the rest of Western Europe, I have clarified the profile of 
the Swedish case by emphasizing the particularity of Sweden’s 
multicultural moment in the European context. 
The analytical purpose of comparison is, according to 
Kocka, to ask and answer casual questions and also to criticize 
explanations of both a local and a generalizing type.176 Both 
analytical purposes of comparison have been employed in 
this dissertation project, even though I do not argue that, 
for instance, the idea of multiculturalism or ethnic activism 
caused Sweden’s multiculturalist turn. I have also utilized the 
174 Ibid., pp. 39–40.
175 Ibid., p. 40.
176 Ibid., pp. 40–41.
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comparative approach to challenge the particularity of earlier 
explanations for the turn.
Kocka finally argues that the paradigmatic function of 
comparison is the distancing effect (Verfremdung) from the 
case an historian knows best, usually the historian’s own 
country (in the comparison of countries), which means 
“comparison can have a de-provincializing, a liberating, 
and eye-opening effect”.177 The comparative approach has 
also provided an “eye-opening effect” in my work with this 
dissertation project, even from my Finnish vantage-point, as 
I have worked on the particulars of the Swedish multicultural 
moment accordingly to the (put in brief ) contextualising 
principles of historiography that can facilitate a reproduction 
of the nation-state as the self-evident framework for analysing 
and explaining past events and processes. 
A comparative approach has many advantages but also 
presents some methodological difficulties, the foremost of 
which are the questions on what it is that is to be compared 
and the selections and abstraction that are necessarily 
involved in the process of comparison. Clearly, all historical 
research must select and abstract; however, when comparing, 
such decisions are accentuated. In this dissertation project, I 
have not compared the ‘totality’ of Sweden with the totalities 
of other national contexts but with the specific historical 
phenomenon of the multicultural moment as it occurred (or 
didn’t occur) in the historical context of particular countries. 
Kocka and fellow comparative historian Heinz-Gerhard 
Haupt denote historical comparisons conducted to identify 
and understand the peculiarities of one case by asymmetrical 
comparison. In an asymmetrical comparison, the other cases 
are usually employed as background to the focal case that is 
investigated thoroughly, which means that the comparative 
study is not “full-blown” but a “national-historical analysis 
177 Ibid., p. 41.
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in a comparative perspective”.178 The three-way comparison 
between the cases of Sweden, Canada and Denmark in 
study I of this thesis, ‘The difference white ethnics made: the 
multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases 
of Canada and Denmark’, is not a full-blown comparative 
study but a national-historical analysis underpinned by a 
comparative perspective. By i) comparing two cases where 
similar historical events occurred (the contemporary 
multicultural turns of Sweden and Canada) and ii) two cases 
with similar societal histories (i.e. Sweden and Denmark) but 
with different outcomes at the event level, the peculiarities 
of the main case, Sweden, are revealed. In addition to 
clarifying the profile of the Swedish case and facilitating 
the explanation of the Swedish turn to multiculturalism, 
which was the main purpose for analysing Sweden from 
a comparative perspective, the three-way comparison of 
‘The difference white ethnics made’ also highlights some 
interesting aspects of the cases of Canada and Denmark and 
in general. The saliency of a strong Diaspora-mentality in 
multiculturalist claims-making (e.g. the Ukrainian Diaspora 
in Canada and the Estonian Diaspora in Sweden) and the 
importance of agency for the advancement of new political 
ideas (e.g. the lack of ethnic activists in Denmark) are results 
of the comparison that can be employed in further studies 
on multiculturalism in the specific national cases of Canada 
and Denmark and as analytical starting points for research on 
multiculturalism in other national contexts or for formulating 
theories on what brought or brings about multiculturalism. 
178 Jürgen Kocka & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, ‘Comparison and Beyond: 
Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History, Comparison 
and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New 
Perspectives, eds. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt & Jürgen Kocka (New York: 
Berghahn Books 2009), pp. 6–7.
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Transnational history
In this dissertation project, the comparative approach was 
employed in tandem with the transnational approach. The 
former approach aided me in formulating and answering my 
research questions, the latter gave me impetus to not shorten 
my investigation when the quest for answers went beyond the 
geographical borders of Sweden. 
The history of ideas has, in part, been ‘transnational’ in 
theoretical outlook due to the border-crossing capabilities 
of ideas and concepts. Ideas travel lightly; a whole school 
of thought can be transported between continents in a 
single letter. The study of ideas and concepts cannot be 
properly conducted if historically constituted borders 
methodologically delimit the analytical scope of the study. 
Studies on the history of ideas and conceptual history have 
undoubtedly often focused on the history of an idea or 
concept in any one country or polity, but without isolating 
the transnational history of the idea or concept that is 
scrutinized. In this thesis I have studied the history of an 
idea and concepts relating to that idea. I thus included the 
transnational approach as a relevant analytical perspective 
from the beginning of the dissertation project. My choice of 
analytical perspective was strengthened by familiarization 
with the so-called ‘transnational turn’ in historiography.
Although the transnational turn in historical studies is, 
as pointed out by historian Christoph Conrad, “as much a 
speech act in public relations, on the demarcation of domains 
and on the search for new founding as it is a theoretical 
revision”, it has also led to the posing of new questions 
and the discovery of new research subjects.179 The most 
179 Christoph Conrad, ‘Social policy history after the transnational turn’, 
Beyond Welfare State Models. Transnational Historical Perspectives on 
Social Policy, eds. Pauli Kettunen & Klaus Petersen (Cheltenham: Edward 
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important lesson of the transnational turn in contemporary 
historiography is the notion that historians should not 
axiomatically treat the nation-state as a hermetically sealed 
unit of analysis and assume that all developments that take 
place within this historically and analytically constructed 
container are shaped only by factors ‘ inherent’ to the 
container.180 Historians need to be aware of past transnational 
processes and forces, if only to be able to refute a hypothesis 
that something might have been the result of transnational 
trends and transfers. In brief, the saliency of a transnational 
approach in historical research depends on the topic and 
questions of the research. 
This study does not perceive the examination on 
transnational history to be something very different from 
traditional examination on history, if we mean the business 
of discovering traces of the past and producing knowledge 
on the past based empirically on these traces (evidence 
in the hands of the historian). A transnational approach 
to studying the past can yield novel historical insight and 
knowledge; however, without basic knowledge on the 
entities that the transnational processes are supposed to have 
influenced and/or formed, it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to analytically grasp the salience of potential transnational 
processes. Haupt and Kocka have argued that transnational 
history and comparative history can be combined to provide 
transnational history with analytical precision and to embed 
comparative history in the potentially salient connections 
between the compared cases.181 I think Haupt and Kocka 
are correct to point out that transnational and comparative 
Elgar 2011), p. 220. 
180 Silke Neunsinger, ‘Cross-over! Om komparationer, transferanalyser, 
histoire croisée och den metodologiska nationalismens problem’, Historisk 
tidskrift 130 (2010), pp. 3–24.
181 Jürgen Kocka & Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, p. 20.
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history can complement each other. I have accordingly 
considered comparative and transnational history to be 
complementary approaches to studying the past and, as such, 
they have also been employed in a complementary manner in 
this dissertation project. 
By surveying the literature on post-war immigration in 
Europe and the emergence of multiculturalism in Canada and 
Australia, I posit that Sweden’s multicultural moment was 
unique in a contemporary European context and similar to 
contemporary developments in Canada and Australia. I then 
continued my research to identify Canadian and Australian 
influences in the multicultural moment of Sweden, especially 
in the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden, as 
earlier Swedish research had noted the Canadian connection 
in the policy-making process.182 In addition to working with 
a more traditional hypothesis of international (between 
states) transfers of ideas, I have studied the empirical 
material on the Swedish moment with a ‘transnational eye’; 
that is, I endeavoured to detect evidence and trace and 
analyse concepts and speech-acts that potentially were the 
direct products of transfer (e.g. foreign policy programs) or 
transnationally shaped (e.g. the ‘stretching’ of an imported 
concept to fit Swedish convention). The use of this method 
produced some interesting results both with regard to intra-
state influence and the transfer of concepts and elements of 
political discourse from other national contexts into Swedish 
political discourse by the actors. 
In study I and study IV, I show how the Canadian policy 
on multiculturalism functioned as an important example 
of the Swedish policy-making process both as a model and 
as a point of reference in legitimizing the introduction of a 
similar policy in Sweden. However, an important observation 
is that the emergence of the political idea of multiculturalism 
182 Hansen 2001, p. 182. 
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in Sweden and its establishment as a viable basis for policy 
occurred independently of Canadian or, for that matter, 
Australian development. There is also nothing to suggest that 
Australia was influenced by Sweden or vice-versa. 
The debates and political struggles concerning non-
Swedish mother tongue teaching were transnational (i.e. 
Swedish-Finnish) at many levels, as made clear in study 
III. The politics of language in Finland was employed as a 
reference point in activist claims-making in Sweden, and the 
concept of semilingualism was scientifically developed and 
employed in an interconnected manner in political argument 
on both sides of the Gulf of Bothnia. The use of the minority 
policy of the inter-war Republic of Estonia as a template 
for how Sweden could set up its minority policy by ethnic 
activist Sven Reinans, and later by Reinans in cooperation 
with Widgren in their capacities as public officials in the 
Commission of Immigration, is an interesting transnational 
aspect of ethnic activism in Sweden, as shown in study IV. 
Furthermore, in study IV, I analyse the personal history of 
key actor Jonas Widgren through a transnational lens, a 
fruitful endeavour that reveals the transnationally constituted 
biographical predisposition of Widgren towards the idea of 
multiculturalism. The heated debates between the ethnic 
activists and the progressive assimilationists (both set of 
actors were mainly immigrants), highlighted in study I and 
study II, were also transnational in nature and I could not 
have fully comprehended the debates without pursuing the 
transnational threads in my analysis of the debates.  
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4.2 Actors
When posing the question of why, or for what kind of 
intention, a linguistic action or, for that matter, action in 
general was performed, I have not only analysed the point of 
the action in relation to other actions (e.g. a rebuttal) and the 
intellectual-political-discursive context in which the action 
was situated, but also the actor performing the action. I have 
thus paid attention to the biographies of the actors, their 
background and social position, when and where (i.e. from 
what position) in the actors’ lives the actions were performed 
and in what way they (potentially) interacted with each other. 
In study III, ‘Making the Case for the Mother Tongue’, the 
analytical concept ‘historical body’, which puts the onus on 
the lived experiences of an actor and how this experience 
affects the actor’s (political) aims and actions, is specifically 
employed as a method of analysis. All of the studies in this 
thesis have, however, addressed the actors’ personal histories. 
By employing this  method,  I  uncovered decis ive 
information on the actors involved in the multicultural 
moment. This information was utilized to create a typology of 
three main actor-categories, all engaged in the politicization 
of the idea of multiculturalism: (i) ethnic activists, (ii) experts 
and (iii) officials (i.e. civil servants). 
Politicians undoubtedly also feature as individual or 
collective (e.g. political parties) actors in this dissertation 
project. Nonetheless, I have not perceived the need to 
theorize their role as political agents, as a politician by 
definition is engaged in (political) activism or politicking, 
whereas the status of an expert in modern society rests on 
his/her (supposedly) apolitical scientific expertise and 
politically neutral and efficient implementation of political 
decisions according to the formal rules of bureaucracy. 
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Ethnic activists
The analytical category ‘ethnic activist’ was adapted from 
the literature on the multiculturalist turns in Canada and 
Australia and the literature on the so-called ethnic revival 
in the West that became a transnational phenomenon in the 
early 1970s.183 In this dissertation project ‘ethnic activists’ 
describes a set of foreign born actors who advanced the idea 
of multiculturalism and engaged in claims-making on behalf 
of immigrants and ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden 
across the dominant left-right division in Swedish politics. 
The term ‘ethnic’ refers to their self-professed non-Swedish 
ethnic identity (minority is a term that could also have been 
employed) and ‘activist’ refers to their cooperative political 
efforts to promote the idea of multiculturalism in different 
arenas and across the traditional party lines of Swedish 
politics as political agents. 
A subcategory to the category of the ethnic activist was 
also employed in the dissertation project to emphasize 
the primary political starting point of many of the ethnic 
activists; that is, the assertion of preservationist claims in the 
name of the ethnic group (as a distinct group) with which 
the activist him/herself identified and wanted to maintain as a 
group (e.g. Estonian activists). 
183 See chapter 1 above. Also see Will Kymlicka, ’The Canadian Model 
of Diversity in a Comparative Perspective’, p. 70; Joshua Fishman et al, 
The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and 
Ethnicity (Berlin: Mouton Publishers 1985); James Jupp, White Australia 
to Woomera: The Story of Australian Immigration 2ed (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2007). 
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Experts and officials
The research on the development of the Nordic welfare 
state has shown that experts, also termed ‘social engineers’ 
in the l iterature,  which is a contested concept,  were 
important political players in the making of the welfare 
state. The experts were often prominent academics, or at 
least became prominent after their services to the state, and 
they gained power through the scientification of politics and 
politicization of science, especially human science, which 
was coupled to the emergence of the welfare state from the 
late 19th century onwards. Not only were the experts active 
players in agenda-setting and the formulation of problems, 
they were also enlisted by policymakers (i.e. politicians and 
officials, usually social democrats) to solve the problems 
the experts themselves as public intellectuals often had a 
hand in defining.184 Swedish family policy was, for example, 
as Lundqvist & Roman have shown, to a large extent 
constructed by “the coalition of the state and state-appointed 
experts”185. Welfare policy was, in brief, developed through 
the interplay of social science and politics. Because policy-
reform was legitimized as scientific, it also de-politicized 
decision-making and put it in the hands of ‘rational’ scientists 
and officials.186 The strong tradition of cooperation between 
184 Christiansen & Markkola,  p.  20; Per Wisselgren, Samhällets 
kartläggare: Lorénska stiftelsen, den sociala frågan och samhällsvetenskapens 
formering 1830-1920 (Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposion Stockholm 
2000); Yvonne Hirdman, Att lägga livet tillrätta 2. Uppl. (Stockholm: 
Carlssons 2000). 
185 Åsa Lundqvist & Christine Roman, ‘Construction(s) of Swedish 
Family Policy, 1930-2000’, Journal of Family History 33 (2008), p. 231. 
186 Åsa Lundqvist & Klaus Petersen, ’Experts, knowledge and the Nordic 
welfare states. An Introduction’, In Experts We Trust. Knowledge, Politics 
and Bureaucracy in Nordic Welfare States, eds. Åsa Lundqvist & Klaus 
Petersen (Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark 2010), pp. 9–31. 
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experts and policymakers (i.e. officials and politicians) in 
Sweden opened a window of opportunity for nascent experts 
in the new field of immigration and immigrant adjustment to 
influence policymaking. 
Social sciences thus played an important part in shaping 
Swedish society from the 1930s at least until the late 1970s, 
and accounts of conceptual change in Sweden over this time 
period have to consider the positions taken by influential 
experts whose expertise derived from the social sciences. The 
system of government commissions was the main instrument 
by which experts could influence policy making in Sweden. 
The parliamentary commission system was an arena for 
interaction between the interest groups of Swedish society 
and the commissions were appointed by the government 
to address a wide range of specific issues that needed to be 
scientifically investigated and for consensus to be reached on 
the proposed solutions.187 Government commissions were an 
integral part of Sweden’s political system and this facilitated 
the close relationship between politics and social science 
in Swedish policy-making between the 1930s and 1970s.188 
The function of the commission system as establisher of 
consensus in Swedish politics, at least up until the late 
1970s, cannot be emphasized enough.189 It was very rare 
that a final report and its policy proposals were discarded. 
187 Jan Johansson, Det statliga kommittéväsendet: kunskap, kontroll, 
konsensus (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet 1992); Per Wisselgren, 
Regulating the Science-Policy Boundary: The Myrdals and the Swedish 
Tradition of Governmental Commissions (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet 
2006). 
188 Åsa Lundqvist, ‘Family Policy Between Science and Politics’, Gender 
Equality and Welfare Politics in Scandinavia, eds. Kari Melby, Anna-Birte 
Ravn & Christina Carlsson Wetterberg (Bristol: The Policy Press 2009), 
pp. 85–99. 
189 Andreas Bergh & Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, ‘Liberalization without 
Retrenchment: Understanding the Consensus on Swedish Welfare State 
Reforms’, Scandinavian Political Studies 32 (2009), pp. 71–93. 
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The commissions also functioned as important knowledge-
producing institutions and Swedish social sciences were 
partly established within the commission system.190 
It has been shown that the social scientists cum women’s 
activists involved in the commissions addressing family 
policy were highly influential in shaping the reports of the 
commissions and thus implementing the Swedish women’s 
movements ideas on gender at a policy level.191 Research on 
the relationship between experts, science and politics in the 
field of immigration and integration policy in other national 
contexts has also highlighted the role of experts and the use 
of social scientific expertise as an authority in the setting of 
de-party-politicized policymaking in the post-war period.192 
The analytical figures of the expert and the official were 
thus important actor categories for this dissertation project. 
After determining the experts in the social science research 
on immigration and minorities’ and the key officials in 
policymaking process, I began analysing them as actors; that 
is, as potential political agents in the making of policy and 
political discourse on ethno-cultural diversity in Sweden. 
This turned out to be a very fruitful endeavour as I was able 
to precisely track the experts’ changing positions on ethno-
cultural diversity and show how social scientific expertise 
was employed to legitimize the idea of multiculturalism in 
190 Per Wisselgren, ’Vetenskap och/eller politik? Om gränsteorier 
och utredningsväsendets  vetenskapshistor ia’,  Mångsysslare  och 
gränsöverskridare: 13 uppsatser i idéhistoria ,  eds. Bosse Sundin & 
Maria Göransdotter (Umeå: Umeå universitet 2008), pp. 109–119. 
191 Lundqvist & Roman. pp. 216–236. 
192 María Bruquetas-Callejo, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Rinus Penninx 
& Peter Scholten, p. 155; Rinus Penninx, ‘Bridges between Research and 
Policy? The Case of Post-War Immigration and Integration Policies in 
the Netherlands’, IJMS: International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 7 
(2005), pp. 33–48; Lopez, The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian 
Politics 1945–1975.
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political discourse and in the policy-making institution of 
the Commission on Immigration. I was also able to uncover 
the acceptance and promotion of the idea of multiculturalism 
by trade union and also government officials (see studies I, II 
and IV).  
Agency, expertise and science
A result of the analysis was that the three main actor 
categories of the dissertation project, ethnic activist, expert 
and official, were overlapping categories in the case of some of 
the actors.193 The way in which expertise and the positions of 
the enlisted experts were utilized by the officials in the policy-
making process followed the results and theoretical insights 
of previous research on the relationship between science, 
institutions and politics. The officials of the Commission on 
Immigration and the civil servants tied to this policy-making 
organization were clearly influenced by the experts but also 
utilized the experts and academic expertize to politically 
further (among members of the commission) and give 
legitimacy to the idea of multiculturalism and their policy 
preferences along the policy-making process. 
My point here is two-fold: the scientific endorsement 
of the idea of multiculturalism by the Swedish academic 
community in the field of immigration and minority research, 
de-politicized the idea and re-conceptualised it as the rational 
and progressive alternative. The scientificated idea could then 
be employed, in light of the scientific consensus, to politically 
legitimize (to parliament and the public) a new policy 
193 Sven Alur Reinans, e.g., was an ethnic (Estonian) activist, an expert 
on immigrant statistics (primarily demographics) and an official of the 
Commission of Immigration. 
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approach as the self-evident way forward. 
Through the intertwined process of politicizing science 
and scientificating of politics carried forward by the officials 
of the commission on Immigration in cooperation with social 
scientists and linguistic researchers, the multiculturalist 
policy reforms were brought, presented to and accepted 
by the parliamentary members of the commission, the 
government and finally the Swedish parliament as a whole. 
This is not to say that science determined political choices 
or that it was employed in a purely instrumental way. The 
argument is rather that the (supposed) boundary between 
science and politics,  so important for the legitimacy 
and status of science, was crossed both when the idea of 
multiculturalism became scientificated and when it became 
formally politicized. 
5 Source work
The methodology for locating and selecting sources for this 
dissertation project was guided by the overarching research 
problem: the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of the multicultural moment 
of Sweden. Heuristic considerations embedded in the 
research design have delimited the scope of source selection; 
nonetheless, a wide range of different types of source material 
have been collected, examined and analysed to answer 
the main questions of the study and the many secondary 
questions that emerged along the research process.  
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Selecting and collecting published sources
The references in earlier research, and in the very useful 
bibliography Invandrare i Sverige 1965–1974194, functioned 
as an introduction to the published sources. In addition to 
following these references, I employed the yearbook register 
of Swedish newspaper articles Svenska tidningsartiklar to 
chart articles of interest. The charting of editorials, feature 
articles, debate articles and review articles registered in 
Svenska tidningsartiklar was conducted in the following way: 
I selectively read the published registers from the year 1961 
(i.e. first year of publication of Svenska tidningsartiklar) to 
1975 and listed the articles that seemed to touch on questions 
relating to, for example, immigration, ethno-cultural 
minorities, assimilation (and related terms such as the 
commonly employed anpassning, or adjustment), minority 
culture and language. 
The register is ordered in accordance with the Swedish 
classification system and the articles on the topics that 
interested me have, for the most part, been consistently 
classified as E (i.e. upbringing and education), M (i.e. 
ethnography and social anthropology) and O (i.e. social and 
legal science). The register’s indexes of names (i.e. authors of 
the articles and persons covered in the articles) and subject 
headings were also systematically surveyed after I had 
compiled lists of authors, articles, books (the register includes 
reviews) and subject headings. Employing the methods 
described above, I believe I was able to list all articles of 
relevance registered in Svenska tidningsartiklar. The same 
methods were also utilized for charting and listing articles 
registered in the national yearbook series on Swedish journal 
194 Lena Böök-Cederström, Kristina Eriksson & Kerstin Fredriksson 
(red.), Invandrare i Sverige 1965–1974. En bibliografi (Borås: Immigrant-
institutet 1976).
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and magazine articles, Svenska tidskriftsartiklar, which I 
surveyed for the same time period, 1961–1975. Thus, I listed 
approximately 800 articles from the two registers. 
This brings us to the next phase in the establishment of 
a corpus of articles, the collecting of the articles. The list 
of newspaper articles was culled according to perceived 
relevance (e.g. articles concerned with racial segregation in 
the USA and apartheid in South Africa, both popular topics, 
were culled) and the size of the newspaper (i.e. articles 
published in local newspapers with a distribution of less than 
50,000 copies)195. Some exceptions were made for articles that, 
on the basis of their titles, seemed to have strong perspectives 
on issues relating to ethno-cultural diversity or that featured 
or were authored by actors who I had identified as important 
in the conceptual struggle between multiculturalism and 
assimilationism. All journal articles that were deemed 
relevant on the basis of title, indexation or authorship were 
included in the collection phase. 
Åbo Akademi University Library holds an almost complete 
microfilm collection of Dagens Nyheter, in which the articles 
of interest were collected by printing paper copies of the 
microfilm. The articles in other newspapers were collected by 
printing copies of the articles from the microfilm collection 
at the National Library of Sweden. Åbo Akademi University 
Library and the National Repository Library of Finland 
together hold an extensive collection of Swedish journals 
and magazines, and I was able to procure the majority of 
the magazine and journal articles of interest from these 
two libraries. Articles in journals, including Swedish social 
science journals, and magazines not available in Finland were 
obtained through inter-library loans from Swedish libraries. 
In this way I collected a substantial corpus of newspaper, 
195 Based on the circulation figures in Lars Furuhoff & Hans Hederberg, 
Dagspressen i Sverige (Stockholm: Aldus 1965).
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journal and magazine articles that covered the time-period 
1953–1975. Most of the articles in the corpus were published 
in the latter half of this period, which was expected. 
I also collected a large amount of other material on 
immigration and related topics published in Sweden between 
in the 1960s and early 1970. The collection of contemporary 
published material (e.g. official reports, parliamentary 
protocols and motions, books, and conference publications) 
was informed by the earlier research, analysis of the 
newspaper and journal articles and the continued following 
up of leads that came to light along the research process. 
If the research literature, a contemporary article or other 
sources at my disposal referred to or reviewed published 
material and if I assessed the published material to be of 
relevance to the dissertation project, I procured it either at 
Åbo Akademi University Library or through inter-library 
loans or internet purchases from second-hand booksellers in 
Sweden. 
The first political programs on immigrant (integration) 
policy of the centre-right parties were obtained through 
purchase and donation. The party programs and election 
manifestos of all the Swedish parties for the focal time-
period studied were obtained from the CD-ROM Vi vill…
Svenska valprogram 1902–2002.196 As it transpired, the 
explosion in published material on immigration and related 
topics occurred at the end of the examined time-period. 
This, as in the case of the articles, made it possible to 
collect and scrutinize the material in a (somewhat) holistic 
manner, which facilitated the tracing of the emergence and 
establishment of the idea of multiculturalism. 
196 Vi v il l . . . !  Svenska valprogram 1902-2002  (Göteborg:  Svensk 
samhällsvetenskaplig datatjänst 2006).
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Source assessment 
The corpus of articles and publications in my possession 
was employed as a primary (contemporary) source material 
on the speech-acts of various actors and other acts and 
events, and also as a narrative source material on acts and 
events. Some of the source material was thus analysed as 
contemporary speech-acts and also primary and/or narrative 
sources if they included statements that I deemed to be of 
interest beyond the particular speech-act move(s) of the text. 
The information derived from the texts, when employed as 
primary and/or narrative sources, was scrutinized following 
a critical assessment of sources according to the basic 
principles of historical source work; that is, the temporal 
closeness and relationship of the statement (and the maker 
of the statement, if he or she could be identified) to that 
which is stated (i.e. distance in time to that which is stated 
and whether the statement is based on personal testimony or 
hearsay), the tendency of the account and how the account 
sustains in relation to other accounts.197 
By following the criteria of historical scholarship on 
the critical assessment of sources and by applying the 
theoretical insights and methods of intellectual history 
described above, I was able to pinpoint the introduction 
of the idea of multiculturalism, the way in which the idea 
was conceptualized and contested, the moves and rhetoric 
employed by the actors involved in the struggle over the idea 
and the scope of the impact of the idea of multiculturalism in 
public discourse after the end of the clearly delimited period 
of public contestation (i.e. 1964–1968). 
The analysis of the corpus also uncovered a group of 
actors who I, based on the literature on the history of 
197 John Tosh, Historisk teori och metod (Lund: Studentlitteratur 2000), 
pp. 76–94. 
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multiculturalism in Canada and Australia and also on the 
ethnic revival, had expected to find: the ethnic activists.198 
The corpus of published material at my disposal also 
included social scientific articles and publications that were 
employed to detect and analyse the usage of the concept of 
assimilation and the idea of multiculturalism in the Swedish 
social sciences and the interconnectedness of this process 
to the public debate and the actors involved in the debate, 
the coming together of ethnic activists and social scientific 
experts. The analysis of the published source material 
indicated that the multicultural moment of Sweden, in a 
similar fashion to the contemporary multicultural moments 
of Canada and Australia, was not just the result of a debate 
between debating citizens that, when coupled to other 
factors such as large-scale labour immigration, resulted 
in a change of official policy. Armed with the results of the 
analysis of the published material, I focused on the politics 
of multiculturalism and the question of why Sweden officially 
turned to multiculturalism. 
Additional source material
The analysis of the published source material strengthened 
my research hypotheses that the idea of multiculturalism 
and the actors who promoted the idea, primarily the ethnic 
activists, were constitutive factors in the multiculturalist 
turn of Sweden. The analysis of the corpus of articles 
and publications also provided information and leads to 
additional sources on the activities of the activists and, as 
it would transpire, experts and officials sympathetic to their 
cause and the idea of multiculturalism. The collection of 
198 See pp. 3–6, pp. 49–51 and p. 55 above. 
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additional published and also unpublished source material on 
the identified actors and, in the case of my own interviews 
(see below), the construction of unpublished source material 
was, again, informed by the overarching research questions of 
the project: the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the multicultural moment. 
I thus collected material on the key actors such as interviews, 
retrospective articles and obituaries. These endeavours 
were facilitated by electronic databases, search engines and 
digitalization.
The archive of David Schwarz, deposited at The National 
Archives of Sweden in 2008, a hitherto unused source on 
the history of multiculturalism in Sweden, provided new 
material, primarily letters, on the life and activities of David 
Schwarz and those associated with him. The single most 
important archive for the study, the archive of the Immigrant 
Commission, was also accessed at the National Archives of 
Sweden. Source material was furthermore extracted from 
the archives of Tage Erlander, Olof Palme, Rune Johansson, 
Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti  (SAP) and 
Kulturarbetarnas socialdemokratiska förening at the Labour 
Movement Archives and Library in Stockholm. The Labour 
Movement Archives and Library also provided me with 
published material such as annual reports on the activities 
of SAP and the motions and protocols of its congresses. The 
king’s speech at the dinner in honour of President Urho 
Kekkonen in 1974, quoted in study IV, was kindly donated to 
me by the court of Sweden. 
I followed up transnational leads, which were identified 
due to my transnational approach, by collecting relevant 
‘non-Swedish’  source material ;  for example,  Finnish 
source material and international source material such as 
conventions. To enable comparison of Sweden with Canada 
and Denmark, I collected some Canadian and Danish source 
material; for example, the contemporary Danish debate and 
social science literature to gauge the (possible) use of the idea 
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of multiculturalism in Danish political discourse and social 
science, even if the comparisons with Sweden were primarily 
conducted by utilizing the extant research literature on the 
history of immigration and ethnic politics in Canada and 
Denmark. 
5.1 Interviews 
Since Herodotus and Thucydides, historians have utilized 
oral sources to make sense of the past.199 All written historical 
sources employed by historians have been created by 
someone at a particular point in time for a particular reason. 
The difference between conventional historical sources and 
the source material that can be produced with the methods 
of oral history is that the latter is actively created by the 
historian, not just located and selected from the traces of the 
past. The sources that are produced by utilizing the methods 
of oral history are the product of interaction between 
the historian and a living person and, therefore, must be 
considered to be narrative sources on the past but not of the 
past. As a narrative source, the source material produced by 
the historian through interviews does not, in principle, differ 
from other narrative sources such as, for example, memoirs. 
As with all sources that are selected and employed to answer 
questions put by historians to the past, the source material 
derived from interviews must be treated critically. Statements 
derived from an interview are not direct and a priori reliable 
evidence on events in the past, even if the informant was a 
primary witness.200 
199 Tosh, p. 244. 
200 Malin Thor, ’Tankar om källkritik och Oral History’, Oral History 1. 
Teoretiska perspektiv på individuella och kollektiva möten, eds. Malin Thor 
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I conducted interviews for the specific purpose of 
gathering new information on Sweden’s multicultural 
moment.  The aim of  the inter views was to  provide 
new insight, perhaps new questions, and to further my 
understanding on the persons, events and processes of 
relevance to the questions this dissertation project has put to 
the past. 
 
Selecting and contacting informants
Naturally, in making my selections, I had to first ascertain 
whether the person identified as a potential informant was 
alive. Unfortunately, I found that the majority of the persons 
identified as key actors in the making of the multicultural 
moment had passed away. I then chose to initiate contact 
with potential informants, such as persons deeply involved 
in the public debate on multiculturalism (ethnic activists 
and progressive assimilationists) and/or the Commission 
on Immigration, when I believed I had gained sufficient 
knowledge on the actors and processes of interest to be able 
to fruitfully utilize the interview method to gain further 
knowledge. 
I made contact with my informants by sending letters 
describing my dissertation project and explaining why I 
thought they could help me in my research. I also listed 
some topics and general questions that I wished to discuss 
with them. After contact was made I, in consultation with 
the informant, arranged a date and time for the interview. 
I was able to establish contact and conduct interviews with 
the following persons, in chronological order: Seppo Isotalo, 
Sven Alur Reinans, Lars Ahlvarsson, Sulo Huovinen, Tomas 
& Lars Hansson (Växjö: Växjö University Press 2003), pp. 5–22. 
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Hammar, Per Gahrton and Olle Svenning. Contact was also 
made with persons unable or unwilling to discuss the past. 
Furthermore, I was in contact with and questioned the 
following persons on their potential possession of source 
material: Matti Similä (son of Artturi Similä, the leader of the 
Finnish community in Sweden until the end of the 1960s), 
Jadranka Widgren (the widow of Jonas Widgren, head 
secretary of the Commission of Immigration) and Torkel 
Wächter (son of Michael Wächter, the leading progressive 
assimilationist in the contested debate on assimilation versus 
multiculturalism in the 1960s). I interviewed Seppo Isotalo 
and Sven Alur Reinans in person. Lars Ahlvarsson, Sulo 
Huovinen and Tomas Hammar I interviewed by phone. I 
corresponded with Olle Svenning and Per Gahrton via email, 
and I also corresponded further with Sven Reinans via email 
after our meeting. The orally conducted interviews were 
taped, utilizing a digital recorder, with the exception of the 
session with Seppo Isotalo that was recorded utilizing pen 
and paper. The audio files were copied to my computer for 
transcription and the e-mail correspondence printed and 
archived in my personal research archive. 
The interview process
The interviews were semi-structured; that is, I proceeded 
from general topics of discussion.201 I began the interviews 
by asking open questions on the informant and his/her 
professional and political life at the time of interest. I wanted 
the informant to freely reminisce on the themes of interest 
before progressing to more detailed questions. I did, however, 
201 Steinar Kvale & Svend Brinkmann, Den kvalitativa forskningsintervjun 
(Lund: Studentlitteratur 2009), pp. 120–133.
105 
ask more precise questions if something of interest arose 
when the informant freely reminisced. Depending on the 
flow of the interview, I began asking fairly open questions 
on specific actors and events according to my prepared 
list of questions, asking impromptu follow-up questions if 
something of interest was discussed. After I had exhausted 
all of my prepared topics and more detailed questions, I 
sometimes followed up questions that had been touched upon 
and which I thought could be discussed further before ending 
the interview. 
In hindsight, I believe that I might have further exploited 
the method of oral history. Also, I should have conducted the 
interviews at a later date, when I knew more, and selected 
the informants more systematically. In the best of worlds, 
the dissertation project should have started earlier. Schwarz, 
for instance, passed away in the autumn of 2008 and I was 
fortunate to contact Sven Reinans shortly before he sadly 
passed away. I also think that I might have been more acutely 
aware of the gulf in perspective between myself and the 
informants and, on a more technical note, I should probably 
have taken a course in the art of interviewing to enhance my 
interviewing technique and conversational skills. 
The source material constructed through the interviews, 
however, gave me new insight that furthered my research 
and, despite my short-comings, I was able to produce 
a unique source material that facilitated answering the 
questions I put to the past. The lucidity of the informants 
and the detail, validated by cross-checking with the historical 
source material including the source material derived from 
the interviews and the previous research, in which they 
narrated their past experiences of the then emerging field of 
immigrant policy and/or research often surprised me. There 
were few if any uncomfortable silences and the informants 
did most of the talking. This can perhaps be partly explained 
by how most of informants described the time-period, events 
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and persons explored in the interviews: it was an exciting 
time, immigration was a new phenomenon and all the 
informants were at some point in their lives deeply involved 
in matters related to immigration, either personally and/or 
professionally. 
Results 
The result of the analysis of the source material constructed 
through the interviews was an important piece in the 
analytical puzzle of the dissertation project. Combined with 
the analysis of the other sources, the interviews helped me 
to establish, for instance, that the ethnic activists cooperated 
extensively202. Lars Ahlvarsson, the ombudsman in charge of 
immigrant matters at the Trade Union Confederation, was 
deeply influenced by the ethnic activists, especially David 
Schwarz203. Schwarz was a very energetic and persistent 
person (“He could walk through closed doors with his 
energy, absolutely fantastic! It was almost impossible to 
throw him out.”204) He also constantly tried to communicate 
his point of view: “A persevering guest of the secretariat 
was of course David Schwarz”205. Jonas Widgren was a big 
personality and an influential actor in the introduction of the 
multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy of 1975 and 
had a strong connection to Yugoslavia through his Croatian 
202 Author’s interview with Sven Alur Reinans, 17 December 2009; E-mail 
correspondence with Olle Svenning, 14 October 2011.
203 Author’s interview with Lars Ahlvarsson, 26 February 2010.
204 “Han kunde gå genom stängda dörrar med sin energi, helt fantastiskt.
Det var omöjligt att slänga ut honom, närapå.” Author’s interview with 
Sven Alur Reinans, 17 December 2009
205 “En trägen gäst hos sekretariatet var ju naturligtvis David Schwarz.” 
Author’s interview with Sulo Huovinen, 22 December 2010.
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wife206. Schwarz and Olle Svenning worked closely together to 
promote multiculturalism within the Social Democratic Party 
from 1966 to 1967.207 
Much of the source material collected for the purposes 
of this dissertation project is not directly referred to in 
any of the articles or in this introductory synthesis. This, 
however, does not mean that it hasn’t been employed 
over the research process. On the contrary, the breadth 
and variation of the source material has enabled me to 
approach Sweden’s multicultural moment from different 
although complementary, theoretical and methodological 
perspectives. Even the reading of what turned out to be, 
for my purposes, seemingly irrelevant source material has 
facilitated my research as it has contextualized my reading of 
other sources and enhanced my understanding on the actors, 
language(s) and contemporaneous thought. The wide variety 
of sources stretched the dissertation project empirically and 
methodologically; however, the multifaceted nature of the 
research problem, the multicultural moment of Sweden, 
called for a high degree of source pluralism.  
6 Summaries of the four studies 
The four studies reprinted in this volume were written as 
four independent articles on the history of the idea and 
politics of multiculturalism in Sweden and beyond. The 
studies therefore overlap each other to some extent. The 
studies employ different reference systems and also different 
forms of spelling due to preferences of the publishers and 
editors. The basic layout of the original articles according to 
2 0 6  Aut hor ’s  i nte r v i e w  w it h  Tomas  Ham mar,  8  March  2 0 1 1 . 
207 E-mail correspondence with Olle Svenning, 14 October 2011.
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the preferences of the publishers and editors has also been 
retained. However, the studies all examine the same topic, the 
multicultural moment of Sweden. Taken together they form a 
comprehensive (but not exhaustive) and interconnected study 
on Sweden’s multicultural moment. 
Study I. Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: 
The Marginalization of Assimilation and the 
Introduction of Integration
The first study, ‘Conceptual Change in Postwar Sweden: The 
Marginalization of Assimilation and the Introduction of 
Integration’ was written for an anthology on multiculturalism 
in the Nordic welfare states.208 The study explores the 
conceptual history of the multicultural moment of Sweden 
by analysing the rise of the concept of (multiculturalist) 
integration and the concomitant fall of the concept of 
assimilation. In the article, I focus on the entangled history 
of the concepts of assimilation and integration in Swedish 
political discourse and academia and also on how the 
concepts were constructed as each other’s opposites. 
The concept of assimilation was, until the latter half of 
the 1960s, a conventional concept in Swedish politics and 
social science. Politically, the concept of assimilation was 
coupled to the egalitarianism of the people’s home project 
as it was developed in the post-war era. Assimilation was a 
prerequisite for the inclusion of previously excluded groups 
such as the Roma in the new (social democratic) society 
of modern living and equal life chances. Assimilation, as a 
208 Peter Kivisto & Östen Wahlbeck, eds., Debating Multiculturalism 
in the Nordic Welfare States (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2013). 
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process and a political aim, was conceptualized as socially 
and politically progressive. 
The concept of integration was first put forward and 
advanced by the ethnic activists, mainly David Schwarz, to 
introduce a counter concept to assimilation. Integration 
was defined as the incorporation of ‘non-Swedish’ groups 
into Swedish society without the loss of their particularity 
as groups. Integration was coupled to another conceptual 
innovation of the ethnic activists, the multicultural society, 
in an ingenious way: the multicultural society was the wave 
of the future and if Sweden successfully wanted to ride this 
wave in a truly progressive (a constant point of contestation 
in post-war Sweden) manner, assimilation had to be replaced 
by integration. According to the ethnic activists, assimilation 
was not only morally objectionable, it was bad policy because 
a majority of ‘non-Swedes’ could not and did not wish to be 
absorbed. A policy of assimilation would create a backlash 
among non-Swedes and hinder their successful incorporation 
into Swedish society. A policy of integration, however, 
would secure a stable and prospering multicultural society 
as non-Swedes would willingly become a part of a society 
that recognized and supported them in their difference as 
members of non-Swedish groups. The non-ethnic Swedes 
should integrate and be integrated, that is, become equal 
members of Swedish society while retaining and developing 
their own (non-Swedish) languages and cultures. 
The conceptual innovation of the ethnic activists was 
picked up by social scientist and immigration and ethnic 
relations expert (for the government) Harald Swedner. 
Swedner adopted the multiculturalist concept of integration 
into his own research and based his policy proposals on it 
by arguing that what he termed ‘functional integration’ 
should guide Swedish immigration policy. Swedner re-
cast the concept of assimilation, which had functioned as 
the fulcrum for his policy-oriented academic work, as the 
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undesirable antithesis to functional integration. The Swedish 
Trade Union, heavily influenced by the ethnic activists, also 
included the new concept of integration in its advocacy of 
multiculturalism. 
The social democratic government was well aware of 
the assimilation–integration dichotomy when it appointed 
the Commission of Immigration in 1968 and rejected both 
concepts in its directives to the commission. This meant that 
the Commission of Immigration was unable to employ the 
term ‘integration’ when it, after its multiculturalist turn in 
the early 1970s, put forward its proposal for a new immigrant 
and minority policy in 1974, even though this new policy de 
facto was a policy of (functional) integration in line with the 
definition of integration of the ethnic activists and Swedner, 
who had worked as an expert for the commission. 
The concepts of integration and assimilation share an 
entangled history and remain highly contested in Swedish 
political discourse on the incorporation of immigrants 
and minorities. The term ‘assimilation’, if not the concept, 
continues to be employed pejoratively in the Swedish 
political mainstream, if utilized at all. The meaning of the 
term ‘integration’ is seemingly in constant flux, although the 
definition given by the ethnic activists and Swedner to their 
concept of integration remains in common usage.
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Study II. The difference white ethnics made:  
The multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison 
to the cases of Canada and Denmark
The second study, ‘The difference white ethnics made: the 
multiculturalist turn of Sweden in comparison to the cases 
of Canada and Denmark’, was written as a contribution to an 
interdisciplinary (i.e. history, political science and sociology) 
anthology on the relationship between migration and the 
welfare state.209 The aim of the study is to examine how the 
welfare state, as a normative and institutional framework, 
shapes discourse and policy on migration and how, in turn, 
the welfare state is shaped by migration. 
The study analyses the introduction and politicization 
of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden in comparison 
to Canada, where multiculturalism was first introduced, 
and Sweden’s close Nordic sibling-nation Denmark, where 
multiculturalism has never established itself as a public 
ideal. The study outlines the history of wartime and post-
war immigration into Sweden and comparisons with Canada 
and Denmark accentuate the features and factors of historical 
change in Sweden. 
Ethnic  act iv ism was an important  feature  of  the 
emergence of the idea of multiculturalism and political turn 
to multiculturalism in Canada and Sweden. Not only was the 
heated public debate on assimilation versus multiculturalism, 
which occurred from 1964 to 1968, ‘won’ by the ethnic 
activists, the social scientists and civil servants involved in 
the emerging field of migration and immigrant settlement 
were personally influenced by the activists. The political 
209  Heid  Vad  Jønss on ,  E l i zab e t h  Onas ch ,  Saara  Pe l l ander  & 
Mats  Wickst röm,  eds . ,  Migrations  and  wel fare  s tates :  Pol ic ies 
discourses and institutions (Helsinki: University of Helsinki 2013). 
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parties were also subjected to lobbying by the activists and 
the organizations they represented. The most notable case 
is the Estonian activists influencing the Conservative party. 
All the prominent ethnic activists in Sweden were Swedish 
citizens who possessed the necessary language and societal 
skills to engage in political activism. They were also, in line 
with the activists who pushed for ethnic recognition and 
support in Canada, white ethnics. 
The activists, and the minority groups for which they 
sought recognition, were all white ethnics whose differences 
to the majority population could be framed as benign while, 
simultaneously, recognition of these same differences was 
framed as pivotal for the well-being of non-Swedes. When the 
multiculturalist immigrant and minority policy was formally 
accepted in the Swedish parliament on the 14th of May 1975, 
the MPs could hardly have envisioned that Sweden, which 
three years earlier had successfully ended non-Nordic labour 
immigration, would be home to one and a half million 
foreign-born immigrants hailing from almost all corners 
of the world and one of the most multicultural countries in 
Europe four decades later. The immigrant problem of 1975, 
such as it was, mainly comprised the aggregated social 
problems of Finnish immigrants, who constituted by far the 
largest immigrant group in Sweden at that time. The typical 
immigrant in 1975 was, both statistically and stereotypically, 
a male Finnish labourer; ‘culturally’ similar to his Swedish 
peers except for the language.
The Finns, the Estonians and the Jews were not culturally 
nor physiologically that different from the Swedes, hence it 
was hard for contemporaneous critics of multiculturalism to 
successfully argue that ethno-cultural recognition of these 
groups went against the ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ standards 
and aims of Swedish society. All post-war immigrants could 
also be perceived as contributing to Sweden’s welfare; was 
it not then only fair that they got something in return? The 
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ethnic activists, together with the civil servants and social 
scientists sympathetic to their struggle for ethnic recognition, 
introduced a new discourse on (non-Swedish) ethnicity in 
which the formerly hegemonic concept of assimilation was 
cast as a negative, unprogressive counter concept to the new 
concept of a multicultural Sweden, where different ethnic 
groups would be recognized, supported and incorporated 
within the welfare state on the basis of group cooperation. 
This new idea was given official status in 1975 and was even 
added to the new Swedish constitution. 
Denmark, however, did not turn to multiculturalism after 
the end of the labour immigration period. The divergent 
paths of the two neighbouring countries would have been 
difficult to predict in the mid-1960s. In contrast to Sweden, 
neither the immigrants nor the small domestic minorities in 
Denmark participated in the public debate on migration and 
immigrant settlement to any great extent during the 1960s 
and 1970s. A committee for foreign workers in Denmark, 
which regarded itself as an interest group for the immigrants, 
was established in 1976, although its impact was limited. Lack 
of interest on the part of immigrants and lack of resources 
limited the influence of immigrant organizations and 
initiatives. The lack of interest and resources was probably 
dependent on three factors: time spent in the country, 
socioeconomic status (i.e. class) and self-identification. It 
is difficult to be politically active in a new polity without 
knowledge on the language and, without any prior experience 
of it, the politics of the respective country probably seems 
even more remote. Even when an immigrant was educated 
and politically active, his/her priorities did not necessarily 
include the pursuit of in the country of residence, especially 
at this time of radical leftist politics and strong political 
conflicts in the country of origin. General pleas for tolerance 
and equal treatment in the workplace might have been 
sufficient for an immigrant voicing his/her concerns in public. 
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This, however, does not mean that immigrants in Denmark 
were not concerned about identity or culture. Pakistanis 
sent their daughters back to Pakistan to avoid the corrupting 
influence of Danish society and many Greeks and Turks were 
also worried about their children becoming overly Danish. 
The Danes, too, were concerned about the immigrants’ 
‘culture’, although from an opposite standpoint: the negative, 
‘primitive’, aspects of immigrant culture compared to modern 
Danish culture.
Another crucial aspect in the Danish stance on immigrants 
and their own politics was the status and future of the 
immigrants, or “foreign workers” (fremmdarbeider) or guest 
workers (gastarbeider), as the Danes referred to them. The 
general line of thinking in Denmark, as in most of Western 
Europe, was that a foreign worker, at some point, would 
return to his/her native country. This line of thinking was 
confirmed by immigrants themselves, who often expressed 
their intentions of returning to their countries of origin. The 
immigrants did not consider themselves settlers; they were 
simply guest workers who would return as soon as they had 
earned sufficient money. Hence, immigrants in Denmark did 
not merely lack resources and an ‘acceptable’ Western culture, 
they lacked the diasporan identity of the well-integrated and 
politically active Estonians and Jews in Sweden. When the 
immigrants in Denmark demanded ‘multiculturalist’ policies 
and services or the demand was made for them by Danish 
activists, the demands were grounded in the idea of return. 
The immigrants’ children should be taught the language of 
their native country so that the whole family could move back 
to its country of origin. The ‘multiculturalist’ educational 
policies (e.g. mother tongue education in national classes) 
that were implemented in Denmark at the municipal level 
in the 1970s were not motivated and legitimized by the idea 
of multiculturalism as in Sweden, even if they were directly 
influenced by Swedish examples. 
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The current differences in immigration and integration 
regimes between Denmark and Sweden can, however, not 
to be solely attributed to existence or absence of (white) 
ethnic activism in the years of labour immigration. The 
multiculturalism of the 1975 policy was already being toned 
down in Sweden during the 1980s. Later policy reforms 
have also not emphasized the maintenance of ethnic groups, 
although the idea of multiculturalism that was introduced 
in the 1970s lingers on in public discourse and in policy 
documents. For instance, the new Swedish constitution of 
2010 strengthened the wording of the paragraph on the 
state’s responsibility for the cultural preservation of ethnic 
minorities in Sweden from “ought” to “shall”. The current 
discursive divergence between Denmark and Sweden can, 
therefore, be traced to the formative period of immigration 
policy and discourse during the 1960s and 1970s that set 
the way in which one could address ethnicity or cultural 
difference in public on two remarkably different paths.     
Study III. Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: 
Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy 
Discourse on the Teaching of Non-Swedish Mother 
Tongues in Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s
The third study, ‘Making the Case for the Mother Tongue: 
Ethnic Activism and the Emergence of a New Policy 
Discourse on Non-Swedish Mother Tongues in Sweden in 
the 1960s and 1970s’, was also written as a contribution to an 
interdisciplinary anthology (i.e. linguistics and history) on 
the multi-sitedness of language policy and language policy 
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discourse in Sweden and Finland.210 
The study specifically investigates an important element 
in the multicultural moment of Sweden, the politicization 
of language. In Sweden, where ‘metaphysical’ natural rights 
carried little political weight but where a concept such as 
equality had been elevated to a matter of secular faith by 
the end of the 1960s, arguments advancing multiculturalist 
policies such as non-Swedish language education were framed 
as a question of providing de facto equal opportunities that 
would then result in equal socioeconomic outcomes. In 
line with the conventions of Swedish political discourse, 
mother tongue education was conceptualized as a necessity 
of progressive social policy. For instance, the working group 
on matters concerning immigration, the precursor to the 
Immigration Board, which was established in 1966, initially 
conceptualized mother tongue education for immigrants’ 
children as preventive social policy. The working group 
argued, in line with ethnic activists who championed the 
idea of multiculturalism, that if immigrants’ children ‘lost’ 
their mother tongue they would be unable to communicate 
at a deep emotional level with their poorly or non-Swedish 
speaking parents with disastrous consequence for family 
cohesion and the psychological well-being of both the parents 
and the children. In and of itself this was unacceptable; 
however, emotional discord in an immigrant family could 
in turn affect society at large as the troubled children might 
become juvenile delinquents and perpetually marginalized 
and, thus, endanger the social cohesion and progressive 
aims of equality and justice of the Swedish welfare state. 
From 1968, the argument of intergenerational breakdown 
was supplemented with another ‘strong’ social policy-
210 Mia Halonen, Pasi Ihalainen & Taina Saarinen, eds., Language 
Policies in Finland and Sweden: Interdisciplinary and Multi-sited 
Comparisons, (Bristol MultilingualMatters, forthcoming 2014). 
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grounded argument for mother tongue education: it was 
needed to prevent semilingualism. The scientific concept of 
semilingualism, which became popularized in 1968 by the 
book Tvåspråkighet eller halvspråkighet? (Bilingualism or 
semilingualism?), was included in the conceptual repertoire 
of the ethnic activists and other actors supportive of the idea 
of multiculturalism. 
The detrimental phenomenon of semilingualism, in this 
context, the inability to attain mother tongue proficiency in 
neither Swedish nor Finnish, had to be avoided or Finnish 
immigrants’  children would be placed in an unequal 
position in comparison to their peers from Swedish speaking 
homes. According to those who employed the concept of 
semilingualism in their advocacy for a more multiculturalist 
policy approach in Sweden, excellent proficiency in a 
foreign language (i.e. Swedish) was also unachievable 
without the basis of the ‘real’ mother tongue, which meant 
that ‘Finnish’ children had to learn Finnish to become 
completely functional in Swedish. As fluency in Swedish was 
an uncontested prerequisite for social and political equality, 
activists could demand mother tongue education in the name 
of equality. The need for mother tongue education was also 
conceptualized as part of migration policy on both sides 
of the Baltic Sea: the preservation of the native language 
facilitated repatriation of the immigrant family. 
The question of mother tongue teaching for non-Swedish 
speaking children was intimately connected to advancing the 
idea of multiculturalism. The establishment of semilingualism 
as a politically affirmed scientific truth on which policy could, 
and would, be based was a man-made phenomenon that 
attained officially affirmed political (and therefore scientific 
and vice-versa) legitimacy when key policy makers added the 
concept to the government sanctioned policy discourse on 
multiculturalism in Sweden during the 1970s that, although 
constituting a discursive break from the previous ways of 
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articulating the politics of language and ethnicity, the actual 
changes in policy that accompanied the discursive change 
were not as revolutionary as the rhetoric perhaps suggested, 
even if the policies stretched social democratic conventions.
Study IV. Huvudsekreteraren och  
mångkulturalismen: Jonas Widgren och 1975 års 
invandrar- och minoritetspolitik
T h e  f o u r t h  s t u d y ,  ‘ H u v u d s e k r e t e r a r e n  o c h 
m ång ku l tu r a l i s m e n :  Jon a s  Wi d g re n  o c h  1 9 7 5  år s 
invandrar- och minoritetspolitik’ (The head secretary 
and multiculturalism: Jonas Widgren and immigrant and 
minority policy of 1975), was published in the Swedish 
journal for biographical research Personhistorisk tidskrift in 
the fall of 2014. 
The study focuses on the role that Jonas Widgren, born 
in 1944, played as head secretary of the Commission on 
Immigration between 1971 and 1974. Widgren was the 
principal author of the commission’s final report and 
also the subsequent government proposition on the new 
immigrant and minority policy, which introduced official 
multiculturalism into Sweden. In the article, I show that 
Widgren, receptive to the arguments of the ethnic activists 
and inspired by the Canadian turn to multiculturalism, at 
the beginning of the 1970s became an advocate of the idea 
of multiculturalism. I also show that he utilized his position 
as head secretary of the Commission on Immigration to 
further the idea politically together with his secretariat, 
which included ethnic activist and expert Sven Alur Reinans. 
Reinans and Widgren, for instance, tried to convince 
parliamentary members of the commission that Sweden 
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should adopt the minority policy model of the inter-war 
Republic of Estonia, which gave the ethno-cultural minorities 
cultural autonomy; that is, full control of minority schools 
and other cultural institutions of the minority through 
a system of tax-funded cultural councils democratically 
constituted by the minorities themselves. The Estonian 
model was never accepted per se by the Swedish politicians; 
however, that it was on the secretariat’s agenda shows the 
strong support for the idea of multiculturalism among the 
commission’s experts and officials. 
In the article, I further argue that the adoption of the 
idea of multiculturalism by the Commission of Immigration 
depended upon Widgren’s acceptance of the idea. Widgren’s 
biography, at least partly, explains his receptiveness to the 
idea of multiculturalism. The latter part of the argument is 
two-fold. 
First, Widgren’s family history was very transnational and 
his family was ethno-culturally diverse. After the death of his 
French-speaking mother in 1959, the adolescent Widgren 
spent time abroad with relatives in France and Switzerland 
and thus came of age in a partly transnational setting. He 
also married a Croatian woman, Jadranka Čaić, in 1965. 
Thus, Widgren’s family history and personal life were very 
multicultural in a descriptive sense. 
Second, Widgren was an almost stereotypical member 
of the politically active and progressive-minded segment 
of the Swedish boomer generation. What set him apart 
from the caricature of the 1968-activist was that, instead of 
becoming a sectarian left-wing radical in the early 1970s, he 
became a (social democratic) official in the emerging field of 
immigrant and minority policy. Although Widgren did not 
join the left-wing revolutionaries, he was still somewhat of 
a revolutionary, albeit a revolutionary that worked within 
the system. Widgren was also well aware of the fact that the 
idea of multiculturalism he promoted as head secretary of 
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the Commission on Immigration was a radical and utopist 
idea that broke with prevailing Swedish and social democratic 
conventions on ethno-cultural diversity. 
At some t ime during the 1980s,  Widgren became 
disillusioned with the idea of multiculturalism when he 
realized, as he put it, that Finnish immigrants (the major 
immigrant group in Sweden) where not that interested 
in organizing and mobilizing themselves as an ethnic 
minority. In the early 2000s, Widgren lamented the endless 
philosophizing on multiculturalism in which he himself 
had engaged during the 1970s. The political thought and 
actions of the young head secretary in the 1970s seemed 
slightly misguided to the now older and internationally 
prominent migration and integration expert. Despite his 
later reservations, Widgren contributed to the historical 
shift in Swedish ethnic politics from assimilationism to 
multiculturalism. This makes Jonas Widgren a person of note 
in modern Swedish history.
7 Conclusions 
Sweden’s transformation from a country of emigration to a 
country of immigration is one of the most salient historical 
changes in modern Swedish history, as it is for many other 
European countries. Sweden’s demographic transformation 
also encompasses a concomitant intellectual and political 
change that catches the eye from a comparative European 
perspective: the introduction and establishment of the 
political idea of multiculturalism in public discourse in the 
late 1960s and the introduction of official multiculturalism 
in the mid-1970s, which is a comprehensive conceptual and 
political shift that I have termed the ‘multicultural moment’. 
121 
This dissertation project is the first study to historically 
analyse the idea of multiculturalism in the making of Sweden’s 
multicultural moment. 
Post-war immigration made starkly visible the fact 
that the Swedish welfare state was a national project with 
restrictions on non-Nordic labour immigration exhibiting 
the power of two branches of the labour movement − the 
trade union movement and the Social Democratic Party – 
in post-war Sweden. If exclusion was the external objective, 
inclusion was the internal principle. Everyone in the 
nationally universal (social democratic) welfare state was to 
be serviced and educated by the same (intrinsically Swedish, 
although purportedly universal) institutions to produce the 
desired outcome of social equality. Difference, especially 
ethno-cultural difference, was perceived as a threat to the 
aims of the national welfare state project. This assimilationist 
logic of the post-war Swedish welfare state, coupled with a 
relatively long history of ethno-cultural homogeneity and 
concomitant ethnocentrism, highlights the radicalness of 
Sweden’s multicultural moment. The idea of multiculturalism 
politicized ethno-cultural differences in Sweden in a 
previously unthought way and the new immigrant and 
minority policy of 1975 included, among its aims, the 
furthering of minority life on a collective basis in Swedish 
society. 
Seven points on Swedish multiculturalism
The historical examination on the making of Sweden’s 
multicultural moment undertaken in this dissertation project 
has resulted in the following conclusions on the emergence of 
the idea of multiculturalism and the introduction of official 
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multiculturalism. 
The inception of the idea of multiculturalism into Swedish 
political discourse exhibits, conceptually, comparatively, 
and transnationally, seven noteworthy features. First, the 
timing of the introduction and conceptual development of 
the idea: by the end of 1966, David Schwarz and the other 
ethnic activists had already developed multiculturalism into 
a fully-fledged political idea with its own conceptual scheme, 
normative claims, set of policy prescriptions and rhetorical 
devices. This was only around two years after the idea had 
achieved a similar level of maturity in Canada211, a couple 
of years before it had done so in Australia212 and more than 
five years before the ethnic revival, in which the idea of 
multiculturalism played a central role, became a cultural and 
political trend in Western Europe and the USA.213 
Second, the pivotal role played by individual actors in 
the making and promotion of the idea of multiculturalism: 
t he  in i t i a l  conceptu a l i zat ion  and  advancement  of 
multiculturalism was the work of a handful of ethnic 
activists. There was no grand popular movement that 
demanded public recognition of ethno-cultural difference 
and support for minority group maintenance in a way 
similar to the mobilization of the substantial Ukrainian-
Canadian community and other large and organized ethno-
cultural groups in Canada in response to the establishment 
of the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 
211 See study II in this thesis.
212 Lopez, The Origins of Multiculturalism, p. 91. 
213 Erik Allardt & Christian Starck, Språkgränser och samhällsstruktur: 
f inlandssvenskarna i ett jämförande perspektiv  (Stockholm: AWE/
Geber 1981); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Revival (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1981); John D. Skrentny, The Minority 
Rights Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2002); 
Matthew Frye Jacobson, Roots Too: White Ethnic Revival in Post-Civil 
Rights America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 2006).
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1963. In this regard, the emergence of multiculturalism 
as an elucidated political idea in Sweden resembles the 
development of multiculturalism in Australia, where it 
first was developed and promoted by a small number of 
academics and activists. However, as long as ethnic (Finnish) 
activist Artturi Similä held his leadership position in the 
National Organization of the Finnish Associations, the claims 
made by the ethnic activists were, according to corporatist 
conventions of Swedish society, in principal supported by 
the growing Finnish community in Sweden. The Estonian 
activists also acted with the mandate of parts of the Estonian 
community. The idea of multiculturalism in Sweden was 
initially developed by ethnic activists and then picked up by 
academics, experts and public officials. 
By  co op erat ing  and ra l ly ing  b ehind the  idea  of 
multiculturalism, the activists from different minority groups 
could move beyond the ethnocentric approach that the 
Estonian and Jewish groups had employed in the past. Instead 
of making group-specific claims, the activists made pan-
ethnic claims utilizing the idea of multiculturalism. Instead of 
casting particularistic appeals on a group-by-group basis, the 
ethnic activists employed the idea of multiculturalism to put 
forward their claims in a universalistic tone, an approach that 
fitted the political conventions of the time. 
Third, the idea of multiculturalism was not transferred to 
Sweden as a ready-made package, but was made in Sweden. 
Swedish multiculturalism was, without doubt, a ‘non-Swedish’ 
product in the sense that it was an immigrant innovation 
shaped by the experiences, ideas and expectations of the 
innovators both as individuals and as members of specific 
groups. The way in which these different experiences, ideas 
and expectations came together and were moulded in the 
specific context of post-war Sweden in the 1960s and 1970s 
was, however, a particular Swedish development. Therefore, 
the conceptual origins of Swedish multiculturalism are as 
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much domestic as they are transnational. The emergence 
of the idea of multiculturalism in Sweden was not the 
manifestation of a conceptually primed transnational 
intellectual current; it was, in light of the historical evidence, 
very much an independent stream. This was also the case in 
Canada and Australia.214
Fourth, the historically contingent and distinct diasporan 
mentality that underpinned the ethnic activism of the 
Estonians and the Jews, in particular the activism of Sven 
Alur Reinans, Voldemar Kiviaed and David Schwarz, must be 
emphasized. The Estonians in Sweden, similar to many other 
migrants and refugees hailing from lands occupied by the 
Soviet Union in the 1940s (e.g. the Ukrainians in Canada), 
had lost their homeland which faced an existential threat 
in the form of communist Russification. The Estonians in 
Sweden, and elsewhere, were not merely living away from 
Estonia with an option to return, they were keeping the very 
nation of Estonia alive in exile, precisely in the same way that 
Ukrainians in Canada were upholding the nation of Ukraine 
in Canada. 
Among Swedish Jews, especially among those who had 
survived the Holocaust and arrived in Sweden as refugees, 
there was a strong will to keep the revitalized Jewish 
community of Sweden alive. This determination was born 
out of the millennia-long diasporan tradition of Judaism 
and the horrors of the Holocaust. For David Schwarz, who 
barely survived the anti-semitic atrocities of the Nazis, the 
Jewish minority in Sweden and also other ethno-cultural 
minorities had a fundamental right to be recognized and 
supported by the majority population in their endeavour 
to establish and develop their own minority communities. 
Schwarz devoted his new life in Sweden to advancing 
the idea of multiculturalism; his work was shaped by his 
214 Breton, p. 45; Lopez, The Origins of Multiculturalism, p. 454. 
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experiences as a member of the Jewish diaspora at a time 
when the very existence of the Jewish people was in peril. 
The prominent Australian multiculturalist and Jewish activist 
Walter Lippmann was also a victim of Nazi persecution and, 
similar to Schwarz, was highly motivated in his aim to secure 
the future of Australian Jews and other minority groups in 
Australia by promoting multiculturalism in his new home-
country. 
For many ethnic activists who advanced multiculturalism 
in Sweden, Canada and Australia, the survival of their own 
ethnic groups in the face of assimilation pressures was a 
matter of life or death. Promoting the idea of multiculturalism 
was a way to preserve the people to whom they belonged and 
cherished as an integral part of their own personal identity.
Fifth, although the debates over multiculturalism in the 
1960s at the basic ideological level share many similarities 
with later debates on multiculturalism (e.g. the individual 
vs. the collective; the salience of historically constructed 
identities in the modern world; ethnic identity vs. class 
position), the emphasis on cultural difference, both for and 
against, was less pronounced than in contemporary debates. 
This is probably due to the fact that the cultural differences, 
factual and/or perceived, between Swedish majority and 
minority groups, especially between Finnish-speaking 
Finns and Swedes, fundamentally amounted to linguistic 
differences. The cultural practices that today’s critics of 
multiculturalism usually refer to when counting the social 
and personal ills supposedly propagated by multiculturalism 
(e.g. religious fanaticism, forced marriages, and female 
circumcision) were not really an issue in Sweden in the 
1960s.215 
215 The progressive assimilationists did make some arguments along 
these lines with reference to the Jewish minority but, as the debate as a 
whole centred on labour immigrants, in particular Finnish immigrants, 
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There was some concern among the Social Democrats that 
a number of Finnish immigrants might spread communism. 
However, communism was never conceptualized as a negative 
and essentialist cultural trait of the Finnish group that would 
grow if the Finns were granted some form of ethno-cultural 
recognition. It is also interesting to note that when the limits 
of the multiculturalist freedom of choice principle of the 
1975 immigrant and minority policy came under criticism 
from the turn of the decade in 1980, it was a feminist-based 
critique of the isolated and oppressed position of immigrant 
woman in families from patriarchal cultures, sometimes with 
direct reference to Muslims.216 The mosque as a symbolic 
and organisational focal point of religious fundamentalism 
and other arguments of contemporary anti-Islamism could, 
however, scarcely be employed in earnest in 1960s debates 
because there were hardly any Muslims in Sweden at that 
time and no visible mosques; the first mosque was built in 
1976.217 
Will Kymlicka has also emphasized the difference between 
debates on multiculturalism in Canada in the 1960s and 
1970s and contemporary debates: 
For many people, a major risk of multiculturalism 
is that immigrant groups will invoke the ideology 
of multiculturalism to demand legal protection of 
illiberal  practices such as female genital mutilation 
(FGM), forced arranged marriages,  or honour 
killings. This idea never arose in the initial debates 
and not on the potentially illiberal practices of a well-integrated and 
small minority whose members had suffered at the hands of the Nazis, 
this line of argument did not catch on. See, for example, Michael Wächter, 
‘Varför stöda en auktoritär judendom?’ Arbetaren 2–8.6.1966; Leif Zern, 
‘…och vad gör man sedan med invandrarna?’ Expressen 20.8.1966. 
216 Dahlström, pp. 98–99. 
217 The Nasir Mosque in Gothenburg. 
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in Canada. After all, the white ethnic groups who 
were demanding multiculturalism had been present 
in Canada for several generations, and were typically 
very well-integrated.218
In Australia,  attacks on the idea of multiculturalism 
began in earnest in the 1980s. One of the leading critics 
of multiculturalism was historian Geoffrey Blainey who 
coupled Australian multiculturalism to increasing Asian 
immigration and argued that this particular combination 
would undermine national cohesion.219 Since the advent of 
the ‘War on Terror’ in the early 2000s, Islam and the presence 
of Muslims in Australian society have also been a major issue 
of contestation in debates on multiculturalism in Australia.220 
Debates on multiculturalism or on any other political 
idea are, of course, historically contingent. The idea of 
multiculturalism in the 1960s and 1970s did not carry the 
implications it does today. Contemporary polemics must 
not be projected onto the past, even though past debates and 
political choices effect the present. 
The sixth noteworthy feature of the early history of the 
idea of multiculturalism in Sweden is closely connected 
to the fifth and can be put into one word: Finns. The Finns 
constituted a ‘special group’ historically, politically and 
even de jure as Nordic citizens. Even though the leader of 
the Finnish community, Artturi Similä, was ousted from 
his leadership position at the end of the 1960s due to his 
conceptualization of the Finnish group in Sweden as an 
oppressed minority in need of minority rights, his claims 
218 Will Kymlicka, ‘Marketing Canadian pluralism in the international 
arena’, International Journal 59 (2004), p. 841.
219 Jupp 2007, pp. 109–110. 
220 Andrew Jakubowicz, ‘Political Islam and the Future of Australian 
Mu lt i c u l tura l i sm’,  National  Ident i t i e s  9  (2007) ,  pp.  265–280 .
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did not go unnoticed in either Sweden or Finland. Similä’s 
analogies between Finnish-speaking Finns in Sweden and 
Swedish-speaking Finns in Finland might have led to his 
political downfall, but he pointed out something that could 
not be ignored in the new context of large-scale migration 
from Finland to Sweden: the fact that Finnish-speaking 
Finns in Sweden almost equalled Swedish-speaking Finns 
in numbers without the former group enjoying any de facto 
group rights of the latter. Furthermore, in the heyday of post-
war Nordism, Finns were conceptualized as Nordic brothers 
of the Swedes, Danes, Norwegians and Icelanders in formal 
intra-Nordic cooperation, which was something that the 
Swedish government had to take into consideration. 
One can also argue that Finnish immigrants, even though 
many of them only spoke Finnish, were very similar in many 
respects to average Swedes of the same generation. Cultural 
difference, without doubt, need not be significant in the 
creation of an ‘other’ who might be prescribed traits that 
condemn him/her to discrimination or worse; although, in 
the context of prospering Nordism during the 1960s and 
1970s, this sort of negative categorization of a fellow Nordic 
nationality was not in any way formally sanctioned by the 
state. The majority of the Finns in Sweden had the reputation 
of being hard-working labourers with modest demands, and 
the demands made in their name by ethnic activists such as 
Artturi Similä were also modest by today’s standards. Similä 
was mostly concerned with the preservation of the Finnish 
identity, primarily emanating from the Finnish language, of 
the Finnish immigrants’ children; that is, Finnish-speaking 
children born in Finland and children born of Finnish-
speaking parents in Sweden. Clearly, this can be regarded 
as a radical and potentially dangerous idea from a social 
democratic perspective; Swedish-speaking Finns in Finland 
with their own institutional life and dominant (within the 
group) centre-right party (i.e. the Swedish People’s Party) 
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again providing a cautionary example of what could happen 
to working-class solidarity in a society with strong emphasis 
on linguistic (ethnic) affiliation. Finnish-speaking immigrants 
thus constituted a special problem for the social democrats.
Finally, the seventh striking aspect of the rise of the idea 
of multiculturalism in Sweden pertains to, again following 
Bloch’s epidemiological analogy, the contagiousness of the 
idea.221 After the resistance of the progressive assimilationists 
had been silenced, the idea of multiculturalism quickly 
established itsel f  as  the conventional  wisdom when 
addressing the issue of ethno-cultural diversity in the 
public sphere. Here, again, it is important to bear in mind 
that immigration into Sweden at that time was perceived 
as being under strict control, and that questions connected 
to the new ethno-cultural diversity of Sweden and the 
management of this diversity were not party-politicized 
to the extent that they are today. Paying lip-service to 
the blessings of diversity and the value of upholding and 
developing non-Swedish ethnic identities was at the time, by 
and large, the politically inconsequential showing of good-
will in a time of great social and cultural change when it 
became somewhat of a norm to question traditional, at least 
‘Swedish’, norms and conventions. The breeding ground for 
the spread of multiculturalism was also favourable after it 
had been established as a progressive, even virtuous, idea; 
after all, Sweden was the land of consensus. The contiuned 
commitment to diversity by the Swedish establishment is 
partly a consequence of the multicultural moment and the 
historical concord on multiculturalism. Questions related to 
ethnic diversity and multiculturalism are, however, no longer 
politically inconsequential. 
221 See p. 30 above. 
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Contributions and future prospects 
By focusing on the idea of multiculturalism, I have been able 
to emphasize the pivotal roles that the idea and the actors 
advancing the idea played in the introduction of official 
multiculturalism in Sweden. I have also identified particular 
historical factors that facilitated the political breakthrough 
of multiculturalism such as the ‘golden age’ of the Swedish 
welfare state, the radicalism of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, the sources and composition of immigration, the 
politicization of science and the scientification of politics and 
the commission system (i.e. the research−policy nexus). 
My main contributions to the research on Sweden’s 
multiculturalist turn are the findings of my comparatively 
under pinned ac tor-centr ic  ana lys is  on  the  idea  of 
multiculturalism in Swedish politics and policy-making. 
I show that the very idea of multiculturalism, as it was 
conceptualized, accepted and promoted by ethnic activists, 
experts, officials and politicians, must be considered to be 
a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the introduction 
of official multiculturalism in Sweden. My point that the 
idea of multiculturalism mattered profoundly in Sweden’s 
multiculturalist turn might seem self-evident or trivial; 
however, in light of the fact that the impact of the idea of 
multiculturalism and the actors who conceived and employed 
it has been unacknowledged or theoretically underplayed 
in previous research is a point that nonetheless must be 
emphasized. 
 Many of the factors I, based on my examination on the 
history of the idea of multiculturalism, highlight as conducive 
to the political breakthrough of multiculturalism have 
been acknowledged although not necessarily meticulously 
investigated and discussed, in previous research; for 
instance, the ‘Finnish factor’ and the ‘expert factor’. Here, my 
131 
contribution is primarily historical; that is, from conceptual, 
comparative, transnational and biographical perspectives, I 
have fleshed out new aspects on previously identified factors 
in the political turn to multiculturalism. 
I argue that the activities of actors not previously 
recognized as political agents, such as ethnic activists, 
experts and officials, were instrumental in the introduction of 
official multiculturalism. I show the intertwined connections 
between the activists, experts and officials and how the 
idea of multiculturalism travelled from public contestation 
to a politically affirmed ideal through social science and 
the Commission of Immigration. Here, I emphasize the 
significance of head secretary Jonas Widgren and put 
forward a biographically underpinned explanation for his 
eager acceptance of the idea of multiculturalism and the 
‘Canadian model’. As I illustrate, this was important as a 
source of inspiration and as a reference point in the political 
advancement of the idea of multiculturalism, but not the 
conceptual source of Swedish multiculturalism. As noted 
above, the emergence of the idea of multiculturalism in 
Sweden did not lack transnational ramifications, which also 
applies to the introduction of official multiculturalism. 
Furthermore, I make the point that the political success of 
the idea of multiculturalism, such as it was, depended upon 
whom the claims-makers were and for whom they made their 
claims, and also the migratory context of the 1970s. All major 
immigrant groups in post-war Sweden were of European 
origin, labour immigration from non-Nordic countries 
had been completely halted in 1972, Finnish immigration 
had markedly subsided by the mid-1970s, immigrants were 
well integrated within the labour market and the political 
potential of the (by far) largest group, the Finns, had been co-
opted by the Social Democratic Party. ‘Finland’ was a factor 
in the political turn to multiculturalism not only at an intra-
state level, as has been noted in the previous research, but at 
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cultural and conceptual levels. The Finns were undoubtedly 
perceived as different, but they were not too different 
and their difference, and also the difference of the other 
European immigrants, could and was conceptualized and 
presented as beneficial. Moreover, new research findings in 
linguistics and in the social sciences emphasize the benefits 
of maintaining the difference that could also facilitate return 
migration, which was deemed important in both Finland and 
Sweden. 
I also highlight Olof Palme’s receptiveness to the idea 
of multiculturalism in contrast to the more traditional 
assimilationist outlook of Tage Erlander and other leading 
social democrats of Erlander’s generation. I furthermore shed 
new light on the multiculturalist position of the Conservative 
party by noting the connection between the Estonian 
community and the party, in particular ethnic (Estonian) 
activist Voldemar Kiviaed. The topic of parties, politicians 
and migration and integration policy has, however, barely 
been scratched in this dissertation project. A monograph 
could, I believe, be written on the Social Democratic Party, 
immigration and the idea of multiculturalism. The dearth 
of studies on how the increasing ethno-cultural diversity 
of Sweden has been discussed and conceptualized by the 
political parties and their leading figures should invite more 
research now that the historical saliency and continued 
relevance of the changes connected to post-war immigration 
are becoming clear for all to see. The history of immigration 
and ethno-cultural diversity should no longer be treated as a 
quaint sub-plot in the history of post-1945 Sweden; it should 
be moved into the historiographical mainstream.
The results of this thesis have not exhausted the need for 
further research on the history of the idea of multiculturalism 
in Sweden that, after its official affirmation in 1975, can be 
explored in all of its conceptual and transnational detail. The 
way in which immigrant groups debated and conceptualized 
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their position in Swedish society after the introduction of 
official multiculturalism is also a subject that can be charted 
and analysed. Historical research with a transnational 
perspective on the question of second-generation Finns 
in Sweden might be especially fruitful. The rise of Finnish 
activism at a local level, such as the school strikes in protest 
against the lack of education in and of Finnish in the 1980s, 
might perhaps provide a starting-point. More information 
on the activities and aspirations of immigrant groups that 
arrived in Sweden after the mid-1970s could further enhance 
our knowledge on ethnic politics in Sweden and on the 
contemporary history of immigration into Sweden. 
From a Swedish perspective, the second-coming of 
the idea of multiculturalism since the late 1980s as an 
international norm is a subject worthy of further research 
both at transnational (e.g.  the history of the idea in 
international organizations and in academia) and national 
levels. The European/Western/global history of the idea of 
multiculturalism remains to be written and, hopefully, the 
findings of this dissertation project will be useful to that 
potential project. Social scientists primarly interested in 
explaining the contemporary divergence in migration and 
integration policy between Sweden and the rest of the Nordic 
countries may also find my research contribution informative. 
The conditionality and contingency of the 
 multicultural moment
As the idea of multiculturalism carried social and political 
implications at odds with prevailing social democratic 
ideology,  the idea needed to be modif ied,  or ‘social 
democratized’, in the policy-making process. Policies put 
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forward by the new immigrant and minority policy were 
tied to existing institutions and the funding of the ethno-
cultural minority organizations became dependent of the 
state. The minorities’ community life was, with the consent 
of the community leadership, formally co-opted into the 
institutional structure of the social democratic welfare state. 
If Canada introduced multiculturalism within a bilingual 
framework in 1971, Sweden introduced multiculturalism 
within a social democratic framework in 1975. The minorities’ 
ethno-cultural difference was recognized, publically endorsed 
as a societal good and given state-funding although, in the 
end, it was a seemingly politically neutralized recognition 
of difference from a social democratic perspective. Minority 
groups’ organizations were incorporated into the social 
democratically controlled corporatist system (with the 
Finnish organizational structure firmly under internal social 
democratic control) and the threat of minority schools, 
especially Finnish minority schools, had evaporated with 
the acceptance of the home language reform as a suitable 
‘compromise’.
Even if official multiculturalism was conditional and 
limited in policy praxis, it still constituted a break from 
traditional Swedish policy as it constituted a 180° turn with 
regard to the publically upheld ideal on ethno-cultural 
diversity. The rejection of homogeneity as a public ideal in 
favour of diversity is a major, if not revolutionary, shift in the 
intellectual history of modern Sweden. This shift changed the 
way in which ethno-cultural minority groups in Sweden were 
perceived, at least formally. ‘Non-Swedes’ were no longer on 
their way to becoming Swedes, but minorities in the making 
whose cultural differences needed to be acknowledged, 
respected and supported. 
The shift also re-opened the field of culturalization or 
ethnification in Swedish politics and public discourse that 
had laid fallow in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
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The ‘othering’ of those not perceived to be Swedish was once 
again a state-sanctioned public ideal, although the rationale 
had been inversed. The ‘non-Swedes’ who then threatened 
the racial purity of the Swedish nation now enriched Swedish 
society with their new cultures. Then, Sweden had been 
conceptualized as fragile and in need of protection from 
alien peoples and cultures; now it was ‘non-Swedes’ and 
their ‘cultures’ that were perceived as brittle and in need of 
shielding from encroaching ‘Swedishness’. A positive position 
on ethno-cultural difference in the name of benevolent 
recognition and progress, together with the continued 
support of increasing ethno-cultural diversity on the basis of 
its stimulating societal effects, seems to be a prevalent legacy 
of the multicultural moment in Swedish politics and public 
discourse. 
In 1965, multiculturalism was a radical idea advanced 
by a handful of ethnic activists. Ten years later it formed 
the ideological basis of Sweden’s new politics on ethnicity 
and, in 1985, Prime Minister Olof Palme claimed that 
the multicultural society was an inevitable revolution. 
It is possible that the post-war demographic changes in 
Sweden’s ethno-cultural make-up were inevitable and even 
revolutionary. However, as evidence by the contextualization 
of Sweden in the contemporary European context of labour 
migration, the intellectual and political ‘revolution’ of 
Sweden’s multicultural moment was not predetermined. 
 The Swedish multicultural moment was undoubtedly 
contingent on Sweden’s recent history and also the country’s 
more distant past. Sweden’s strong economic growth from 
the end of the 1940s to the mid-1970s enabled the realization 
of the people’s home and gave the country one the highest 
living standards in the world. The expansion of the Swedish 
economy also attracted foreign workers to Sweden in 
unprecedented numbers, mainly the descendants of Swedish 
subjects from Finland. This set the historical scene for the 
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advent of Swedish multiculturalism. However, it was a 
small company of dedicated actors, working from a script 
imbued with the need for ethno-cultural recognition, who 
put forward the idea on the public stage and engineered its 
inclusion in Swedish politics. The fact that Sweden, together 
with Canada and Australia, to this day upholds a formal 
commitment to the tenets of multiculturalism developed 
and espoused in the 1960s and 1970s through the agency of a 
handful of activists, experts, officials and politicians, testifies 
to the power of ideas and the agents of change who promote 
them to shape even seemingly inevitable revolutions. 
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